Subject: [ietf-nomcom] Fwd: Call for discussion of draft-dawkins-nomcom-3777-issues-00

From: Danny McPherson <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2008 18:59:49 -0600

On Jul 22, 2008, at 6:13 PM, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
>
> I actually dispute this from a factual view. I joined the IAB in
> 1994, put there by the second NomCom in history, and from the start
> the IAB was complaining about too much admin work...
>
> I think it's probably fairer to say that the community, and NomComs,
> have tended to underestimate the amount of non-technical work that
> falls on the IAB, even with IASA in existence.

I think that's a fair point and tend to agree.

> Personally I'd be worried if we changed this, because surely we want
> people in the IAB who have strong technical roots. But the NomCom
> surely needs to be aware of the IAB's real workload.

Indeed, and as you noted above, and certainly with what I've
learned over the past two years, there's considerably more work
that happens on the back end of the IAB that many folks don't see.
Whether folks believe this falls within their definition of  
"architecture"
or not can certainly be discussed, but IMO, it's product certainly has
architectural implications, albeit often not "sexy" ones...

> I think there is a point missing here, something like
>
>  o  The confirming body also has role of satisfying itself that
>     the NomCom has followed a fair and sufficient procedure in
>     preparing the slate and that the nominees meet the requirements.
>     However, this does not require the confirming body to repeat
>     the work of the NomCom and in particular it is not the role of
>     the confirming body to evaluate alternative candidates.

I agree with the alternative candidates bit.  However, isn't it
the role of the advisor, each NomCom member, and all the
liaisons to ensure the NomCom has followed "a fair and
sufficient procedure"?  The reality is, it's very difficult for the
confirming body to know if the procedure was followed when
all they have is the output of the process, and the checks
are in place within the NomCom itself to ensure that's the
case.

As a matter of fact, I think this is one of the places where
contention arises between the NomCom and confirming body.
It's reasonable for a confirming body to say that you're not going
to confirm a candidate, but if the confirming body attempts to
assess the integrity of the process execution within the NomCom,
something for which it has very little insight, the members of the
NomCom that have just devoted a considerable amount of
resources to the tasks of putting candidates forward for
confirmation feel their integrity is being question, and that's not
a good thing.

>>  o  Although [RFC3777] states that confirming body deliberations are
>>     under the same requirements for confidentiality as the NomCom
>>     itself, recent experience shows that NomComs and confirming  
>> bodies
>>     can, and do, disagree on how much information the NomCom should
>>     share with confirming bodies.
>
> Let me stick my neck out and suggest that it is reasonable for
> the confirming body to ask for CV information about candidates.
> I'm far from convinced that other items in the IAB's standing
> request at http://www.iab.org/documents/docs/2003-07-23-nomcom.html
> are reasonable. The CV is useful when the confirming body has never
> heard of the candidate; the other items go beyond what is needed
> to check that fair and sufficient procedure was followed.

I believe that could use a bit of an update as well, although having
been on both sides of the process, I'm not sure where to start.

> But I think it is necessary to trust the confirming bodies to
> respect the confidentiality rules; so clarifying to candidates
> that their information may be shared with the confirming body
> seems to be necessary in any case. This should be made clear
> in the rules, I think.

Agreed, and at least by the process, which is something I know
Joel, Olaf and all are planning to discuss before the questionnaires
go out this year.  That is, provide a clear demarcation for what
will and will NOT be shared outside of the NomCom itself, and
what may be provided to the relevant confirming body during the
confirmation process.

> I believe we should state clearly that it's OK to confirm a partial
> slate if that is what the confirming body thinks is the best next  
> step.
> As for the question of the NomCom thinks it's OK for two candidates
> to serve together and the confirming body has doubts, I believe
> that the correct answer is for the confirming body to ask "Did you
> consider this? If not, please do so". And I don't see anything
> in the present rules that forbid that.

But if the NomCom did consider this and has a difference of
opinion with the confirming body?  The only tool the confirming
body has is a go/no go on a candidate.  There should certainly
be a dialog on these sorts of things if additional information within
the confirming body changes any of this. I agree that candidates
should be able to be progressed individually, although any
contentious inter-dependencies that might arise should be
able to be identified as the slates should be provided to the
confirming body as a whole - I think.

-danny

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---

From: Eric Rosen <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2008 10:43:03 -0400

I think the  root problem here is  that there is ambiguity as  to just which
group is the "appointing authority".

One  point of  view which  is sometimes  discussed is  that the  IAB  is the
appointing authority, and the purpose of  the NomCom is to advise and report
to the  IAB.  If this is  the model, then the  IAB would be  well within its
rights to make any modifications it wants to the candidate slate recommended
by NomCom.  They would even have the right to ignore it entirely.

Another  point of  view, more  often expressed,  is that  the NomCom  is the
appointing authority, and the IAB's job  is simply to verify that the NomCom
has not been grossly incompetent and  that the NomCom members have not acted
unethically.   If this  is the  model, then  one can  understand  why NomCom
members feel attacked if the IAB doesn't endorse their slate of candidates.

I'm not  sure that any other  model has been articulated.   However, I think
the first step to eliminating the  IAB/NomCom conflict is to either make one
of these models explicit, or to articulate and defend a different model.

I think  that the issue  of what information  the IAB is allowed  to request
from  the  NomCom is  really  a second-order  issue,  and  cannot really  be
resolved unless the lines of authority are made clear.

---

From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2008 09:54:37 +1200

Eric,

On 2008-07-26 02:43, Eric Rosen wrote:
> to the  IAB.  

Wow. I can't iamagine how to derive this interpretation from
"a complete specification of the process by which members of the
IAB and IESG are selected, confirmed, and recalled" when it's
quite clear from the rules that the NomCom selects and the
confirming body confirms. In fact, given how the process works,
I don't believe there actually is a single "appointing authority".

If there's a phrase in 3777 that confuses me, it's "advice and
consent model", which is fuzzier than the words "select" and
"confirm".

   Brian

---

From: James Galvin <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2008 14:43:42 +0100

-- On Saturday, July 26, 2008 9:54 AM +1200 Brian E Carpenter 
<[email-masked]> wrote regarding Re: [ietf-nomcom] 
Fwd: Call for discussion	of	draft-dawkins-nomcom-3777-issues-00 --

> > I think the  root problem here is  that there is ambiguity as
> > to just which group is the "appointing authority".
> >
> > One  point of  view which  is sometimes  discussed is  that the
> > IAB  is the appointing authority, and the purpose of  the
> > NomCom is to advise and report to the  IAB.
>

Speaking both personally and as editor of the document, it is the 
use of the phrase "advice and consent" that expressly gives the 
nomination and appointment responsibility to the NOMCOM, while the 
confirmation body is responsible for confirmation only.

Speaking only as editor, the use of the phrase and thus the model 
of "advice and consent" was carefully chosen, although frankly I 
don't think it quite got the discussion it probably deserved at the 
time.  I can not claim credit for introducing it.  By my 
recollection that honor goes to Marshall Rose, but I liked it as 
soon as he proposed it.

I did some quick research and found a recent document that provides 
a very readable description of the model in the context of the US 
Constitution and US Presidential nominations:

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/AmericanFoundingandHistory/wm800.cfm>

Speaking personally, one thing that always stood out for me as a 
significant difference between the model as I have always known it 
and as it used within the IETF, is that in the US the confirmation 
process is public.  The US Senate gets to "interview" the nominee 
before deciding whether it agrees with the President's selection or 
not.  In the IETF the confirmation process is neither public nor 
does the confirming body have formal or official access to the 
nominee.

The issue of privacy and it's boundaries is something that should 
be revisited, but I'll separate my views on that from this message.

Jim

---

From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2008 02:56:37 +1200

Jim,

On 2008-07-28 01:43, James Galvin wrote:
> <[email-masked]> wrote regarding Re: [ietf-nomcom] Fwd:
> Call for discussion    of    draft-dawkins-nomcom-3777-issues-00 --
> 
> Speaking both personally and as editor of the document, it is the use of
> the phrase "advice and consent" that expressly gives the nomination and
> appointment responsibility to the NOMCOM, while the confirmation body is
> responsible for confirmation only.

I absolutely agree that the text following the phrase
    7. Unless otherwise specified, the advice and consent model is used
       throughout the process.  This model is characterized as follows.
is completely clear about this, but the phrase itself isn't quite as
self-defining to me as you find it. I guess I'm confused because of
the British model where the government "advises" the monarch, who had
darn well better consent (actually "assent") if s/he wants to keep
the job. Anyway, this is a detail of phrasing. I believe that you and
I agree on the intent.

     Brian
> 
> Speaking only as editor, the use of the phrase and thus the model of
> "advice and consent" was carefully chosen, although frankly I don't
> think it quite got the discussion it probably deserved at the time.  I
> can not claim credit for introducing it.  By my recollection that honor
> goes to Marshall Rose, but I liked it as soon as he proposed it.
> 
> I did some quick research and found a recent document that provides a
> very readable description of the model in the context of the US
> significant difference between the model as I have always known it and
> as it used within the IETF, is that in the US the confirmation process
> is public.  The US Senate gets to "interview" the nominee before
> deciding whether it agrees with the President's selection or not.  In
> the IETF the confirmation process is neither public nor does the
> confirming body have formal or official access to the nominee.
> 
> The issue of privacy and it's boundaries is something that should be
> revisited, but I'll separate my views on that from this message.
> 
> Jim
> 
>

---

From: Dave Crocker <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2008 21:39:13 +0100

Brian E Carpenter wrote:
>     but the phrase itself isn't quite as
> the job. 

Brian,

You are citing a circumstance based on a polite fiction as causing confusion in 
the current circumstance?

Presumably our own document's use of the phrase is intended as more than a 
polite fiction.  Consequently, the phrase does seem pretty simple and self-defining.

d/

-- 

   Dave Crocker
   Brandenburg InternetWorking
   bbiw.net
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---

From: Eric Rosen <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2008 17:19:20 -0400

> expressly  gives  the nomination  and  appointment  responsibility to  the
> NOMCOM, while the confirmation body is responsible for confirmation only.

Perhaps the next step then is to discuss valid reasons for non-confirmation.

In the  US government, where the  president is the  appointing authority and
the  Senate confirms (provides  "advice and  consent"), confirmation  may be
withheld  for  any reason  whatsoever,  including  overtly political  and/or
personal reasons.  The Senate may  demand any type of documentation it cares
to demand,  and the president may refuse  to hand it over,  leading to court
fights,  extended  deadlocks,  positions  that stay  unfilled  for  extended
periods of time,  or positions that stay filled  by temporary appointees for
extended periods of time.

In fact,  the chairman of  a Senate committee  can force the rejection  of a
candidate  by letting  it be  known that  he will  not put  the confirmation
discussion  on the committee  agenda.  This  can derail  a candidacy  for no
reason at all other than the  fact that the committee chair doesn't like the
candidate.  Imagine  if the chairman  of the IAB  simply refused to  allow a
discussion of Nomcom slate on the  IAB agenda if the slate contained certain
candidates!

This is  the "advice and consent"  model has it  has evolved in the  US.  It
doesn't quite seem right for the IETF.

The authors of the US constitution probably had in mind a more collegial and
collaborative process in which  all appointees would have consensus support,
but they didn't have very good foresight about the way the political process
would develop in the US.

---

From: "Jeffrey A. Williams" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2008 17:41:53 -0700

Jim and all,

  Frankly the noncom members of which I am only one, should
be by their vote, determining whom represents them.  Appointing
a person doesn't reflect a good democratic standard or process.
Ergo, I am not in favor of this proposed policy accordingly.

> be revisited, but I'll separate my views on that from this message.

Regards,

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---

From: "Jeffrey A. Williams" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2008 18:00:59 -0700

Eric and all,

  Well argued!  "Advise and Consent" for any body is a very
dangerous notion unless what exactly such actually and specifically
requires or is defined.

Regards,

---

From: SM <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2008 16:32:29 -0700

>confirmation body is responsible for confirmation only.

The advise and confirm (or consent) model is used in used in several 
countries.  I don't think that the model is being questioned.  The 
problem is how can one consent without having the details to make an 
informed decision.  If the confirming body doesn't have the 
information, then they will have to duplicate the NomCom work to get it.

Regards,
-sm

---

From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2008 19:04:17 +1200

On 2008-07-28 11:32, SM wrote:
>> Speaking both personally and as editor of the document, it is the use
>> of the phrase "advice and consent" that expressly gives the nomination
>> and appointment responsibility to the NOMCOM, while the confirmation
>> body is responsible for confirmation only.
> 
> informed decision.  If the confirming body doesn't have the information,
> then they will have to duplicate the NomCom work to get it.

> Perhaps the next step then is to discuss valid reasons for non-confirmation.

If (for example) the only valid reason for non-confirmation
was a reasonable belief by the confirming body that the NomCom
had used an unfair process or shown bias, then the information
they would need is feedback from their liaison about the NomCom's
process.

If we extend the valid reasons for non-confirmation beyond that, they
would need correspondingly more info.

What I observe is that the two confirming bodies appear to take
very different views of the answer to Eric's point.

   Brian

---

From: Lakshminath Dondeti <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2008 01:09:39 -0700

> very different views of the answer to Eric's point.

FWIW, there are three confirming bodies in the context of the nomcom 
process, the IESG, the IAB and the ISOC BoT.

regards,
Lakshminath

---

From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2008 20:19:58 +1200

> On 7/28/2008 12:04 AM, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
...
> process, the IESG, the IAB and the ISOC BoT.

Oh yes, that's correct, but the IESG one is a bit of a special case.

    Brian

---

From: Ralph Droms <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2008 04:35:10 -0400

> Oh yes, that's correct, but the IESG one is a bit of a special case.

How so?   Something special aside from not being formalized in RFC 3777?

>    Brian

- Ralph

---

From: James Galvin <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2008 10:41:11 +0100

Speaking personally:

-- On Sunday, July 27, 2008 5:19 PM -0400 Eric Rosen 
<[email-masked]> wrote regarding Re: [ietf-nomcom] Fwd: Call for 
discussion of draft-dawkins-nomcom-3777-issues-00 --

> Perhaps the next step then is to discuss valid reasons for

People say this but I'm not convinced.  The issue in my opinion is 
privacy.

Privacy has always been sacrosanct to the IETF NOMCOM process. 
There's this not very tall wall around everything about the NOMCOM 
itself and the confirming bodies.

The NOMCOM is permitted to do whatever it wants for whatever reason 
it wants and we are all supposed to trust it (within the constraint 
that it acts in the best interests of the IETF).  That's the model. 
More importantly, that is the foundation for the model.

Because of the privacy policy neither the NOMCOM nor the confirming 
body needs to explain itself.  That's my opinion.

This implicitly limits the actions of the confirming body.  The 
document says they "review" the candidates, using whatever 
information they can, but they are not guaranteed anything in 
particular.

The "advice and consent" model is supposed to be a collegial one. 
Clearly it breaks down when there is any degree of animosity 
between the parties or when the NOMCOM stands behind the issue of 
privacy in the extreme.

I would argue that if we allow for a little less privacy or perhaps 
more judgment on the part of the NOMCOM when communicating with the 
confirming bodies, some of our issues would be addressed.  In 
particular, we would be less likely to find ourselves left with the 
"nuclear option" on the part of the confirming bodies, which I 
would argue is their only effective option in the absence of a 
collegial discussion between the confirming body and the NOMCOM.

I happen to think this model is a good one for the IETF because the 
NOMCOM is the only means by which the community can change its 
leadership.  The NOMCOM has all the leverage, as it should.  It's 
supposed to take its primary guidance from the community, not the 
existing leadership.  In my opinion, the role of the existing 
leadership in its role as a confirming body is really just to make 
sure that the NOMCOM did its job, i.e., followed the process.  It 
shouldn't be second guessing actual choices except to the extent 
that all possible choices were considered.

Alternatively, we could also consider if the model itself needs to 
be revisited.

Jim

---

From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2008 21:46:32 +1200

> How so?   Something special aside from not being formalized in RFC 3777?

Well, it's only one slot per year (IAOC for those who don't know)
and with a very different requirements profile from all the others.
However, that doesn't mean that the basic issues we're discussing
here should be different.

To get back to that, my personal preference is that the "valid
reasons for non-confirmation" should be largely limited to
matters of correct and fair process, which may go as far as
questioning whether the NomCom considered questions like
compatibility between individuals, but really should not
include full review of nominees' suitability as individuals
or whether A or B is the better candidate. That part is NomCom's
job IMHO.

    Brian

---

From: Lakshminath Dondeti <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2008 03:33:29 -0700

> or whether A or B is the better candidate. That part is NomCom's

Compatibility is just one of the issues.  A and B may not be as 
compatible as we'd like, but the other option C may have too many 
skeletons in the closet.  If the people providing the feedback 
(including people from the confirmation bodies) did include notes about 
compatibility then the question goes back to "has the nomcom done its 
job?"  The liaison should have that answer handy.

I sometimes wonder whether the whole confirmation drama has to do with a 
process similar to DISCUSSes, but worse.  One or more members of a 
confirmation body may have the feeling that the nomcom has not 
considered their feedback and start raising issues during confirmation. 
  The fact is the nomcoms consider their feedback and that from other 
members of the community as well.

If we let the confirmation bodies play too much of a role, we'll 
essentially reduce the model to self-selection of I* by I*.

regards,
Lakshminath

---

From: SM <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2008 17:34:51 -0700

>they would need is feedback from their liaison about the NomCom's

If we take a view that it's about checks and balances, then the 
confirming body is there not only to see that the process has been 
followed but also to refuse confirmation if the body has strong 
reservations against the candidate.  If I am not mistaken, there is 
the possibility of a process deadlock if the two bodies cannot come 
to an agreement.

Regards,
-sm

---

From: SM <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2008 17:45:44 -0700

At 02:41 AM 7/28/2008, James Galvin wrote:
>Clearly it breaks down when there is any degree of animosity between 
>the parties or when the NOMCOM stands behind the issue of privacy in 
>the extreme.

The "advise and consent" model is not a collegial one.  If it was, 
then there would be one body instead of two.

>"nuclear option" on the part of the confirming bodies, which I would 
>argue is their only effective option in the absence of a collegial 
>discussion between the confirming body and the NOMCOM.

There are several issues.  The most important one is whether there is 
a clear definition of the two bodies.  The words assent, consent and 
confirm have been used during this discussion.  They can mean 
different things.  By having a collegial discussion, you are putting 
the two bodies on the same footing.  We have see the problems that 
can arise from that.

>that all possible choices were considered.

For argument's sake, let's assume that NomCom followed the process 
and proposed the wrong candidate.  Should the confirming body confirm 
the candidate or not?

Regards,
-sm

---

From: Lakshminath Dondeti <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2008 01:39:30 -0700

On 7/28/2008 5:45 PM, SM wrote:
> The "advise and consent" model is not a collegial one.  If it was, then 
> there would be one body instead of two.
> 
> There are several issues.  The most important one is whether there is a 
> clear definition of the two bodies.  The words assent, consent and 
> confirm have been used during this discussion.  They can mean different 
> things.  By having a collegial discussion, you are putting the two 
> bodies on the same footing.  We have see the problems that can arise 
> from that.
> 
>> shouldn't be second guessing actual choices except to the extent that 
>> all possible choices were considered.
> 
> For argument's sake, let's assume that NomCom followed the process and 
> proposed the wrong candidate.  Should the confirming body confirm the 
> candidate or not?

It is an interesting exercise to think about what is "wrong" with a 
candidate.  Suppose a majority or for that matter the entire 
confirmation body thinks that a particular candidate is "wrong" for the 
position, but say that they also know from their liaison that the 
process was followed and the opinions of the confirmation body were 
taken into account (let's assume that they all provided their opinions 
on the said candidate to the nomcom) by the nomcom during the selection 
process.

The question is "Should the confirming body confirm the candidate or not?"

Lakshminath

---

From: SM <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2008 02:49:29 -0700

Hi Lakshminath,
At 01:39 AM 7/29/2008, Lakshminath Dondeti wrote:
>confirmation body thinks that a particular candidate is "wrong" for 
>the position, but say that they also know from their liaison that 
>the process was followed and the opinions of the confirmation body 
>were taken into account (let's assume that they all provided their 
>opinions on the said candidate to the nomcom) by the nomcom during 
>the selection process.

If I understood what you said correctly, NomCom had a compelling 
reason to select that candidate despite the entire confirming body 
being against him/her.  Given that NomCom is the nearest thing we 
have for the community to choose their "leaders", it would be 
difficult for the confirming body to turn down the candidate openly.

>The question is "Should the confirming body confirm the candidate or not?"

Most of us might agree that the confirming body is not there to 
rubber-stamp the decision of NomCom.  If the process is open, then my 
answer would be that the confirming body can do it.  If it's not, 
then what we have is the confirming body picking and choosing which 
candidate is eligible for attaining that higher state of enlightment 
without having to face any pressure from the community.

Regards,
-sm

---

From: James M Galvin <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2008 11:16:22 +0100

-- On Monday, July 28, 2008 5:34 PM -0700 SM <[email-masked]> 
wrote regarding Re: [ietf-nomcom] Fwd: Call for discussion	of 
	draft-dawkins-nomcom-3777-issues-00 --

> > they would need is feedback from their liaison about the
> > NomCom's process.
>
> confirming body is there not only to see that the process has
> been followed but also to refuse confirmation if the body has
> strong reservations against the candidate.  If I am not mistaken,
> there is the possibility of a process deadlock if the two bodies
> cannot come to an agreement.

The process is not deadlocked insofar as there is a dispute 
resolution process that is deterministic.

For example, I believe the right thing happened this past NOMCOM 
cycle.  The confirming body is not supposed to redo the work of the 
NOMCOM but if it firmly does not agree with the decision of the 
NOMCOM, for whatever reason, then a dispute may exist that can only 
be resolved with an arbiter.  Similarly, the NOMCOM is not 
obligated to change its mind just because the confirming body does 
not agree with it.

Because of the privacy policy, neither the NOMCOM nor the 
confirming body need to explain themselves fully to each other or 
the community.  Both are well within their rights to stand behind 
their decision and force the use of arbiter to resolve any 
difference.  Of course, they do need to explain themselves fully to 
the arbiter.

I also believe the burden is on the confirming body to justify the 
rejection of the nominee.  The structure of the model is such that 
all leverage rests with the NOMCOM, which is accountable only to 
the IETF community.  The confirming bodies have additional 
responsibilities that may bias their decision and this can not be 
ignored.

Jim

---

From: Eric Rosen <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2008 09:30:44 -0400

> resolution process that is deterministic.

Does  this mean  it could  be left  up to  the arbiter  to decide  whether a
particular  decision  to not  confirm  a  particular  candidate is  a  valid
decision?

We didn't  face a deadlock like  this, just a deadlock  over whether certain
information needed to be turned over.

By the way,  if one settles on a  rule stating that the IAB  has very narrow
grounds for rejecting  a candidate, the question will come  up as to whether
the Nomcom really can be trusted  to do a competent job of selection.  Given
the  way  Nomcom  itself is  selected,  I'm  not  sure  there is  that  much
confidence in it.

---

From: Danny McPherson <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2008 08:17:45 -0600

> particular  decision  to not  confirm  a  particular  candidate is   

Right, that was going to be my question, and I have to
believe the answer is NO.

> information needed to be turned over.

Yes.

> the  way  Nomcom  itself is  selected,  I'm  not  sure  there is   

I think the crux of the issue is still with precisely what  
"confirmation"
entails.  Until we answer that, we're not going to move past this
issue.

-danny

---

From: James Galvin <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2008 15:02:36 +0100

-- On Tuesday, July 29, 2008 9:30 AM -0400 Eric Rosen 
<[email-masked]> wrote regarding Re: [ietf-nomcom] Fwd: Call for 
discussion of	draft-dawkins-nomcom-3777-issues-00 --

> Does  this mean  it could  be left  up to  the arbiter  to decide
> whether a particular  decision  to not  confirm  a  particular
> candidate is  a  valid decision?

If it comes to that, yes.

> ... the question will
> come  up as to whether the Nomcom really can be trusted  to do a
> competent job of selection.  Given the  way  Nomcom  itself is
> selected,  I'm  not  sure  there is  that  much confidence in it.

There is always the question of where you want to place the most 
trust and equally the most confidence.

I agree that choosing the NOMCOM from a self-selected set of 
volunteers is imperfect, but I'm not prepared to say it's flawed. 
Even so, as long as we're talking about potential changes, do you 
have a suggestion for what we might change it to?

Jim

---

From: SM <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2008 08:06:44 -0700

>resolution process that is deterministic.

Isn't the dispute resolution process about the process itself?

>be resolved with an arbiter.  Similarly, the NOMCOM is not obligated 
>to change its mind just because the confirming body does not agree with it.

The dispute that happened this past NomCom cycle was about the 
process.  If NomCom does not change its mind, then how does it get 
the confirming body to confirm the candidate it is strongly opposed to?

Regards,
-sm

---

From: Lakshminath Dondeti <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2008 09:22:44 -0700

> particular  decision  to not  confirm  a  particular  candidate is  a  valid

My understanding is that the dispute resolution process is to resolve 
process disagreements.  It is plausible, I think, to frame 
non-confirmation of one or more candidates as a process question (the 
arbiter may not even need to know the name of the candidate).  However, 
I am not sure whether it is always possible to frame the disagreement as 
a process question.  I haven't given it enough thought.

> the Nomcom really can be trusted  to do a competent job of selection.  

The choice is between the nomcom process (plus a better definition of 
what confirmation means), self-selection of I*, direct or indirect (WG 
chairs) voting.

regards,
Lakshminath

> Given

---

From: "Jeffrey A. Williams" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2008 12:55:02 -0700

Eric and all,

  I have been following along here.  Seems to me this argument
is a circular one with no resolution unless the members themselves
vote on issues/proposals and whichever proposal or issue resolution
gains the most votes, prevails one person, one vote.

Regards,

---

From: James Galvin <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2008 14:44:12 +0100

-- On Tuesday, July 29, 2008 8:06 AM -0700 SM <[email-masked]> 
wrote regarding Re: [ietf-nomcom] Fwd: Call for discussion	of 
draft-dawkins-nomcom-3777-issues-00 --

> Isn't the dispute resolution process about the process itself?

No, it is not limited in that way (speaking personally).

> If NomCom does not change its mind, then how does it
> get the confirming body to confirm the candidate it is strongly
> opposed to?

How does either side get the other side to see it's side of the 
position?

This again, gets to the privacy issue I keep raising.  If the two 
sides can not communicate effectively, there is no path for 
resolution within the "ordinary" process.  The only option is the 
dispute resolution process.

I think we need provide a way for the two parties to communicate 
better about why their choice is the one they want.  That still 
only leaves the dispute process but at least we have provided a 
path for a possible resolution.

I still firmly believe the NOMCOM has the leverage in this process. 
If the confirming body disagrees the burden is on it to state and 
support its position effectively.  I would like to see us document 
this.  My model is that the NOMCOM itself is where the most trust 
and confidence lies.

Now, if we want to consider not trusting the NOMCOM itself, that's 
a wholly different issue to consider.

Jim

---

From: Lakshminath Dondeti <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2008 06:55:33 -0700

On 7/31/2008 6:44 AM, James Galvin wrote:
> 
> 
> -- On Tuesday, July 29, 2008 8:06 AM -0700 SM <[email-masked]> wrote 
> regarding Re: [ietf-nomcom] Fwd: Call for discussion    of 

Hi Jim,

I seem to not able to come to that conclusion from my reading(s) of the 
RFC.  Could you point me to any specific text that might be interpreted 
to say this?  (I am not challenging, just trying to focus on that part 
to understand better).  I am using the word process a bit loosely; for 
instance I understand that dispute resolution applies to evaluate 
eligibility of volunteers and effectiveness or correctness of Chair's 
activities, but not for selecting candidates. So an arbiter can declare 
that yes, this volunteer is eligible or the chair needs to be replaced 
but not select candidate A instead of B.

> How does either side get the other side to see it's side of the position?
> 
> This again, gets to the privacy issue I keep raising.  If the two sides 
> can not communicate effectively, there is no path for resolution within 
> the "ordinary" process.  The only option is the dispute resolution process.
> 
> I think we need provide a way for the two parties to communicate better 
> about why their choice is the one they want.  That still only leaves the 
> dispute process but at least we have provided a path for a possible 
> resolution.
> 
> I still firmly believe the NOMCOM has the leverage in this process. If 
> the confirming body disagrees the burden is on it to state and support 
> its position effectively.  I would like to see us document this.  My 
> model is that the NOMCOM itself is where the most trust and confidence 
> lies.

I agree.

> 
> Now, if we want to consider not trusting the NOMCOM itself, that's a 
> wholly different issue to consider.

Indeed.  If there is a quorum along these lines, we should have that 
discussion rather than let it simmer on.

regards,
Lakshminath

---

From: James Galvin <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2008 15:03:44 +0100

-- On Tuesday, July 29, 2008 9:22 AM -0700 Lakshminath Dondeti 
<[email-masked]> wrote regarding Re: [ietf-nomcom] Fwd: Call 
for discussion	of	draft-dawkins-nomcom-3777-issues-00 --

> My understanding is that the dispute resolution process is to
> resolve process disagreements.

Speaking as editor:

I went through the document and checked carefully.

There is a sentence in Section 8 Changes from RFC2727 where it 
actually states that the dispute resolution process was added to 
address process concerns.

I believe there is an ambiguity though, because all references to 
the dispute resolution process do not limit the usage of the 
process to only process concerns.

I did some research in the old archives and I found where back in 
November 2002 Brian Carpenter suggested changing these words in the 
beginning of Section 6 Dispute Resolution Process:

   The dispute resolution process described here is to be used as
   indicated elsewhere in this document.  Its applicability in other
   circumstances is beyond the scope of this document.

To the following:

   The dispute resolution process described here is to be used as
   indicated elsewhere in this document, or otherwise as needed.

The old archives are not incorporating into the IETF archive yet so 
you can only see this message here:

<http://lists.elistx.com/archives/ietf-nomcom/200211/msg00014.html>

This suggestion was in the context of discussing issues over 
volunteer selection.  The suggestion had no resolution or comment. 
However, perhaps we are back here again, for different reasons, and 
this is something we should consider.

The real point here is that I've said personally a few times that 
the dispute resolution process was for more than just process but 
apparently I was wrong.  Guess I was remembering my own preference 
more clearly than what was in the document.

Sorry about that,

Jim

---

From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 01 Aug 2008 03:04:08 +1200

On 2008-08-01 02:03, James Galvin wrote:
> <[email-masked]> wrote regarding Re: [ietf-nomcom] Fwd: Call for
> There is a sentence in Section 8 Changes from RFC2727 where it actually
> states that the dispute resolution process was added to address process
> concerns.
> 
> I believe there is an ambiguity though, because all references to the
> dispute resolution process do not limit the usage of the process to only
> process concerns.
> 

I'm pretty sure I made that suggestion because I'd become aware
that the RFC2026 appeal procedure is defined in a quite limited
way, but the IESG and IAB have always been prepared to consider
appeals against any kind of decision. So it would seem reasonable
to have similar flexibility in the NomCom case.  I have no memory
of the change wasn't made, but I'd advocate the same change today.

This issue seems to have got lost - it was discussed shortly
before IETF55 but is not mentioned in the draft minutes from IETF55.
For some reason, the session is not covered in the IETF55
proceedings.

    Brian

> 
> The old archives are not incorporating into the IETF archive yet so you
> can only see this message here:
> 
> This suggestion was in the context of discussing issues over volunteer
> selection.  The suggestion had no resolution or comment. However,
> perhaps we are back here again, for different reasons, and this is
> something we should consider.
> 
> 
> The real point here is that I've said personally a few times that the
> dispute resolution process was for more than just process but apparently
> I was wrong.  Guess I was remembering my own preference more clearly
> than what was in the document.
> 
> Sorry about that,
> 
> Jim
>

---

From: Lakshminath Dondeti <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2008 08:17:51 -0700

> of the change wasn't made, but I'd advocate the same change today.

I would like to see the text proposal.  There are some differences 
already in the nomcom dispute resolution process in that there is a 
single arbiter, appointed temporarily for the purpose, and his or her 
decision is final and binding.  I would be uncomfortable if the arbiter 
can for instance can pick an I* member.  But, I have to think about it 
some more.

regards,
Lakshminath

---

From: "Jeffrey A. Williams" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2008 18:52:37 -0700

Jim and all,

  Speaking for myself only here, after several reviews I also
concluded that there is much ambiguity in throughout this RFC,
not only in the process resolution section, Section 8 as Jim
IMO rightly observed.  This RFC needs allot of revision
IMHO.

Regards,