Subject: draft-klensin-iaoc-member-01 (was: Re: I-D Action: draft-hardie-iaoc-iab-update-00.txt)

From: John C Klensin <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2016 23:01:55 -0500

Hi.

Largely in response to the call from Andrew and others to post
an actual I-D with an alternate proposal, I've just posted
draft-klensin-iaoc-member-01.  Note that this is a -01 version
of one of the proposals, referred to in a few postings, to
reform the IAOC membership (and the IAB and IETF Chair roles in
it) a few years ago.   It differs from the earlier version in
several respects, but the most important one is that it contains
considerable discussion and rationale for what is being
proposed, probably saving readers of this list some rather long
email messages from me.

A few things it does not address, or makes proposals about, that
are different from what I think have been trends on the list are
worth calling out:

--On Wednesday, February 03, 2016 15:30 +1300 Brian E Carpenter
<[email-masked]> wrote:

> I think the IETF Chair slot is a different matter. Yes, the
> IETF Chair is also the IESG Chair, but I don't believe s/he is
> in the IAOC on behalf of the IESG. On the contrary, it's on
> behalf of the IETF. I think it's exactly right that the IETF
> Chair votes in the IAOC, because nobody else has the same
> overview, and also because I believe that any IETF Chair who
> did not closely track the IAOC's business would be
> irresponsible.

I believe most of the reasoning above but not the conclusion.
I do think that, under normal circumstances, the IETF Chair
would be the right appointee from the IESG.   However, I think
that unusual circumstances might arise -- that someone else
might be a better choice or that an IETF Chair might be faced
with a choice of doing a good job on a few things or a bad job
on many or that a Nomcom might look at someone and say "really
good IETF Chair material but a bad candidate for the IAOC" --
and that it is more sensible to give the IESG the discretion to
sort that out.  As far as "on behalf of the IETF", that is why
the Nomcom selects several IAOC members and there are proposals
floating around to increase that number or percentage.     The
IESG (and, in particular, the IETF Chair) are likely to have
some special insights but, unless those can be effectively
communicated and the rest of the IAOC persuaded, we are talking,
not about better representation of positions but about
concentration of power (comments about "kings" incorporated by
reference).

Note that the draft contains appendices that discuss other
changes it doesn't make, either because I (and my reading of at
least parts of the list discussion) believe they would be bad
ideas or because they lie outside the scope of the document as
now defined.  The most important of those is the question of
whether we have reached the point that we should partially or
completely separate the membership of the IAOC from the Trustees
of the IETF Trust.  Comments in Appendix A.2 of the new I-D
address that issue to some extent.

   best,
     john

---

From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2016 13:05:44 +1300

Broadly, I am sympathetic to John's draft. That said, I will
argue a bit more on one point.
On 13/02/2016 17:01, John C Klensin wrote:
> would be the right appointee from the IESG.

And that statement is one I can agree with. My point is a bit
more subtle though. At one point I found myself occupying three
jobs simultaneously:
1. IETF Chair
2. IESG Chair
3. General Area Director
(Gory details at https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-carpenter-ietf-chair-tasks)

The question is, is the IETF Chair in the IAOC as "IETF Chair",
"IESG Chair", or both? John's analysis is quite right as far as the
IESG Chair is concerned. For example, consider the IAOC's job of
overseeing the IAD's job of ensuring that tools such as the tracker
are in good shape. IESG input there is essential, but it could be
conveyed by any Area Director. However, for some other matters,
especially policy matters handled by the Trust, the IESG has no
special role - they are community matters, where ultimately it's
the IETF Chair who calls consensus.

So I see a case for the IETF Chair being in the IAOC ex officio as
today, and that is *orthogonal* to the question of an IESG liaison.

    Brian

> However, I think

---

From: Michael StJohns <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2016 21:53:22 -0500

On 2/15/2016 7:05 PM, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
> today, and that is*orthogonal*  to the question of an IESG liaison.

Hi Brian -

I think your analysis is pretty on target.  Given the above and the 
discussion on the IAB chair I would probably do this:

Have the IAOC consist of

o The IETF Chair (ex-officio)
o One member of the IESG selected by and from its membership for a 1 or 
2 year term
o One member of the IAB selected by and from its membership for a 1 or 2 
year term
o One member of the ISOC BOT selected by and from its membership for a 
minimum 2 year term with an option to extend year to year.
o Four members selected by the Nomcom for 2 year terms - confirmed by 
both the IAB and IESG (alternately 3 or 6 members with three year terms)
o The ISOC BOT Chair and the IAB Chair as observers if they aren't 
otherwise appointed.

The term lengths for the IAB and IESG would be variable to allow 
different "entering classes" to serve on the IAOC. A member would 
expected to serve at least two years and would be automatically 
reappointed to the IAOC for an additional year if they are re-upped to 
the IAB or IESG  and have served less than two years.    After that, 
their appointing organization can continue them year to year as long as 
they retain their slot on the IESG or IAB.

The term lengths for the ISOC BOT are to deal with their three year term 
length - the BOT would have to appoint someone that has at least two 
years left on their ISOC BOT term, but could then extend their 
appointment by a year at a time.  That gives the IAOC some stability in 
ISOC participation.

The NOMCOM selected members are currently confirmed by the IESG.  If we 
make the above changes, then we require anyone appointed by the Nomcom 
to be acceptable to both the IAB and IESG, but we take away the IAB and 
IESG's current appointment power for the two other at large members.   
Given that the IAB, IESG, ISOC and Nomcom are all pulling candidates 
from mostly the same pool, it does not make a lot of sense to have 4 
different groups appointing at-large members.

The benefit of staying with the current ex-officio model is to not have 
to figure out how to deal with varying term lengths amongst the 
ex-officio replacements.  But, if you change the model, then you have to 
figure out how to give the IAOC *at least* the same level of stability 
that it currently has in membership terms.

---

From: John C Klensin <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2016 03:18:09 -0500

Hi,

A few obervations...

--On Monday, February 15, 2016 21:53 -0500 Michael StJohns
<[email-masked]> wrote:

>> The question is, is the IETF Chair in the IAOC as "IETF
>> Chair", "IESG Chair", or both? John's analysis is quite right
>> as far as the IESG Chair is concerned. For example, consider
>> the IAOC's job of overseeing the IAD's job of ensuring that
>> tools such as the tracker are in good shape. IESG input there
>> is essential, but it could be conveyed by any Area Director.
>> However, for some other matters, especially policy matters
>> handled by the Trust, the IESG has no special role - they are
>> community matters, where ultimately it's the IETF Chair who
>> calls consensus.

>> So I see a case for the IETF Chair being in the IAOC ex
>> officio as today, and that is*orthogonal*  to the question of
>> an IESG liaison.

The above, to me, is a really strong argument for either
separating the IAOC membership from that of the IETF Trust or
for explicitly changing the IESG so that the IESG Chair and IETF
Chair roles are separated to different people and job
descriptions.  Without one of those splits, I think the "three
jobs" discussion conceptually useful but not helpful as an
actual operational model.

> I think your analysis is pretty on target.  Given the above
> and the discussion on the IAB chair I would probably do this:
> 
> Have the IAOC consist of
> 

See above.

> o One member of the IESG selected by and from its membership
> for a 1 or 2 year term
> o One member of the IAB selected by and from its membership
> for a 1 or 2 year term
> o One member of the ISOC BOT selected by and from its
> membership for a minimum 2 year term with an option to extend
> year to year.

Mike, I'd like to better understand why you want to eliminate
the ISOC President's presence and responsibility on the iAOC.
Remember that the IASA is an ISOC activity, that the IAD is an
ISOC employee, that the ISOC President and CEO controls the day
to day budgeting and financial chain into which the IASA leads
and, unless we delegate that to an IAOC member and volunteer, is
the direct, line management, reporting chain of the IAD.   By
contrast, the function and membership of the ISOC BoT members
are, as I understand it, much more strategic and oversight.
They are selected no more specifically for the skills needed in
IAOC (and the Trust) -- narrow subsets of the IAOC BoT role--
than, e.g., the IAB Chair and do not have any direct operational
responsibilities (for IASA or anything else) as part of their
roles.

> o Four members selected by the Nomcom for 2 year terms -
> confirmed by both the IAB and IESG (alternately 3 or 6 members
> with three year terms)
> o The ISOC BOT Chair and the IAB Chair as observers if they
> aren't otherwise appointed.

The ISOC BoT Chair is much like the IAB Chair -- selected from
the membership of the BoT with the main formal responsibility,
other than symbolic appearances, being to chair meetings.  Not a
substitute for the ISOC President and CEO (again, a professional
with operational and line management responsibilities) at all.

>...
> The NOMCOM selected members are currently confirmed by the
> IESG.  If we make the above changes, then we require anyone
> appointed by the Nomcom to be acceptable to both the IAB and
> IESG, but we take away the IAB and IESG's current appointment
> power for the two other at large members.   Given that the
> IAB, IESG, ISOC and Nomcom are all pulling candidates from
> mostly the same pool, it does not make a lot of sense to have
> 4 different groups appointing at-large members.

In what way do you see ISOC as pulling from the same pool as the
others? The IAB does appoint some members of the BoT, but they
are, if I recall, in a significant minority, few of the other
members are appointed from active IETF participants, and the IAB
has occasionally appointed ISOC BoT members who are no longer
active in the IETF community.

> The benefit of staying with the current ex-officio model is to
> not have to figure out how to deal with varying term lengths
> amongst the ex-officio replacements.  But, if you change the
> model, then you have to figure out how to give the IAOC *at
> least* the same level of stability that it currently has in
> membership terms.

Makes sense up to a point.  That point involves your assumption
about "stability" in the IAB Chair.   It may just be another
reason to get the IAB Chair out of the picture, but, while IAB
Chairs are normally selected for terms that start at the first
IETF meeting of the year, terms have been quite variable, with
some history of Chairs stepping down in the July-September
window in order to better provide for transition and overlap.
Sometimes that has even been the plan when someone agrees to
take the position in circa March.   And, of course, that is
independent of "serves at the pleasure of..." and the consequent
potential for mid-term firing (or honored requests to resign).
So, if long-term stability of membership is your goal, you want
the IAB Chair out and, if Brian's implicit suggestion to split
the IETF and IESG Chair roles were adopted, your'd want the IESG
Chair out too.

best,
     john

---

From: Michael StJohns <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2016 12:13:09 -0500

Hi John -

>> >o The IETF Chair (ex-officio)
See my comments at the end of my response wrt to "implicit suggestion".
> the ISOC President's presence and responsibility on the iAOC.
AFAICT from the ISOC website, the ISOC President is a member of the ISOC 
BOT.   There is no problem with the ISOC board appointing the ISOC 
president as their representative.  The change would give the ISOC board 
the same flexibility that the IAB is asking for - a choice over who they 
send over - rather than mandating it be the ISOC President.
> responsibilities (for IASA or anything else) as part of their
Mostly fair points, but as I read the ISOC website most board members do 
have "other duties" related to their presence on the board. (e.g. 
various subcommittee assignments).  And looking at the current IAOC 
board list, I could see a good half or more as being good fits for the 
IAOC.     Again, this is all about giving the ISOC flexibility to manage 
their involvement with the IAOC/IETF trust and not an attempt to remove 
the ISOC President per se.

(Basically, when I looked at this I assumed that the three organizations 
- IESG, IAB and ISOC - should have similar treatments unless there was a 
good reason not to.  There may be a reason from the IAOC's point of view 
to require the ISOC president in the ISOC slot, but then again there may 
not - I'd like to hear from them on this point.  If not, then giving the 
ISOC BOT the ability to pick their representative seems a useful tweak 
to the current rules).

> with operational and line management responsibilities) at all.
Oops - sorry.  The observer line above was supposed to be the ISOC 
President not ISOC BOT chair.  Its possible that having both (Chair and 
President) as observers might be useful.

> active in the IETF community.

Umm.... the current ISOC appointee to the IAOC is Scott Bradner.  If the 
IAB/IESG/Nomcom wouldn't consider him as part of their pool, they aren't 
doing their job.  Looking backwards the IAOC website doesn't list the 
source of appointment for each member, but mostly I recognize the 
members as being somewhat active in the IETF and therefor likely 
candidates to be considered by any body appointing to the IAOC.

(Reading your comment, I'm not quite sure how you interpreted "same 
pool" - so let's restate it like this for clarity:  "The I* and Nomcom 
all pull candidates for the IAOC from the same pool"   NOT "The IAB,IESG 
and ISOC all pull candidates for their own membership from the same pool")

> about "stability" in the IAB Chair.
See my previous emails.  I said that the IAB chair appointment was the 
least stable of any on the IAOC - I would stand on that point. I'm 
thinking that if the IAB appointed the IAB chair as their representative 
to the IAOC and then that person stepped down as IAB chair, they'd still 
continue as an IAOC member.  This is not a "serves at the pleasure of" 
appointment by the IAB chair, but an internal selection of the IAB for 
an external appointment with a term requirement.

>   It may just be another
Anyone can resign at anytime - it's the nature of the beast.  But if you 
state the expectations up front and you excoriate them if they don't 
meet the expectations without a good reason the you tend to get 
participants that stick with it if for no other reason than to keep 
their reputations intact.

> the IETF and IESG Chair roles were adopted, your'd want the IESG

I didn't get the "implicit suggestion" out of what Brian said.  What I 
got was "we need the IETF chair on the IAOC to represent the IETF's 
interests as a whole and it might be nice to have someone else from the 
IESG to represent the IESG's interests directly".  I did not get - 
"we're going to have two chairs - an IETF chair and an IESG chair".  
(Which incidentally is a bad idea IMHO).

Later, Mike

---

From: Russ Housley <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2016 13:58:59 -0500

Mike:

> AFAICT from the ISOC website, the ISOC President is a member of the ISOC BOT.   There is no problem with the ISOC board appointing the ISOC president as their representative.  The change would give the ISOC board the same flexibility that the IAB is asking for - a choice over who they send over - rather than mandating it be the ISOC President.

The idea that the ISOC Board could appoint someone other than the ISOC President is not new. See [1]. During the discussion in 2011, it was also suggested that the ISOC President might want the flexibility to appoint a direct report.   The IAOC often gets advice from the ISOC CFO, so this would not be an unreasonable choice.

[1]  https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kolkman-iasa-ex-officio-membership-01.txt

Russ

---

From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2016 08:25:04 +1300

I'm trying to avoid repeating myself, so I won't comment on everything.

On 17/02/2016 06:13, Michael StJohns wrote:

<snip>

> (Basically, when I looked at this I assumed that the three organizations - IESG, IAB and ISOC - should have similar treatments
> unless there was a good reason not to.

To the contrary, I think there are four organizations involved (IETF, IESG, IAB and ISOC)
that have very distinctive roles, and there is no reason to look for symmetry.

> There may be a reason from the IAOC's point of view to require the ISOC president in the
> ISOC slot, but then again there may not - I'd like to hear from them on this point.

Well, I don't think that it's really the IAOC's call.

> If not, then giving the ISOC BOT the
> ability to pick their representative seems a useful tweak to the current rules).

It isn't the ISOC BOT. It's the ISOC acting as an employer and funding agency. So
I agree with John on this: the ISOC President/CEO is the right person.

I should also clarify that I'm not proposing actually splitting the job of IESG
Chair from that of IETF Chair. I'm simply observing that they are two very different
roles, and speaking for the IESG on admin matters is different from speaking
for the IETF as a whole on admin or policy matters.

Regards
    Brian

---

From: Jari Arkko <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2016 11:26:30 +0200

> Well, I don't think that it's really the IAOC's call.

(Background for others - the IAOC has ISOC CEO as an ex officio member in the board, but ISOC also names one of the other members.)

I wanted to provide my opinion.

For what it is worth, while the CEO hopefully does not spent a huge amount of time with various IAOC detail issues, I have found the presence of the CEO extremely helpful on a number of occasions. There are some big topics where it has been very important for her (or them) to be in the team. IETF and ISOC are bound together from the administrative and financial perspective, and there are some topics where the leadership just has to be involved.

Now, I am not saying that the ex officio slot has to be filled by the CEO. And different CEOs might have different skill sets and focus areas, and there are other arrangements with respect to the role in the IAOC. Other people, for instance, the CTO, could and have filled in many situations. But what I am saying is that there are some topics where there CEO pretty much has to be involved, either as part of the team or otherwise, because they are core questions not just to us but also for ISOC in their role. How is financing of the IETF going to evolve in the future? What ISOC share of IETF’s budget is feasible? Are you going to back us up if X happens? How do we approach a large sponsorship discussion? These are all questions that we have to deal with.

Jari

---

From: Michael StJohns <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2016 12:01:08 -0500

Hi Brian

> that have very distinctive roles, and there is no reason to look for symmetry.
I believe you're looking at it from the wrong direction.  Look at it 
from the IAOC side instead - what are the IAOC benefits/reasons for each 
of these to a) be on the IAOC, and b) have a vote?  The fact that the 
organizations have somewhat different missions doesn't really change 
that analysis much.
> Well, I don't think that it's really the IAOC's call.

It's not their call, but the level of participation in the IAOC of any 
given organization is certainly an IAOC concern.  Jari has good 
commentary on why the IAOC may occasionally want to send the CFO vs the 
CEO or a random board member and I think that's a useful set of 
comments.  But there are actually two different things going on: who 
gets the vote and who gets a voice.  The IAOC may believe it's for the 
best that the CEO continue to be the voting member (for whatever reasons 
- that's why I asked), or may be happy as long as there is one single 
identified voting member fairly up in the ISOC hierarchy.  I would 
believe that the IAOC would be unhappy if the voting member were a third 
or fourth level employee of the ISOC or a BOT member randomly selected.  
So yes, it's is somewhat the IAOC's call, and I think that applies to 
all organizationally tied members of the IAOC.

> I agree with John on this: the ISOC President/CEO is the right person.
(Aren't you arguing against yourself?  Above you said that the IAOC 
doesn't get to pick, but here you're mandating that they pick the ISOC 
President.)

I don't disagree with this - but I also don't unconditionally agree with 
it either.  Certainly having the President (or event the CFO) involved 
in discussions and agreements with the IAOC/IETF Trust is important on a 
topic to topic basis, but can they give the IAOC the time commitment the 
IAOC needs for business other than that directly touching the ISOC?  If 
yes, then leave the voting position there. If not, find another ISOC 
related member to represent the ISOC, and move the vote there.

> for the IETF as a whole on admin or policy matters.

Didn't think you were - but I read John's comment as him thinking you were.
Later, Mike

---

From: Michael StJohns <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2016 12:48:01 -0500

Hi Jari - See below.

> (Background for others - the IAOC has ISOC CEO as an ex officio member in the board, but ISOC also names one of the other members.)

The member they name is an at-large member that does not, per the IAOC 
charter,  represent the ISOC per se.  The ISOC BOT names this member.

> Now, I am not saying that the ex officio slot has to be filled by the CEO. And different CEOs might have different skill sets and focus areas, and there are other arrangements with respect to the r…

Hi Jari -

Your post helped me figure out what questions (I think) should be asked:

1) Who gets to/needs to participate in the business of the IAOC? (Who 
gets a voice?)
2) Who gets to vote on the business of the IAOC? (and if organizational, 
how many votes?)
3) How do we  (or who get's to ) decide if (1) and (2) have to be the 
same person for any given organization?

(1) and (2) need not necessarily be the same person as you've indicated, 
but are currently for the IAB, IESG/IETF and IAOC.

  * I think Brian made a good case for the IETF chair and that the chair
    needs to be involved in pretty much all of the decisions of the IAOC.
  * I think Andrew has made a case that the IAB has a somewhat less
    participatory need and that it ties more with specific relatively
    short term issues (e.g. RFC editor/IANA transition) than other
    things in their wheelhouse.
  * I think you've (Jari) made a good case that the ISOC  (and
    specifically the ISOC CEO) has a need to be involved in decisions
    that affect the relationship between the IETF and the ISOC, but a
    lesser interest in the day to day issues of the IAOC.
  * No one has made a good case for the three organizations (vice having
    the Nomcom do it) to continue to appoint additional at-large members
    and there are good reasons (redundant and conflicting processes
    drawing from the same pool of volunteers) not to continue the practice.

With respect to the IAB, the above bullet point tries to differentiate 
between things that they'd like to have a say in and things that are 
related directly to the IAB's chartered responsibilities.

At this point, I don't know what the above could mean for changes with 
the IAOC composition and voting structre- but I've made a few 
suggestions.  I do believe that considering changes to  IAB 
participation in isolation as Ted Hardie's draft wants to do is probably 
not the right approach.

I can live with the status quo which is why I didn't provide my own 
draft.  But, if we're going to change anything on the IAOC, I believe we 
should review all of the going in assumptions and original biases and 
see if they still hold before mucking with the structure piecemeal.

Later, Mike

---

From: "Fred Baker (fred)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2016 19:03:55 +0000

On Feb 16, 2016, at 9:13 AM, Michael StJohns <[email-masked]> wrote:
> AFAICT from the ISOC website, the ISOC President is a member of the ISOC BOT.

Speaking as a former ISOC BoT Chair...

The President/CEO of ISOC is indeed a member of the BoT. That said, like any CEO, s/he is also an employee of the board.

---

From: Andrew Sullivan <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2016 21:54:14 -0500

Hi,

On Mon, Feb 15, 2016 at 09:53:22PM -0500, Michael StJohns wrote:
> The term lengths for the IAB and IESG would be variable to allow different
> "entering classes" to serve on the IAOC. A member would expected to serve at
> least two years and would be automatically reappointed to the IAOC for an
> additional year if they are re-upped to the IAB or IESG  and have served
> less than two years.

I have nothing to say about the IESG case here, but why this rule for
the IAB?  This is a new invention, because the IAB chair's _ex
officio_ position on the IAOC comes by virtue of being IAB chair, and
that appointment is for no more than one year-cycle (i.e. Spring
meeting to Spring meeting -- this year it'll turn out slightly longer
than one year).  For all I know, the IAB will replace me in April with
someone else.  (Indeed, some days I think that, were they sane, they'd
replace me that afternoon!  That'd be less than a year.)

> replacements.  But, if you change the model, then you have to figure out how
> to give the IAOC *at least* the same level of stability that it currently
> has in membership terms.

But you're making it greater than it is now.

Best regards,

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
[email-masked]

---

From: Michael StJohns <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2016 00:29:09 -0500

> replace me that afternoon!  That'd be less than a year.)

There's what's written down and then there's what actually happens. 
According to the IAB history page, no IAB chair so far has served less 
than 2 years as chair so I'm not all that worried about your scenario.  
And there's a lot of pressure to have some stability in the IAB chair's 
position, which translates into similar stability in the IAOC IAB 
position.  If you want to change who serves on the IAOC from the IAB, 
then we need to have a rule with respect to that appointment that gives 
us a similar result to what's already been happening.   E.g. someone 
from the IAB on the IAOC who will be around for ideally for a few years.

> But you're making it greater than it is now.

You make that sound like its a bad thing?

Seriously though, as I noted above, I'm not really making it greater - 
I'm just trying to come up with an approach that preserves the current 
*actual* stability.

Later, Mike

---

From: Andrew Sullivan <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2016 09:41:39 -0500

> There's what's written down and then there's what actually happens.

Ok.

> 2 years as chair so I'm not all that worried about your scenario.  And
> there's a lot of pressure to have some stability in the IAB chair's
> position, which translates into similar stability in the IAOC IAB position.

Ok.

> If you want to change who serves on the IAOC from the IAB, then we need to
> have a rule with respect to that appointment that gives us a similar result

This doesn't follow.  Your argument is of the form, "We currently have
a formal rule that the appointment is nominally for one year, with a
possibility of it being shorter; but social pressure means that in
practice it is more stable.  Therefore, in the new system we need a
formal rule that enforces that greater stability."  The premises don't
really support your argument.  It'd be just as reasonable to conclude,
"Therefore, there should be a social expectation that people be
prepared to do this for two years or more."  My experience of the IETF
suggests that we are better off with more social conventions and fewer
formal rules, because the formal rules all require exception handling,
recovery rules, and so on; whereas when social conventions turn out
not to work perfectly you can treat the case as the one-off that it
usually is.

> You make that sound like its a bad thing?

Yes.  See above.

Best regards,

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
[email-masked]

---

From: John C Klensin <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2016 10:05:20 -0500

--On Thursday, February 18, 2016 09:41 -0500 Andrew Sullivan
<[email-masked]> wrote:

>> If you want to change who serves on the IAOC from the IAB,
>> then we need to have a rule with respect to that appointment
>> that gives us a similar result
> 
> This doesn't follow.  Your argument is of the form, "We
> currently have a formal rule that the appointment is nominally
> for one year, with a possibility of it being shorter; but
> social pressure means that in practice it is more stable.
> Therefore, in the new system we need a formal rule that
> enforces that greater stability."  The premises don't really
> support your argument.  It'd be just as reasonable to conclude,
> prepared to do this for two years or more."  My experience of
> the IETF suggests that we are better off with more social
> conventions and fewer formal rules, because the formal rules
> all require exception handling, recovery rules, and so on;
> whereas when social conventions turn out not to work perfectly
> you can treat the case as the one-off that it usually is.
> 

FWIW, I strongly agree with Andrew.  

The draft was very much developed in the spirit of "the relevant
parties should use discretion and figure out what to do, with no
more than general guidance from the spec/rules" and, "if we
cannot trust the IAB and IETF to do the right thing, we need to
be more focused on the problems that implies and how to fix them
than on tuning the IAOC.

I have also finally figured out what the fundamental issue may
be on which Mike and I disagree.  In case it is useful to
others, he has said several times that various things about how
the IAOC is organized and who its members are should be up to
the IAOC.     To me, the IAOC is just a committee, appointed (in
some set of ways) to represent the community in running the IASA
for the IETF.  I think the community should be willing to hear
opinions from IAOC members about what they believe would be most
efficient or effective but, especially in times where some of us
have serious questions about the openness and transparency of
the IASA generally and the IAOC and its committees in
particular, the decisions about the structure of the IAOC and
the qualifications and appointment mechanisms really have to be
the community's.  If they are necessary, so do decisions about
the tradeoff between, e.g., transparency and efficiency.

I still believe the ISOC ex-officio position is different from
the IAB and IESG ones because IASA is ultimately an ISOC
function, the IAD is an ISOC employee, etc.  Those are line
management activities, not Board-level strategy ones, and, to
me, that argument for the ISOC CEO having an IAOC seat is almost
the same as the one for having the IAD on the IAOC rather than
just supervised by it.   If ISOC comes back to the community and
says "the CFO would be better" or "the CEO and CFO should
jointly hold the ex-officio seat", I think the community should
take that input seriously, but that is a different question.   I
can argue for or against an ISOC BoT appointment (or position)
on the IAOC (btw, more strongly for the IETF Trust), but that is
rather separate from the ISOC senior executive role.

Finally, in case it hasn't been clear, the draft was posted to
provide a framework for discussion about reforming the way the
IAOC is organized and/or appointed (rather than tuning the way
the IAB does its work) and in response to comments from Mike and
others that we needed something written from an IASA
perspective.  If someone wants to take it over or fork it to
provide a different set of details, feel free.   On the other
hand, I'm fairly impatient, and think others should be
impatient, with positions that appear to be imply that we should
not make any changes without a comprehensive review and reform
of the IASA design.

     john

---

From: Michael StJohns <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2016 14:28:06 -0500

On 2/18/2016 9:41 AM, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
> prepared to do this for two years or more."
Close - it's  "Therefore, there should be an expectation that people be 
prepared to do this for two years or more" (note the lack of "social" 
here).  With the IAB chair as the ex-officio member, we have an 
expectation based on experience and current social conventions that 
he/she will be in the IAB chari job for 2 or more years (and therefore 
in the IAOC member job for 2 years).  I don't see a similar long held 
convention (social or otherwise) that would necessarily apply to the 
non-chair IAB member joining the IAOC, so putting in as an explicit 
expectation seems to make sense.

>   My experience of the IETF

Mostly I agree with the above about letting social conventions rule. But 
you want to go from a current model where the expectation (and 
experience) is that we're going to have someone from the IAB on the IAOC 
for at least two years (with the concomitant benefit that said IAB 
member gains experience working with the IAOC), to a model where there 
is no expectation or even stated desire for the appointed IAB member to 
stick with the IAOC <hyperbole>past a change of underwear</hyperbole>.

draft-hardie-iaoc-iab-update talks about how the IAB might modify its 
charter, but doesn't provide concrete language for the IAOC charter on 
the change (e.g. the program language you have in the draft shouldn't 
become a dependency in the IAOC charter).  Given the current draft (and 
your comments), I'd read the change as:

"Replace 'the IAB chair shall serve as an ex-officio voting member of 
the IAOC' to 'the IAB shall select one of its members to serve as an 
ex-officio voting member of the IAOC.  The IAB shall be the sole 
authority for deciding how long and in what manner that IAB ex-officio 
member will serve. '"

I can see various scenarios like:  "I'm tired of doing this after 6 
months - we've got a new class of IAB members coming in, stick one of 
them with it"  or "George, we don't like how you voted on the last site 
selection so we're replacing you effectively immediately" or "My boss 
wants me to lobby for an IETF in XXX, so put me on the IAOC - when I've 
accomplished that, I'll give the job to someone else" or "Someone else 
needs the job for resume building" or "I want to change jobs - my new 
org will support my time on the IAB, but thinks the IAOC is a waste of 
time - since I haven't given any commitment to stay on the IAOC, let me 
just dump that responsibility".  The outside (e.g. non IAB) would simply 
see "X was replaced with Y" with no real understanding of why the change 
took place.

  Everyone else on the IAOC has term requirements/expectations of a sort 
- and I mean everyone else.  Why should the IAB be treated any 
differently?  And I'm specifically talking about language that modifies 
the IAOC charter and not internal IAB changes (that only require IAB 
approval for said changes).  I want there to be an expectation expressed 
by the IAOC towards the IAB of who and how the IAB will provide its 
member, with the understanding that extreme cases (member gets sick, 
member gets fired from his job, member ends up in too many conflicts of 
interest etc) requiring replacement may occur, but that generally 
service on the IAOC has a term and commitment obligation.

[Preemptive note on the programs - given that there's not a lot of 
transparency on how the IAB selects the various programs, members, leads 
etc, there's not a lot of "social expectation" on how long a given 
program lead normally serves, the criteria for replacement, etc. That 
may change over time, but for now, I believe this is a reasonable 
outsider's view.  ]

In any event, I think I'm done with this discussion. I'm not saying 
anything above that I haven't before, nor have you I would say. I'll 
continue to monitor the chatter, but I'll reserve any comments for the 
next round of documents.  I think draft-hardie-iaoc-iab-update is a dead 
end without specific charter change language.

Later, Mike

>> You make that sound like its a bad thing?
Stability is a bad thing?  Hmm....

---

From: Randy Bush <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2016 08:50:39 +1300

> My experience of the IETF suggests that we are better off with more
> social conventions and fewer formal rules

yessssssssssss!

lawyer envy wraps us around so many axles, this being a case in point.

randy

---

From: Andrew Sullivan <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2016 15:05:48 -0500

Hi,

On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 02:28:06PM -0500, Michael StJohns wrote:
> I can see various scenarios like:  "I'm tired of doing this after 6 months 

[&c]

If you really think that the IAB members are that irresponsible,
surely we should be talking about shutting down the IAB, not whether
any IAB member ought to be an IAOC member.
 
>  Everyone else on the IAOC has term requirements/expectations of a sort -
> and I mean everyone else.

Stamp your foot and say it louder, if you like, but it's false.  I
could be replaced tomorrow by the IAB, and the IAOC would get a new
member thereby.  It doesn't happen because when selecting the IAB
chair the IAB looks in part for stability.  I don't have any problem
with a statement that the community is better served if the
appointment to the IAOC is stable (though in fact I think there is no
evidence one way or the other about this).  I have a problem with
elevating what is currently a social convention that is provided for
through good judgement into a job requirement written into formal
selection criteria.  

> changes).  I want there to be an expectation expressed by the IAOC towards
> the IAB of who and how the IAB will provide its member, with the
> understanding that extreme cases (member gets sick, member gets fired from
> his job, member ends up in too many conflicts of interest etc) requiring
> replacement may occur, but that generally service on the IAOC has a term and
> commitment obligation.

Since you want all of that, please write down all the rules for how
handling of replacements ought to work.  Suppose that it's (say)
October.  Suppose that, tragically, the IAB member who is on the IAOC
is struck with a serious illness such that he or she cannot continue.
Suppose further that all the people whose term is about to be up have
already told the nomcom that they're not going to stand again.  So,
you're down to 50% of the IAB, and none of them can promise to be on
the IAOC for 2 years because their term ends in less time than that.
Even if some of the about-to-depart people put their names in, there's
no guarantee that they'll be reappointed so maybe they won't be able
to do 2 years either.

If we follow the path of writing down all the rules for this, we need
a procedure to follow in this imaginary case (and probably a dozen
others I could think of if I tried).  If we follow the path of
assuming that the so-called leadership will behave in a responsible
fashion, we don't need any of those rules.  And if we don't think that
the so-called leadership will behave in a responsible fashion, then I
think we should be worrying about an altogether different set of
issues.

Best regards,

A 

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
[email-masked]

---

From: Michael StJohns <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2016 15:17:23 -0500

> lawyer envy wraps us around so many axles, this being a case in point.

I'm going to go off on a tangent.  This is only peripherally related to 
the other topic.

One of the other things that comes up with the IETF from time to time is 
how to make the IETF more open and welcoming to newcomers. The IETF has 
a *lot* of unwritten rules - perhaps more than most organizations. 
*IMHO*, that may make it more difficult for newcomers to figure out how 
things work and where they can push or pull to effect change - there's a 
lot of anecdotal evidence that this may be the case.  I would also tend 
to believe that written rules with plain meanings (that are mostly 
followed) tend to level the playing field for those just joining.

(A quick google search - "written vs unwritten rules newcomers" finds 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-brunswick/battah-workplace-rules-1.3274856 
for example - there are a lot of others in this space)

So I'm not so sure that the above is a universal truth.    Both you and 
Andrew (and me FWIW) are long term participants and tend to know where 
the levers are.  I wonder if those just joining us would agree?

[Please think about the above and wait at least a few hours (ideally a 
day) before writing any reply.  Right now the above is a point for 
thought first, discussion later - thanks]

Later, Mike

---

From: <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2016 20:52:16 +0000 (UTC)

Mike,

>the levers are.  I wonder if those just joining us would agree?

The question of "unwritten rules" comes up in the mentoring program quite a bit, so I wrote the following:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-elkins-ietf-unwritten-rules-values/

Would love to have your comments,

Nalini Elkins
IETF Mentoring Program

---

From: Randy Bush <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2016 13:54:01 +1300

> So I'm not so sure that the above is a universal truth.

i would be very surprised if anything in this discussion was a universal
tuth.

randy

---

From: joel jaeggli <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2016 22:13:34 -0800

On 2/18/16 12:05 PM, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
> fashion, we don't need any of those rules.

If we assume the counter-factual conditional; that we can limit the
potential for exposure to bad actors through rule-making (as opposed to
consensus decisions) we're down an incredibly strange wormhole.

If a process describes, how to install people in roles, what the roles
do, and how to remove them if the community concludes that they've
strayed, and that proves to be workable, we're doing pretty good.

>  And if we don't think that

---

From: Jari Arkko <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2016 08:22:15 +0200

Andrew, Michael,

Up-leveling your discussion a bit.

John had suggested a comprehensive review, and I think he has a point.

Figure out what works and what doesn’t, identify problems that exist. From my perspective, the IAOC setup and membership has been quite stable, so I’m not sure it is a problem. Of course, if we make a change, we shouldn’t make it unstable either, but I don’t see any such proposals on the table.

Up-leveling a bit further. This whole discussion is about the organisational aspects. If we do John’s comprehensive review, I want everyone to remember that there are other aspects. As an example — and I think I mentioned in some e-mail already — the workload for the IAOC and the team (IAD etc) has increased quite a bit recently for various reasons, and that is also something we need to address. That specific topic is on our retreat agenda for May to talk about, but of course we still need to assess other questions as well. Another example is the specific ways that the IAOC goes about its business, such as meeting selections, and are there areas where for instance better documentation would be needed.

Jari

---

From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2016 11:37:02 +1300

On 19/02/2016 19:22, Jari Arkko wrote:
> Figure out what works and what doesn’t, identify problems that exist. 

I think that is a very important step. The IASA/IAOC itself came out of
a careful problem analysis and a long debate. While I doubt if we need
to go that far (https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/problem/charter/),
a problem analysis that those interested agree on would be a good start.
Maybe on its own list to avoid distracting several thousand people here?

(Incidentally the archive of the problem WG list seems to have gone missing;
all I can find in the IETF archive is carefully archived spam.)

   Brian

> From my perspective, the IAOC setup and membership has been quite stable, so I’m not sure it is a problem. Of course, if we make
a change, we shouldn’t make it unstable either, but I don’t see any such proposals on the table.