Subject: [Isms] Draft-harrington-isms-SecShell-00.txt

From: "David B Harrington" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2005 10:47:20 -0400

Hi,

I have submitted the attached draft for -00- publication. I have
published it primarily so the WG can see that progress is being made
on the document. 

The current document is raw and missing many parts and some questioins
have already been answered but are not reflected here. Nevertheless,
the document should be helpful to organize the work effort, and focus
discussions on various issues that need to be addressed by an
SSH-based security model. It can also be used to understand some
aspects of the USM approach that may not be needed with an SSH (or any
TMSM) approach.

Contributed text is welcome, especially for the [todo] sections.

David Harrington
[email-masked]

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---

From: Miao Fuyou <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2005 16:52:08 +0800

Hi,

In section 1.1 the draft discusses server authentication and user
authentication. I believe server authentication is important for user
authentication. In SNMP, it is the tranport  protocol to provide
confidentiality for password user authentication, and it is sent in clear.
If the server is not authenticated, an attacker can spoof a SSH server to
get user's password.  

Miao

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On
Behalf Of David B Harrington
Sent: Wednesday, September 07, 2005 10:47 PM
To: [email-masked]
Subject: [Isms] Draft-harrington-isms-SecShell-00.txt

Hi,

I have submitted the attached draft for -00- publication. I have published
it primarily so the WG can see that progress is being made on the document. 

The current document is raw and missing many parts and some questioins have
already been answered but are not reflected here. Nevertheless, the document
should be helpful to organize the work effort, and focus discussions on
various issues that need to be addressed by an SSH-based security model. It
can also be used to understand some aspects of the USM approach that may not
be needed with an SSH (or any
TMSM) approach.

David Harrington
[email-masked]