Subject: [mpls] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-mpls-ri-rsvp-frr-07: (with COMMENT)

From: Roman Danyliw via Datatracker <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 05 Dec 2019 05:40:27 -0800

Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-mpls-ri-rsvp-frr-07: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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Section 5. Recommend adding language about using more modern HMAC algorithms
than those suggested in RFC2747.  For example:

OLD:
The security considerations pertaining to the original RSVP protocol
[RFC2205], [RFC3209] and [RFC5920] remain relevant.

NEW:
The security considerations pertaining to the original RSVP protocol [RFC2205],
[RFC3209] and [RFC5920] remain relevant.  When using RSVP Cryptographic
Authentication [RFC2747], more robust algorithms such as HMAC-SHA256,
HMAC-SHA384, or HMAC-SHA-512 [RFC2104][SHS] SHOULD be used when computing the
keyed message digest where possible.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February
              1997.

   [RFC2747]  Baker, F., Lindell, B., and M. Talwar, "RSVP Cryptographic
              Authentication", RFC 2747, January 2000.

   [SHS]      National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
              FIPS Publication 186-3: Digital Signature Standard,
              October 2008.