Subject: DNSSECbis Q-12: Support for multiple preconfigured public keys in a security-aware resolver

From: Matt Larson <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2003 05:46:53 -0400

This question corresponds to editor's note #11 from
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-01.

Q-12: Should support for configuring multiple trusted public keys in a
security-aware resolver be a MUST rather than a SHOULD?

Background: Here is the text in question from Section 4 (page 22) of
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-01:

   A security-aware resolver MUST be capable of being preconfigured with
   at least one trusted public key, and SHOULD be capable of being
   preconfigured with multiple trusted public keys.  Since a security-
   aware resolver will not be able to validate signatures without such a
   preconfigured trusted key, the resolver SHOULD have some reasonably
   robust mechanism for obtaining such keys when it boots.

Suggested text: It is reasonable to assume the need for multiple
trusted public keys during initial DNSSEC deployment as various
portions of the name space become secured.  A resolver that supported
only a single trusted public key would constrain its users.
Therefore, the following text is suggested:

   A security-aware resolver MUST be capable of being preconfigured with
   multiple trusted public keys.

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