Subject: Re: Last Call: 'DNS Name Server Identifier Option (NSID)' to Proposed Standard (draft-ietf-dnsext-nsid) (fwd)

From: Andrew Sullivan <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2006 19:15:26 -0400

On Fri, Jul 07, 2006 at 06:32:08PM -0400, Dean Anderson wrote:
> 
> I think that presently 7 of 10 in the DNSEXT WG who previously commented
> on the spoofing issue now either support or at least accept the proposed
> wording change:

[ . . . ]

>   Andrew Sullivan is not for spoofing.  "To be clear, I am not "for
> spoofing".  I think I've said enough on the topic, however, so I won't
> re-hash my arguments here."

It appears to me that my statements are being (presumably
accidentally) misrepresented.

My position is that I am not "for spoofing".  That does not entail in
any way that I support the formulation Mr Anderson is arguing for. 
It seems to me to be a little emotionally charged to suggest that
those who are opposed to the importation of policy into a protocol
are "for spoofing".

Best regards,
A

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From: Alex Bligh <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 08 Jul 2006 10:11:55 +0100

--On 07 July 2006 18:32 -0400 Dean Anderson <[email-masked]> wrote:

>   Alex Bligh does not think there should be a prohibition on opaque NSID
> (i.e. in am in favour of removing the prohibition), but does not think
> the ability to use them needs to be expressly authorised in the standard
> (does not objecting to it doing so per se, I just think its otiose and
> understands the argument that we shouldn't be seen to encourage it).
> [the new proposed change does not prohibit opaque NSID, but requires
> that it be unique per anycast instance. -Dean]

While the above is true, I did also (I think) point out that despite the
fact that particular bit of draft-ietf-dnsext-nsid wasn't how I would have
phrased it myself, I was happy with the document going forward in the
current form, that being the nature of compromise, as all the document has
now in my view is "a few unnecessary words". I thought this was perhaps
evident from my original contribution, which was to say that we should NOT
prohibit opaque NSID (what Dean calls spoofing) though we need not
encourage it. In any case, I think the point is sufficiently minor that it
doesn't merit going back to the w/g, and for the record I think Olaf made
the right call.

Alex

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From: <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2006 11:48:02 +0100

Dean Anderson <[email-masked]> wrote on 2006-07-07 23:32:08:

> Strongly for spoofing:
>   Peter Koch
>   Ed Lewis
>   [email-masked]

To be clear, I'm persuaded there are "legitimate", non-detrimental
uses for returning encrypted responses containing values that don't
persist between responses.  The term "spoofing" probably inaccurately
characterises these uses.

I'm very reluctantly responding to your most recent message, but I fear
that if I (and others) remain silent, that some observers with incomplete
information may interpret this as acquiescence, or -- worse -- agreement,
to your charactarisations.

Geoff