Subject: [netlmm] #102: Qualify claim of location privacy threat

From: netlmm <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2006 16:58:28 -0000

#102: Qualify claim of location privacy threat
------------------------------------------+---------------------------------
 Reporter:  [email-masked]      |       Owner:  [email-masked]
     Type:  defect                        |      Status:  new                     
 Priority:  minor                         |   Milestone:  milestone3              
Component:  draft-ietf-netlmm-nohost-req  |     Version:  2.0                     
 Keywords:  REQ draft                     |  
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 >      When  a  mobile  node  moves  geographically,  it  also  moves
 >      topologically between subnets. In order to maintain routability,
 >      the mobile node must change its local IP address when it moves
 >      between subnets. A correspondent node or eavesdropper can use the
 >      topological to geographical map to deduce in real time where a
 >      mobile node - and therefore its user - is located.

 This is a bit too straightforward claim. Eavesdropper can certainly
 do that, but the ability of the correspondent nodes to do this depends
 on what type of protocol and configuration you run. For instance,
 in MOBIKE CNs would never be able to do that, because all communication
 takes place through a gateway.

 Soften/reformulate the claim.

-- 
Ticket URL: <http://www1.tools.ietf.org/wg/netlmm/trac/ticket/102>
netlmm <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netlmm/>
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From: netlmm <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2006 17:03:51 -0000

#102: Qualify claim of location privacy threat
-------------------------------------------+--------------------------------
  Reporter:  [email-masked]      |       Owner:  [email-masked]
      Type:  defect                        |      Status:  closed                  
  Priority:  minor                         |   Milestone:  milestone3              
 Component:  draft-ietf-netlmm-nohost-req  |     Version:  2.0                     
Resolution:  fixed                         |    Keywords:  REQ draft               
-------------------------------------------+--------------------------------
Changes (by [email-masked]):

  * resolution:  => fixed
  * status:  new => closed

> Soften/reformulate the claim.

New description:

 Jari Arkko, INT AD, submitted this comment as part of AD Review

Comment:

 Added more detail:

 When a mobile node moves geographically, it also moves topologically
 between subnets. In order to maintain routability, the mobile node must
 change its local IP address when it moves between subnets. If the mobile
 node sources packets with its local IP address in the clear, for example
 through route optimization in Mobile IPv6, the correspondent node or an
 eavesdropper can use the topological to geographical map to deduce in real
 time where a mobile node - and therefore its user - is located. Depending
 on how precisely the geographical location can be deduced, this
 information could be used to compromise the privacy or even cause harm to
 the user. The geographical location information should not be revealed to
 nor be deducible by the correspondent node or an eavesdropper without the
 authorization of the mobile node's owner.