Subject: RE: [NSIS] RE: Security Threats for NSIS & RSVP Security Properti es documents

From: Tschofenig Hannes <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 23 May 2003 10:31:27 +0200

hi john, 
hi melinda. 

thank you for raising this issue. 

it is true that the rsvp security properties document does not reflect the
two layer split discussions. 

i would certainly like to incorporate a discussion about the two layer split
into the document. however, some issues make it complicated for me: 

- the two layer split has an impact on certain security issues. the rsvp
security properties document address the security of rsvp (obviously). since
many of these issues are more concentrated on non peer-to-peer security
(which is not provided in rsvp) it is difficult to discuss them  in this
context (since they are simply not there). an example: the session
identifier

- there is no doubt that different nslps add different security requirements
and particularly authorization seems to the hard part. we looked into the
nat/firewall and the qos signaling and discovered some differences (which is
not surpising). however, other people have other applications in mind, which
i am not aware of. hence it might be difficult to address their needs
whithout knowing what they want. an example: melinda, you mention a
discovery protocol.

- i haven't seen a document about the ntlp functionality yet. the need for
some security mechanisms simply arises from the presence of certain
payloads, messages and protocol functionality. this document should be
created by melinda and henning. without a reference point i can only create
fuzzy text.

btw, the "nsis aaa" draft actually adds a number of information to the rsvp
security draft although it was not really noticed by anyone. the reason for
this is the misleading name of the draft. allison gave me the advice to
change it to nsis qos authorization. 

as a summary i can try hard to incorporate some issues, but i need more
input (and feedback) from other people. 

ciao
hannes

> 
> Hi Melinda,
> 
> > I continue to think this is an excellent document, but the
> > layer split issues are sometimes not completely obvious and
> > at some point in the not-too-distant future we're going to
> > need to have a thorough discussion of where different
> > protections need to be made available, and to what extent
> > security concerns should drive certain layer split
> > decisions.  Also, different types of applications will have
> > different threat models and different needs (for example,
> > the concerns in a discovery protocol will be different from
> > the concerns in a reservation protocol).  Clearly those can
> > only be properly discussed in the context of the application
> > protocols themselves, but at any rate I think there may be a
> > need to beef out the layer split and transport layer
> > discussions.
> 
> Good point - Hannes, do you think that you coul daddress this
> in the update?  Melinda, if you have any specifics you think should be
> added, please let Hannes know.
> 
> > But generally I think the document is ready for last call
> > (although there may be some formatting issues in the
> > references, formfeeds, etc).
> 
> Good.
> 
> thanks,
> John
> 
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From: Melinda Shore <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 23 May 2003 08:36:11 -0400

> two layer split discussions. 

I'm sorry if I was unclear - I was referring to the NSIS
threats document, not the RSVP security properties document.

Melinda