Subject: [OSPF] Automated group keying for OSPFv3

From: Liu Ya <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2006 15:17:29 +0800

Hi all,

RFC4552 provides authentication/confidentiality to OSPFv3 using
AH/ESP. Manual keying is recommended as default keying method. That
method is not scalable. Script configuration tools can improve that
problem. However, they must be used together with additional secure
mechanisms (e.g. IPsec encryption tunnels) to prevent from passing
plaintext keys from configuration server to devices. Furthermore,
manual intervention can not be completely avoided in such cases as
router crashing and rebooting, route flapping, etc. 

Therefore, an automated, scalable and secure group keying method is
necessary for OSPFv3. Standard group key management protocols have
been defined by MSEC WG. They can be used here to serve the group
keying purpose. 

Comments are welcome.

Regards,
Liu Ya

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From: Curtis Villamizar <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2006 12:55:43 -0400

> been defined by MSEC WG. They can be used here to serve the group

The typical provider solution is to automate the distribution of keys
but use a secure means of accessing either a CLI interface or other
interface provided by the router.

In practice, this is a very small problem and it is a solved problem.
The interface (CLI, MIB?, XML?, or other, usually CLI), the means to
access that interface securely, and the method of automating (can be
as simple as a perl program using the 'expect' interface to the CLI)
are all out of scope for the protocol definition.  "Manual" does not
mean human fingers in this contect, but through some means outside the
protocol itself, of which human fingers on the keyboard is one.

Another issue is that export restrictions on cryptography in some
countries and restrictions on use of cryptography in others would
prevent standardizing the "means to access that interface securely".
The least common denominator would be unacceptable in many
circumstances and the stronger methods would be illegal in others.
The key itself is used for authentication and is therefore legal in
places where the best means to avoid sending the key "in the clear"
might not be legal.

Curtis