Subject: [P2PSIP] draft-ietf-p2psip-base publication to be requested

From: "David A. Bryan" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2011 09:48:08 -0700

Unless something major comes up, we plan to request the newest version
of the base draft, draft-ietf-p2psip-base-15, be published. I'll put
in the request in a week (June 16th or 17th). If there are any further
comments from the last call a while ago (or further comments on the
comments since then), please send them to the list ASAP.

Thanks,

David (as chair)

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From: Marc Petit-Huguenin <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 08 Jun 2011 12:14:00 -0700

> comments since then), please send them to the list ASAP.

draft-ietf-p2psip-base-15 fixes all the interoperability issues I found so far,
so as far as I am concerned, this version can be published.

- -- 
Marc Petit-Huguenin
Personal email: [email-masked]
Professional email: [email-masked]
Blog: http://blog.marc.petit-huguenin.org

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From: Cullen Jennings <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2011 14:32:52 -0600

I think it is ready to be sent to IESG. There may be some trivial tweaks to the IANA registration for the xml config file but that can easily handled as part of IESG processing. 

On Jun 8, 2011, at 10:48 AM, David A. Bryan wrote:

> _______________________________________________
> P2PSIP mailing list
> [email-masked]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/p2psip

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From: Diego Suarez <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 09 Jun 2011 16:31:18 +0200

Hi, 

I had in mind writing a draft about this, but since I'm running out of
time, I would like to summarize a new certification model for P2PSIP I
have been working on, in case it is of interest for the group.
Further details can be found in paper:

D. Touceda, J. Camara, L. Villalba, and J. Marquez, “Advantages of
identity certificate segregation in P2PSIP systems,” Communications,
IET, vol. 5, pp. 879–889, Apr. 2011.

The idea is to split the certification of users and devices. Devices are
identified by PKCs including a nodeID and the PK of the device, while
users are identified by PKCs including a username and the PK of the
user. Similar models have been used before in other communications
systems, such as GSM where devices and users are separately represented
by the international mobile equipment identity (IMEI) stored in the
phones and the international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) stored in
the user subscriber identity module (SIM), respectively.

Motivations of this model are:

- Users and devices are different entities performing different
roles within a P2PSIP system. Devices are nodes of the P2P
overlay network (represented by a nodeID) that offer services
(to route messages, to store data, . . .) to the system, while
users (represented by an username) utilize these services,
usually to establish media communications using SIP.

- Support for mobility scenarios where a user may be logged at different
devices at the same time using the same PKC.

- Support several users to be logged in the same device (like a fixed
phone) at the same time.

- Support for user independent hard-coded devices.

- Interoperability with SIP. SIP certificates are not valid in actual
P2PSIP since they don't include a nodeID.

cheers

Diego Suárez

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From: Marc Petit-Huguenin <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 09 Jun 2011 10:05:13 -0700

Does this model really required modifications in the base document, or can it be
designed as an extension?  (Unfortunately the paper is not freely available, so
it is difficult to know really what is needed for this).

- -- 
Marc Petit-Huguenin

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From: Diego Suarez <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 09 Jun 2011 19:47:29 +0200

I think it would require a (slight) modification in the base document.
Current P2PSIP certification model is based on a single PKC (including
both usernames and nodeIDs) that uniquely identifies a user and her
devices. On the other hand, our model is base on a split certification.
Devices and users are independent. Each device has its own PKC including
a nodeID and a PK. Similarly, each user has her own PKC including her
username and a PK. This approach do not prevent a centralized entity
(such as an offline CA) to have information related to the devices each
user (or company, etc.) has registered, but permits, among other
improvements, a user to be connected to the system through devices she
has not registered herself such as a phone issued by a telco or a fixed
phone in a laboratory shared by all the members of a research group.

On Thu, 2011-06-09 at 10:05 -0700, Marc Petit-Huguenin wrote:
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> iEYEARECAAYFAk3w/UMACgkQ9RoMZyVa61ctqACfTdnpLBUDY3GqmcHvcT41ncRS
> 3r0An3YjUnCnMv4Rg/a91pra/xZFiGj6
> =NiCK
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From: Marc Petit-Huguenin <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2011 12:58:06 -0700

I read the paper and this modification makes sense to me (for example without
this modification a peer that is purely used for routing and storage purpose,
like a bootstrap peer, had to invent a valid, unique, and useless username just
to acquire a certificate).

So I support its inclusion in draft-ietf-p2psip-base.

On 06/09/2011 10:47 AM, Diego Suarez wrote:
>>>> D. Touceda, J. Camara, L. Villalba, and J. Marquez, Advantages of
>>>> identity certificate segregation in P2PSIP systems, Communications,
>>>> IET, vol. 5, pp. 879889, Apr. 2011.
>>>>
>>>>

- -- 
Marc Petit-Huguenin