Subject: Re: PANA FAQ

From: "Alper E. YEGIN" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2002 14:56:53 -0700

> > But this is not a problem introduced by PANA, or by the
> > "ND should take place after PANA" suggestion.
> >
> > Doing ND after PANA doesn't make the system less secure.
> > It's easier (not always possible, like in your pre-paid card example)
> > to secure ND if it takes place after PANA, because of the initial
> > bootstraping via PANA.
>
> Yes, but those are also arguments for L2 authentication.
> I sense an undertone that PANA needs to be as good as L2 authentication
> (e.g. by being able to use it before IP addresses has been assigned)
> but will use IP packet formats for some perceived notion of "L2
independence".
> I don't think that PANA needs to compete with L2 authentication - I think
> it fills a different nitch.
> And the problem with the desire to do this is that it makes it very
> hard (or impossible) to reuse existing IP protocols, since few if any
> work using unspecified address.
>
> For example, if it turns out that e.g. PIC could be reused, the
requirement
> that the protocol operate using unspecified addresses means that it
couldn't
> be reused.

This is a good point.

I think there is a clear motivation to make this protocol work before
IP address assignment. But, if we realize we need a protocol component
that requires a valid IP address, we should be able to evaluate which one
is more desirable: using that particular component, or the ability to do
PANA
before IP address assignment. We cannot guess it, we need some analysis.
And we cannot analize such components without requirements.
I guess, we should at least mark this feature as desirable (not a must)
for now, and give a chance to components that require an IP address
to work.

>
> > Yes, CGA based techniques can be a candidate, but details might be
> > important. For example, do they work for IPv4?
>
> What does "ND" stand for in "the SEND BoF"?
> I haven't seen anybody suggesting a SEARP BoF.

My point was, CGA was identified as a possible candidate to
secure IPv6 address configuration if we let it happen prior to
PANA. Since PANA should work for both IPv4 and IPv6,
then what would secure IPv4 address configuration prior
to PANA?

alper

---

From: Yoshihiro Ohba <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2002 19:43:42 -0400

I agree with Alper on that we need more analysis.  But I don't agree
on marking that feature as "desirable".  I think the appropriate
marking before doing analysis is "possible".

Yoshihiro Ohba