Subject: RE: Protection of success/failure indication.

From: "Mohan Parthasarathy" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 8 May 2003 17:01:20 -0700

> > So, the requirement can be modified to say that "The success/failure
> > messages
> > SHOULD be protected where possible" with some explanatory text as
> > described
> > above.
> 
> I agree. Not all authentication methods can produce crypto keys, hence
> saying "result MUST be protected" is too strong. Not all 
> environments need
> this kind of security anyways....
> 

Even if the methods can produce crypto keys, EAP success itself may not
be protected always. Please see my discussion in the EAP mailing list.
You may derive keys at the end of successful authentication in which case
EAP success was already transmitted unprotected. It is possible that
the EAP method derives keys first, eap exchanges happen, success is sent
out protected using the keys derived first. I think both these flavors
are possible. Is that right ?

-mohan

> Alper

---

From: Alper Yegin <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 08 May 2003 17:12:14 -0700

> are possible. Is that right ?

Yes, the former model is when the protection comes from turning on
lower-layer ciphering (link-layer or IPsec). The latter model is when the
last exchange of EAP can be MIC'ed by EAP transport. This is what we can do
with the current PANA design.

Alper