Subject: Certificate Policy Framework
From: Santosh Chokhani <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked], [email-masked], [email-masked]
Date: Tue, 31 Dec 1996 05:00:29 -0500

At the IETF meeting in December, a concern was raised regarding the size the
of poliyc document.  One point that I did not make clear is that the purpose
of the policy framework is to be all inclusive.  A policy writer has
complete freedom to make no stipulation on many of the elements in the
proposed framework.  Thus, if a CA does not feel that its certificate policy
need to address an element, it can say "no stipulation".  This decision can
be made at any level of refinement of the framework.

-------------------------------------------------
Santosh Chokhani
CygnaCom Solutions, Inc.
Suite 100 West
7927 Jones Branch Drive
McLean, Virginia 22102-3305
(703) 848 - 0883
[email-masked]

From: [email-masked] (joseph j twomey)
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Date: 29 Dec 1996  17:27 EST
Subject: Re: your LISTSERVE request "subscribe [email-masked] ietf-pkix"

unsubscribe

Thanks, Joe Twomey, [email-masked]

Date: Sat, 28 Dec 1996 17:06:09 -0800
To: [email-masked], [email-masked]
From: Warwick Ford <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Revised Certificate Extensions Amendment Text

Yes, it was a conscious decision.  The motivations, as I recall them, were
to produce optimal encodings with simplest notation, and to align with the
prevalent direction adopted by modern ASN.1 protocols.  (In fact the more
modern AUTOMATIC tagging was considered also, but rejected because it would
necessitate ASN.1 1994 tools.)

To reduce the confusion, I suggest that a clear CAUTION statement be
included in PKIX Part 1.

Warwick

At 05:31 PM 12/19/96 -0800, Anil R. Gangolli wrote:
>On Jun 2, 12:15pm, warwick (w.s.) ford wrote:
> > Subject: Revised Certificate Extensions Amendment Text
>
>Was it a conscious decision to go from default EXPLICIT tagging
>(X.509 Certificate definition module) to default IMPLICIT tagging
>in the (X.509 CertificateExtensions definition module)?
>
>Does anyone know the rationale for this?
>
>This kind of thing really confuses implementors.
>
>--a.
>
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Warwick Ford, VeriSign, Inc., One Alewife Center, Cambridge, MA 02140
   [email-masked]; Tel: (617)492 2816 x225; Fax: (613)661 0716
---------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Fri, 27 Dec 1996 11:50:04 -0500
To: [email-masked]
From: Stephen Kent <[email-masked]>
Subject: slides

All,

'm assembling the slides for publication in the IETF proceedings.  I have
slides online from Bob Blakley and Santosh.  Any other speaker who would
like his slides includes in the proceedings should send them to me (in
power point format) by 1/3/97.

You also should note that a revised set of minutes was sent out today, both
to the list and to the IETF secretariat.  I received only one correction
(from D. Pinkas), so only that change was made to the minutes.

Date: Fri, 27 Dec 1996 11:19:56 -0500
To: [email-masked]
From: Stephen Kent <[email-masked]>
Subject: PKIX WG( revised) Minutes (37th IETF)
Cc: [email-masked]

<fontfamily><param>Times</param><bigger><bigger>

		       PKIX WG Meeting Minutes

			(December 9-10, 1996)

	The PKIX WG met for two days at the December IETF meeting in

San Jose.  Approximately 200 IETF members attended the two meetings.

The main agenda topics were status/update briefings on Parts 1 and 3

of the PKIX document set, and an initial briefing on certification

policies, the focus of the Part 4 document.  There also was a
presentation

on a technique for requesting a certificate containing a
Diffie-Hellman

key, which requires a mathematically different approach to verifying
that

the requester holds the corresponding private key.

	There were also several informational briefings on topics of

interest to the PKIX WG.  M. Polk provided a status update of the NIST

MISPC activity, and B. Blakley provided an extensive briefing on the

APKI Working Group (not an IETF WG) activity, relating this

architecture to IETF standards activities.  This presentation

generated a substantial number of questions, at least in part because

of its inclusion of facilities for key escrow/recovery.

	The Part 1 document is nearing completion, and was briefed by

a new document editor, M. Polk, and by R. Housley.  Major changes

include a revision of the validity interval syntax (to better deal

with the year-2000 problem), inclusion of syntax for the PKIX

(private) extensions, etc.  Several suggestions for changes (most

minor) were made after the briefing, by D. Pinkas.  It was agreed that

these changes would be discussed on the WG mailing list after the

meeting.  The WG chairs called for rapid resolution of these issues

and document completion, to enable a WG last call early in 1997.

	M. Polk provided a brief update on the status of the MISPC

activity at NIST, as a successor to a similar briefing provided in

Montreal.  For the most part, the resulting NIST specs match the PKIX

specs (parts 1 and 3), with minor differences.  For example, there are

no private extensions defined and there is a requirement for non-null

subject and issuer DN fields.  With regard to algorithms, ECDSA, DSA,

and RSA are all defined and support for at least one of these is

required.  LDAP is required for repository access, and the NIST spec

does not include any CA-repository protocols; it also accommodates

PKCS-10 request formats, embedded in PXIK message formats.  90-day

comment period began 12/2, and after review a NIST Special Publication

will be produced.

	D. Solo provided a brief presentation on certificate requests

that contain Diffie-Hellman keys.  The focus here is on the means by

which the requester uses his private key to "sign" the request, since

D-H does not support signatures.  The context for this certificate

request is the PKCS-10 specification.  The basis of the "signature" is

a D-H key generated between the requester and the CA (the CA must have

a D-H certificate for this purpose), which is then input to a hash

including the requester and issuer names, and the resulting output is

used as a key for an HMAC computation covering the text of the request

message.

	The presentation on the Part 3 document was made by its

authors, S. Farrell and C. Adams.  Major changes include

simplification of the ASN.1 syntax, added message types (e.g.,

information requests and responses, publication, private key archive),

some new security services for RA/user-CA communication.  There are

some differences between proposed "proof of possession" approaches for

D-H keys, vs. what D. Solo presented.  This difference needs to be

resolved.  Also, there was some concern that this protocol might be

"close" to the Bellovin-Meritt encrypted key exchange, which is a

patented algorithm.  An issue was raised about using PKCS-7 as a

security envelope technique, in lieu of some of the current Part 3

format This would simplify the document and re-uses existing code,

although it also creates a dependency on another document.  A straw

poll suggests widespread support for PKCS-7 in this context. There is

a separate issue about use of PKCS-10, which is somewhat less powerful

than what is currently offered.  Thus the suggestion is to make

PKCS-10 a format option, but not the only format option for

certificate request messages.

	The PKIX Part 4 presentation was the first on this part of the

PKIX document set, and was provided by S. Chokhani.  This was a

informational briefing on the topic of certificate policies, as well

as providing technical details for a proposed certificate policy

framework.  The framework encompasses 9 top-level elements: community

definition and applicability, I&A policy for subjects/RAs/CAs, key

management policy, non-technical security policy, technical security

policy, operations policy, legal & business provisions, certificate

and CRL profiles, and policy administration.  This is all viewed as

human, not machine, readable.  The machine readable aspect is

captured by the use of the policy OIDs and policy qualifiers.

	The meeting concluded with a brief announcement of the

formation of a BOF and a mailing list to address the topic of

certificate (and private key) storage.

</bigger></bigger></fontfamily>

To: IETF-Announce:;@tandem.com
cc: [email-masked]
From: [email-masked]
Reply-to: [email-masked]
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-ipki-part1-03.txt
Date: Tue, 24 Dec 1996 09:46:58 -0500
Sender: [email-masked]

--NextPart

 A Revised Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
 directories. This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure 
 (X.509) Working Group of the IETF.                                        

       Title     : Internet Public Key Infrastructure   
                   Part I:  X.509 Certificate and CRL Profile                             
       Author(s) : R. Housley, W. Ford, T. Polk, D. Solo
       Filename  : draft-ietf-pkix-ipki-part1-03.txt
       Pages     : 61
       Date      : 12/23/1996

This is the second draft of the Internet Public Key Infrastructure X.509 
Certificate and CRL Profile.  Since the first version was distributed, ISO 
has completed work on X.509 Version 3 Certificates and X.509 Version 2 
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).  Many of the Internet community 
requirements that were in the previous version of this document have been 
included in the final ISO document.  As a result, this document has gotten 
simpler.  Please send comments on this document to the [email-masked]
mail list.                                                                 

Internet-Drafts are available by anonymous FTP.  Login with the username
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Internet-Drafts directories are located at:	
	                                                
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--NextPart--

Date: Sat, 21 Dec 1996 14:18:00 -0500
From: "David P. Kemp" <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked], [email-masked]
Subject: Re:  FW: PKCS#7 in PKIX-3

From: Peter Williams <[email-masked]>
>
> Carlise,
>
> Much of the analysis here seem highly prescriptive (you seem to have
> decided you dont like the proposal, then constructed an argument
> against it), whereas what we need is internet PKI components with
> feature flexibility in order to satisfy the actual market demand for
> multi-vendor PKI product/service interworking, and the buildup of a
> unified infrastructure involving many parties.

It is not possible for an external observer to know which of the
following thought processes were used:

 1) consider the problem as deeply as possible, and formulate a
    proposal which best addresses the issues as understood by the
    author, or

 2) arbitrarily pick a position, and then come up with a set of
    rationalizations to support that position. This latter technique
    is used in debate training, where participants are told what
    positions to defend, and are judged on the quality of their
    defense. It is also used in the U.S. legal system, where lawyers
    are obligated to represent their client's interests without
    regard for their own personal opinion of the merits.

But regardless of whether Carlisle is at heart an engineer or a
lawyer, the arguments he presents are concrete, in writing. They
can be considered by all observers, and they will succeed or fail
based on their technical merit, assuming that this audience (the
IETF) is interested in good engineering.

From: Peter Williams <[email-masked]>
>
> Tim,
>
> You seem, say I, to attack my style of writing and argument, rather
> than the issues I raise.

To this observer, the ad-hominem attacks have come from neither
Carlisle nor Tim.  Let's hope that in the future all participants
will confine themselves to the issues, to wit:

 1) PKIX-3 will be used to establish credentials where none currently
    exist, therefore it must include its own protection mechanism which
    is mandatory to implement.  It may also optionally rely on external
    protection mechanisms, but that is beside the point.

 2) The purpose of all standards, including this one, is to reduce
    the degrees of freedom available to developers and consumers. PKIX-3
    must be capable of addressing today's requirements and flexible enough
    to accommodate what we currently understand of future requirements,
    but should not define or require more than the necessary and sufficient
    capability.

I recently re-read RFC 2026, "The Internet Standards Process". It
makes a useful and enlightening distinction between Applicability
Statements (AS) and Technical Standards (TS).  A TS defines a particular
protocol. An AS applies to a particular environment/application area, and
specifies one or more TSs to be used in that environment, along with
the requirement level (mandatory, recommended, optional) for each TS.

PKIX-3 is a TS.  If it is useful to specify the applicability of
{PKCS-7, S/MIME, PKCS-10, PGP, PEM, MOSS, MSP, MMP, SSL, IPSEC,
ActiveX, Java, ...} to the Certificate Management environment, the
proper way to do so is to write an AS, not re-write PKIX-3 to include
any or all other protocols/message formats that might be involved in a
Certificate Management system.

To me, the logic behind Carlisle's and Tim's positions on the above
two issues appears both sound and technically motivated. And, for the
record, I agree with those positions.

But the purpose of this working group is to achieve (at a minimum)
rough consensus. Let's attempt to arrive at that consensus as
harmoniously as possible, without over-analyzing the motivations
of the participants.

From: Peter Whittaker <[email-masked]>
To: "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: PKCS#7 in PKIX-3
Date: Sat, 21 Dec 1996 13:28:00 -0500
Encoding: 27 TEXT

>> I think we need a 
>>credible commitment by the PKCS editor, that the new version of PKCS#7 
>>will be stable by the end of February 1997.  This commitment must be 
>>provided by the end of the first week in January 1997.  However, this 
>>time-scale seems unrealistic. 
> 
>Why not just incorporate the required portions of PKCS into PKIX?  The
>clarity 
>and openness of the specifications would be greatly improved.  There should
>be 
>no reason to rely on PKCS (a vendor controlled document) in the open IETF 
>process. 

During the SAAG review at the San Jose IETF, it was mentioned that the
IESG may publish the PKCS documents as informational RFC's:  the owners
of the PKCS documents had indicated their willingness/desire to submit
them.  While the PKCS editors would maintain control over document
content (unless the PKCS documents became standards-track), IESG rules
would require new RFC numbers for new versions of the documents, which
would at least make it possible for us to all refer unambiguously to the
same version of a particular PKCS document.

I don't know what the status of this is.  Would the publication of the
PKCS documents as RFC's address your concern?

pww

From: Peter Williams <[email-masked]>
To: "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>
Subject: FW: PKCS#7 in PKIX-3
Date: Fri, 20 Dec 1996 15:53:47 -0800
Encoding: 208 TEXT

Tim,

You seem, say I, to attack my style of writing and argument, rather than
the issues I raise. This is becoming uniform and commonplace in certain US govt-related
circles, its my perception (conspiracy followup to alt.privacy, perhaps). But, lets
address technical issues, and consider how best the document should evolve
to represent an determinable concensus.

I find it bogus that one forces a given model of certification management object 
protection upon the free-wheeling Internet (with its mix
of interanet, internet, and extranet functional and physical distirbution modes), 
whilst arguing for a priori interworking  benefits, when
there can be no assumption that two parties, using a priori "unknown" implementations,
will use the same algorithms, or use the same profile of a given popular
algorithm as to key lengths, exponents etc. One cannot know they will support the same set of
attributes for naming, or they can handle given size of encodings. One cannot
know, given the document as-is that a given CA solution will support any one of the listed
operational protocols (I.3-4) or that all the service will be enforced/provided by a CA service of
product ( e.g. mandatory key escrow for all foreigners).  
 
I dont intend my contributions in this thread to be any different to the intent of
one from the I-D  "this document defines a profile to promote .. development
of   application tools; and interoperability determined by policy, as
opposed to syntax." ok, this applied to cert contents, but it goes
for management protocols also, it seems.

its policy freedom - at the protection layer - during the management
activity that Im calling for in the framework, and is the sentiment epxressed at the WG, I learned
from the minutes posted to the the list.

PKIX-1 goes on to say:

"Some communities will need to supplement, or possibly replace, this
 profile in order to meet the requirements of specialized application"

I suggest that supporting a certifcate management service is precisely just one such
specialised management application - by virtue of its inherent needs for adressing
local threats and objectives for control procedures Enrollment and management activities
of router-based certs, versus consumer certs, versus CA certs are
all turning out to have quite different dynamics, requirements and
needs for localization based on such practical matters as available
memory in a device. Furthermore, as some enviornments use short-life
certs (1 day, and even use-once) whereas others use long-life certs,
the protection requiremnets for rollover and reissuance are
not such that one can at this stage in the industry standardize
their requirements of services. It would be nice, however, if they could use
std syntaxes from PKIX for the information objects so promote
reuse of std modules and multi-vendor componentware which can be profesionally
built for integration into solution environments by third parties. At least this
should be denied!

PKIX-3 says "9. PKI management protocols must be usable over a variety of "transport" 
mechanisms, specifically including mail, http, TCP/IP and ftp." yet it
goes on to define specific peer-peer request-response layer protocol at a socket ports.
Is this mandatory? Is the document contradictory? If all the transports
are wholly equivalent, and non-specalised, they do no need standardizing
here, especially as support seem not to be mandatory and may well
conflict with corporate security policies for transport channels, firewall configurations,
and require duplicate management/configuration etc. If I do not implement
this optional socket protocol, will the Nortel and VerISign products not fail to interwork?!

It seems evident that general internet-wide system-level interoperability is thus
not sensibly mandated in PKIX scope; PKIX should  agree the nature of the information objects
and indiciate the flows system one should expect to participate it.

Its on account of the inherent nature of the problem of certifcation system's requiring
a high degree of environmental specialization that I comment thus. PKIX is not PEM - a
solution; PKIX seems limitied to being able to standardize componentware so solutions
can be constructed. At most it is a framework standard, and to to pretend
more is not realisitic. I suggest the framework be structured to separate
protection, and information objects, merely, and exploit layering encapsulation.

There is an emerging alternative perspective to the current PKIX-3 notion - that on each
hop of message flow between principals in the certification system, one can realistically
expect a *local* control system to be deployed to assure some property of the overall
system required by the prevailing security policy, which will need to be tuned to
both local threats and local requirements for control laid down
in said security policy document. Often this will satisfy commercial threats
of information disclosure as much as technical threats to system integrity.
 
It is highly likely that corporate users will base such management
control systems upon the existing features of corporate security policy - exploiting
reliance on *encapsulating" secure physical networks, networking level encryption, closed
user groups, global distributed system security, secure email networks - in which
they have invested heavily, and have developed the complementary
risk/personnel/audit management control systems which assure those technology
deployments, and their adequacy for use in a key management scenario.

On controlling a new procedures, such as an ORA's activity in
authentication management, we have found that those with
wel-managed, comemrcial-grade corporate security systems, e.g. Entrust-protected
email, sometimes wish to exploit that technology as part of the
control system for certificate management, rather than invent
anew. They have significant non-technical resources already
invested in that control systems apparatus, including specialization of such
as an Entrust email channel to the specific purpose of supporting
authentication management function of a certification system.

My observation that an *unbundled* protection envelope (which encapulates
std information objects, rather than protects inner types) be the basis
of the design is founded on such observation of the success of the
above approach in which componentware from multiple sources were
bunded by the customers without third-party invention, yet
all parties in a staticaly configured certification system could agree the
actual basis for technical interworking and system msg flow with minimal effort,
complete control over local security policy maintained in the hands
of the procurer, and selection from muliple sources of equivalent
product/toolkit/protction technology based on price, availability,
and other value-adds  etc.
 
The minutes from the meeting clearly epxressed that a sentiment
had been heard from the floor that a PKCS7-like relationship
should be addressed. I.e. some form of unbundling. I have deduced that the
underlying message was one of unbunding the protection mechanism from the information
types used to construct the certiifcation system, so reuse
of component and controls is a feature, not an after-thought. Its not clear
to me from the minutes whether the notion is to use a PKCS7
as one of the "algoirhtms" within the current msg format, else
use PKCS7 as one of the whole-msg encapsulation technologies
allowing for control of msg flow to thus be enforced by configuration of
std corporate infrastructure components (Entrust, S/MIME, Hannah.
IPSEC tunnels etc), versus reinventing control system enforcement
mechanism when performing the task of cert enrollment and management.

Before we discuss the pros and cons of a solution with PKCS7 syntax
or otherwise, perhaps we can address the design concept
of unbundling the mechanism ,and using encapulating technolgies
to ensure std control practices, and ensure concensus of concept. This
is after all a benefit of a well-managed I-D and RFC process.

It seems shame that a protocol of this importance should receive so
little comment, and thatm and a community polls which are volunteered to
the WG authors is so apparantly disparaged. Concensus
by default will likely lead to another MOSS scenario. What we
need is active concensus.

Peter.

----------
From: 	Tim Moses
Sent: 	Friday, December 20, 1996 7:46 AM
To: 	[email-masked]'
Subject: 	PKCS#7 in PKIX-3

Colleagues - I have just reviewed two contributions to the PKIX list
from Russ Housley and Peter Williams.  Russ's is a model of clarity and
succinctness which needs no further explanation from me.  I believe that
at the kernel of Peter's contribution are two main points:

1. 	Where PKIX-3 exchanges require the presence of a secure channel
(authentic and/or confidential) it should assume that the required
secure mechanism is available; provided by some other (unspecified)
means.
2. 	PKCS#7 is a suitable secure mechanism under some circumstances.

Taking the first point; at first glance it seems persuasive: why invent
something new when the community has already devoted a great deal of
effort to the development of sound and efficient secure communication
mechanisms that should be suitable for the present purpose?  But
questions remain: should we allow ANY suitable mechanism, or should we
select just one of the available standard mechanisms (PKCS#7 perhaps)?
Peter seems to propose the former approach and Russ seems to lean
towards the latter, provided that PKCS#7 is amended in the new draft to
address the deficiencies identified by Carlisle in his recent analysis.

As Carlisle has pointed out, PKIX-3 must be capable of breaking the
vicious circle in which a secure mechanism must be available in order
that PKIX-3 can be used to establish a secure mechanism.  Therefore,
PKIX-3 must include a secure mechanism in its mandatory subset.  If
implementors wish to use a current or future version of PKCS#7 they may
do so, in accordance with the optional subset of the PKIX-3 provisions.

I believe the vendor and user communities expect the number of degrees
of freedom in the solution space to be significantly reduced by
standards like PKIX-3.  PKIX-3 should be a code-word in the user's mind
for "a future-resistant protocol suite that addresses all my concerns
related to the management of public key infrastructure services in a
sound, efficient and a multi-vendor interoperable manner".  If we
achieve this, then the issue will be removed from the table, and we can
all go on to solve the next big problem.  If we allow the mechanism to
be chosen by the implementor, then interoperability will be threatened,
and the user will have to assess the suitability of the underlying
secure communication mechanism for management of the public key
certificates in his/her particular application.  For example, Peter
suggests DCE as a mechanism which may be suitable under some
circumstances, but DCE was developed to satisfy the requirements of user
authentication in a distributed computing environment.  It may,
therefore, be quite unsuitable for satisfying the requirements of
non-repudiation for high-value business transactions.

Russ's proposal is more attractive.  And, because of the succinct, clear
and unemotional way in which it is presented, it is much more likely to
receive a sympathetic review by its readers.  My one concern is for
time-scale.  It is undesirable, or perhaps unacceptable, to delay the
progression of PKIX-3 in anticipation of a revision to PKCS#7 which may
or may not solve the problems that are not solved by the current
version. Before we can consider this solution, I think we need a
credible commitment by the PKCS editor, that the new version of PKCS#7
will be stable by the end of February 1997.  This commitment must be
provided by the end of the first week in January 1997.  However, this
time-scale seems unrealistic.

Best regards.  Tim.

Date: 20 Dec 96 13:13:52 -0800
From: "PALAMBER.US.ORACLE.COM" <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: PKCS#7 in PKIX-3

--=_ORCL_27679169_0_11919612201430390
Content-Transfer-Encoding:7bit
Content-Type:text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"

> I think we need a 
>credible commitment by the PKCS editor, that the new version of PKCS#7 
>will be stable by the end of February 1997.  This commitment must be 
>provided by the end of the first week in January 1997.  However, this 
>time-scale seems unrealistic. 
 
Why not just incorporate the required portions of PKCS into PKIX?  The clarity 
and openness of the specifications would be greatly improved.  There should be 
no reason to rely on PKCS (a vendor controlled document) in the open IETF 
process. 
 
Paul 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Paul Lambert                     Director of Security Products 
Oracle Corporation               Phone:         (415) 506-0370 
500 Oracle Parkway, Box 659410     Fax:         (415) 633-2963 
Redwood Shores, CA  94065       E-Mail: [email-masked] 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
"Secure Jobs"  ->  send resumes to: [email-masked]   
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                or interest in: (C++, Java, CORBA, security,  
                X.500, etc.) 
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Date: 20 Dec 96 07:46:55
From:"Tim Moses <[email-masked]>" <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked] ,<[email-masked]>
Subject:PKCS#7 in PKIX-3
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Colleagues - I have just reviewed two contributions to the PKIX list
from Russ Housley and Peter Williams.  Russ's is a model of clarity and
succinctness which needs no further explanation from me.  I believe that
at the kernel of Peter's contribution are two main points:

1. 	Where PKIX-3 exchanges require the presence of a secure channel
(authentic and/or confidential) it should assume that the required
secure mechanism is available; provided by some other (unspecified)
means.
2. 	PKCS#7 is a suitable secure mechanism under some circumstances.

Taking the first point; at first glance it seems persuasive: why invent
something new when the community has already devoted a great deal of
effort to the development of sound and efficient secure communication
mechanisms that should be suitable for the present purpose?  But
questions remain: should we allow ANY suitable mechanism, or should we
select just one of the available standard mechanisms (PKCS#7 perhaps)?
Peter seems to propose the former approach and Russ seems to lean
towards the latter, provided that PKCS#7 is amended in the new draft to
address the deficiencies identified by Carlisle in his recent analysis.

As Carlisle has pointed out, PKIX-3 must be capable of breaking the
vicious circle in which a secure mechanism must be available in order
that PKIX-3 can be used to establish a secure mechanism.  Therefore,
PKIX-3 must include a secure mechanism in its mandatory subset.  If
implementors wish to use a current or future version of PKCS#7 they may
do so, in accordance with the optional subset of the PKIX-3 provisions.

I believe the vendor and user communities expect the number of degrees
of freedom in the solution space to be significantly reduced by
standards like PKIX-3.  PKIX-3 should be a code-word in the user's mind
for "a future-resistant protocol suite that addresses all my concerns
related to the management of public key infrastructure services in a
sound, efficient and a multi-vendor interoperable manner".  If we
achieve this, then the issue will be removed from the table, and we can
all go on to solve the next big problem.  If we allow the mechanism to
be chosen by the implementor, then interoperability will be threatened,
and the user will have to assess the suitability of the underlying
secure communication mechanism for management of the public key
certificates in his/her particular application.  For example, Peter
suggests DCE as a mechanism which may be suitable under some
circumstances, but DCE was developed to satisfy the requirements of user
authentication in a distributed computing environment.  It may,
therefore, be quite unsuitable for satisfying the requirements of
non-repudiation for high-value business transactions.

Russ's proposal is more attractive.  And, because of the succinct, clear
and unemotional way in which it is presented, it is much more likely to
receive a sympathetic review by its readers.  My one concern is for
time-scale.  It is undesirable, or perhaps unacceptable, to delay the
progression of PKIX-3 in anticipation of a revision to PKCS#7 which may
or may not solve the problems that are not solved by the current
version. Before we can consider this solution, I think we need a
credible commitment by the PKCS editor, that the new version of PKCS#7
will be stable by the end of February 1997.  This commitment must be
provided by the end of the first week in January 1997.  However, this
time-scale seems unrealistic.

Best regards.  Tim.

--=_ORCL_27679169_0_11919612201430390--

From: Tim Moses <[email-masked]>
To: "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>
Subject: PKCS#7 in PKIX-3
Date: Fri, 20 Dec 1996 10:46:55 -0500
Encoding: 61 TEXT

Colleagues - I have just reviewed two contributions to the PKIX list
from Russ Housley and Peter Williams.  Russ's is a model of clarity and
succinctness which needs no further explanation from me.  I believe that
at the kernel of Peter's contribution are two main points:

1. 	Where PKIX-3 exchanges require the presence of a secure channel
(authentic and/or confidential) it should assume that the required
secure mechanism is available; provided by some other (unspecified)
means.
2. 	PKCS#7 is a suitable secure mechanism under some circumstances.

Taking the first point; at first glance it seems persuasive: why invent
something new when the community has already devoted a great deal of
effort to the development of sound and efficient secure communication
mechanisms that should be suitable for the present purpose?  But
questions remain: should we allow ANY suitable mechanism, or should we
select just one of the available standard mechanisms (PKCS#7 perhaps)?
Peter seems to propose the former approach and Russ seems to lean
towards the latter, provided that PKCS#7 is amended in the new draft to
address the deficiencies identified by Carlisle in his recent analysis.

As Carlisle has pointed out, PKIX-3 must be capable of breaking the
vicious circle in which a secure mechanism must be available in order
that PKIX-3 can be used to establish a secure mechanism.  Therefore,
PKIX-3 must include a secure mechanism in its mandatory subset.  If
implementors wish to use a current or future version of PKCS#7 they may
do so, in accordance with the optional subset of the PKIX-3 provisions.

I believe the vendor and user communities expect the number of degrees
of freedom in the solution space to be significantly reduced by
standards like PKIX-3.  PKIX-3 should be a code-word in the user's mind
for "a future-resistant protocol suite that addresses all my concerns
related to the management of public key infrastructure services in a
sound, efficient and a multi-vendor interoperable manner".  If we
achieve this, then the issue will be removed from the table, and we can
all go on to solve the next big problem.  If we allow the mechanism to
be chosen by the implementor, then interoperability will be threatened,
and the user will have to assess the suitability of the underlying
secure communication mechanism for management of the public key
certificates in his/her particular application.  For example, Peter
suggests DCE as a mechanism which may be suitable under some
circumstances, but DCE was developed to satisfy the requirements of user
authentication in a distributed computing environment.  It may,
therefore, be quite unsuitable for satisfying the requirements of
non-repudiation for high-value business transactions.

Russ's proposal is more attractive.  And, because of the succinct, clear
and unemotional way in which it is presented, it is much more likely to
receive a sympathetic review by its readers.  My one concern is for
time-scale.  It is undesirable, or perhaps unacceptable, to delay the
progression of PKIX-3 in anticipation of a revision to PKCS#7 which may
or may not solve the problems that are not solved by the current
version. Before we can consider this solution, I think we need a
credible commitment by the PKCS editor, that the new version of PKCS#7
will be stable by the end of February 1997.  This commitment must be
provided by the end of the first week in January 1997.  However, this
time-scale seems unrealistic.

Best regards.  Tim.

From: "Anil R. Gangolli" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 19 Dec 1996 17:31:13 -0800
Reply-To: [email-masked]
To: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Revised Certificate Extensions Amendment Text

On Jun 2, 12:15pm, warwick (w.s.) ford wrote:
 > Subject: Revised Certificate Extensions Amendment Text

Was it a conscious decision to go from default EXPLICIT tagging
(X.509 Certificate definition module) to default IMPLICIT tagging
in the (X.509 CertificateExtensions definition module)?

Does anyone know the rationale for this?

This kind of thing really confuses implementors.

--a.

Date: 19 Dec 1996 14:32 EST
Sender: "Carlisle Adams" <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
From: "Carlisle Adams" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: PKIX-3 San Jose Discussions...

Hi Peter,

In message " PKIX-3 San Jose Discussions...", [email-masked] writes:

>Carlise,
>
>Much of the analysis here seem highly prescriptive (you seem to
>have decided you dont like the proposal, then constructed an argument
>against it),

I'm sorry (not to mention surprised) that it looks this way to you.  What
I tried to do was give a short, clear list of the reasons that PKCS7 and
PKCS10 seem to be deficient for what PKIX-3 is trying to achieve.  Stephen
and I have nothing whatsoever against PKCS.  However, since they do not
satisfy the requirements in some areas, we thought it might be useful (at
least as a basis for further discussion) to point this out before removing 
bits of a suitable protocol and replacing them with PKCS7 and 10.

>Depending upon local threats, the protection requirements for
>the messaging channel for a certification system are diverse; one 
>protection concept will simply not fit all as the assurnaces required
>demand different mechanims in different enviornments, given
>local threat analysis, and model of handling liability.

While I agree with this in principle, I must admit that it's not clear to
me how replacing the proposed ProtectionBits field with PKCS7 enveloping
achieves this...  

My guess is that much of what you suggest here will be achieved through 
the use of various *algorithms*, rather than various enveloping protocols, 
and the ProtectionBits concept of course allows for this.

>Thus I argue that general-purpose enveloping standards (PEM, S/MIME,
>MOSS. MSP, PGP), versus a given protection mechanism solution, is where the
>IETF WG needs to spend it efforts amending PKIX-3. 

In other words, you are suggesting that we divorce the actual PKIX-3 protocols
from the method used to protect the protocols.  PKIX-3 should define the
message contents and leave the protection of the messages to some other
mechanism (i.e., enveloping protocol).  Again this sounds fine in principle,
but it is interesting to note that most of the enveloping protocols you 
suggest depend on (or at least assume) some sort of public key infrastructure
(i.e., the sender and/or receiver already have authenticated names of some
form, and already have key pairs which can be trusted by some means
(certificates, or otherwise)).  But the primary purpose of PKIX-3 is 
precisely to *establish* this public key infrastructure in the first place.
That is, you start with PKIX-3 (or equivalent) and *then* you will be able
to use things like S/MIME, PGP, MSP, etc..  It seems to me that PKIX-3 needs
its own (simple) protection mechanism so that authenticated names and trusted
keys can be created in the *absence* of any pre-existing infrastructure.

>(...stuff deleted...)

The remainder of your e-mail served to drive home the point that you felt
that the messages and the protection of those messages should be separate
issues, and that existing mechanisms (e.g., enveloping protocols, IPsec,
TLS, etc.) should be used for the latter.  Perhaps I should just note in
passing that PKIX-3 *already* supports this.  The syntax for PKIMessage
very clearly has the ProtectionBits field as OPTIONAL, meaning that you
could certainly take the SEQUENCE of PKIHeader and PKIBody, add no
ProtectionBits, and protect the result using your "preferred" protection
mechanism.  This in no way violates the letter or the spirit of PKIX-3.

However, such an action does not easily lead to interoperability.
If I as an end-entity decide that I will use only S/MIME, but my CA/RA
uses only PGP, we have no communication.  Allowing everyone to use 
whatever mechanism they want will clearly lead nowhere.  PKIX-3 needs to
allow any number of options, but MANDATE only one (so that interoperability
is guaranteed between any pair of conformant communicants).  I have already
(in my previous note) given the reasons why it does not make sense to mandate 
PKCS7 (as it is currently specified).  Unless people in this working group
can find another candidate which *does* meet all requirements, PKIX-3 needs
to specify its own protection mechanism.  The one we have specified appears
to be as simple as it can possibly be and meets all requirements -- in my 
opinion it makes sense for this to be the mandatory mechanism.  Any other 
mechanism suitable for a given pair of communicants may be used without 
breaking the PKIX-3 protocols.

I'm having trouble understanding why this does not satisfy everyone.

Carlisle.

>by many, many, many parties using the Internet worldwide.

Just curious to know how you arrived at this precise number.  I suspect 
that some people would claim that four "many"s are necessary, while 
others would argue that two "many"s are more than sufficient...

Date: Wed, 18 Dec 96 10:49:17 
From: "Housley, Russ" <[email-masked]>
Encoding: 368 Text
To: [email-masked], Carlisle Adams <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: PKIX-3 San Jose Discussions...

Carlisle:

Good analysis.

I still prefer the use of a wrapper like PKCS#7 or MSP as opposed to a 
PKIX-3 specific wrapper.  RSA has announced that PKCS#7 is open for 
modification.  In fact, they have asked for input from a wide array of 
sources.  Perhaps we can provide our requirements so that the next 
generation of PKCS#7 can be used directly.

Russ

Date: Wed, 18 Dec 1996 10:19:38 -0800
From: Denis Pinkas <[email-masked]>
Reply-To: [email-masked]
Organization: Bull
To: IETF-PXIX <[email-masked]>
Subject: Comments on part 1

This is remainder of the five comments made during the PKIX session on 
part 1.

These comments have been discussed after the meeting with two of the 
editors (Russel Housley and David Solo) and the results of the
discussion
will be reflected in the next version.

Note: Text between brackets [ ] was not part of the discussion.

1) Page 8. Section 3.3. Last sentence of the second paragraph. Entries
of 
a CRL must still be present, at least, in the next CRL following the 
expiration date of the certificate. [In practice, it should stay for
some 
period of time as it may be difficult for a verifier to identify which
is 
the next CRL following the expiration date of the certificate].

2) Page 10. item g). cross-certification can be unilateral or
bi-lateral. 
This is currently reflected correctly in part 3.

3) Page 24. Section 5.3.3. Invalidity date. Second sentence. The 
invalidity date cannot always be later than the issue of the previously 
issued CRL.

4) Page 25. Section 6. Certificate path validation. The issue was how to 
handle the case of the hold when non repudiation applies. After 
discussion, it appears that the result of a path validation is not
simply 
YES or NO, but also "Wait, may be and come back later". While a 
certificate is on hold it is not possible to state the validity of a
path 
and so the caller will have to call again later on to wait for the 
termination of the hold state, which may end up by a revocation status
or 
not. In the case of revocation, the revocation date will be the date
where 
the certificate was first placed on hold.

As a side discussion, we observed that if there is an hold state and if 
the certificate expires, the CA must make a decision which must appear 
(at least) in the next CRL issued after the validity period of the 
certificate. The decision must be to include it or not in the CRL. The 
default should be to include it. [As mentioned above, in practice, if 
revocation occurs then it should stay for some period of time as it may
be 
difficult for a verifier to identify which is the next CRL following the 
expiration date of the certificate. This means that CRLs may have to 
include, during some period of time, certificate identifiers referring
to 
recently-expired certificates.

I would like also to comment on the mail exchanges related to "The
Meaning 
of Hold" posted during the IETF meeting, in particular the mail from
Russ 
from Tuesday the 10 th. He said "The decision is always based on the
most 
recent CRL". When referring to the example, this is absolutely is true. 
However, I would like to point out that this is not the case when the
time 
of verification is not within the certificate validity period. In that 
case it is necessary to grasp the "n+1 CRL" which means in practice to
get 
a CRL issued recently after the expiration date of the certificate.

I would suggest that we consider in the policy (part 4) to add a time 
period during which recently-expired certificates will be retained in
the 
CRLs].

5) Page 13. Page 13. Section 4.1.5. Validity period within the 
certificate. We discussed that topic and came into agreement about the 
rational. Dave will try to capture the notion by proposing a new 
definition, saying basically that it is the period during which the CA
is 
responsible for posting the CRL (without forgetting the n+1 CRL). In 
addition we will attempt to provide an annex giving more explanations on 
the topic in particular when non repudiation is concerned.

Denis

-- 

      Denis Pinkas     Bull S.A.         E-mail : [email-masked]
      Rue Jean Jaures  B.P. 68            Phone : 33 - 1 30 80 34 87
      78340 Les Clayes sous Bois. FRANCE   Fax  : 33 - 1 30 80 33 21

Sender: [email-masked]
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 1996 08:34:06 -0200
From: Edjozane Campos Cavalcanti <[email-masked]>
Organization: INMET
To: [email-masked]
Subject: (no subject)

unsubscribe

From: Peter Williams <[email-masked]>
To: "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: PKIX-3 San Jose Discussions...
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 1996 11:32:10 -0800

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Carlise,

Much of the analysis here seem highly prescriptive (you seem to
have decided you dont like the proposal, then constructed an argument
against it), whereas what we need is internet PKI components with feature flexibility
in order to satisfy the actual market demand for multi-vendor
PKI product/service interworking, and the buildup of a unified infrastructure
involving many parties.

Depending upon local threats, the protection requirements for
the messaging channel for a certification system are diverse; one 
protection concept will simply not fit all as the assurnaces required
demand different mechanims in different enviornments, given
local threat analysis, and model of handling liability.

Thus I argue that general-purpose enveloping standards (PEM, S/MIME,
MOSS. MSP, PGP), versus a given protection mechanism solution, is where the
IETF WG needs to spend it efforts amending PKIX-3. This is the mood that the WG
expressed, it was reported (subjectively...) to me. I would argue for the syntax of PKCS#7
to ensure harmonization of software interworking - the actual mechanism
for indiciating protection requiremnets, negotiation thereof, and signalling
of features etc, can be worked as the WG proceeds to consider the IETF WG's
polled desires.

If one wishes to use use MOSS, instead, I would not
architecturally object. On account of market penetration, I would *practically*
argue for adoption of the equivalent PKCS7 framework, though, as
many parties have tools, working implementations/products or component-level 
integrations already already bundled with the OS.

To consider the issues, rather than an ordained outcome:

PKCS7 can be used in a PEM-like S/MIME mode - designed
for inter-personal  email environments, else it can be used in SET mode (tailored
for tight, specialised, payment protocol environments) else it can
be used in support of key management protocols.. The channels
protected by PKCS7 services may be profiled as "S/MIME-like channels"
 - between parties who may have no prior relationship -
else they may be symmetrically-keyed  "EncryptedData channels"
- for use in more statically-managed crypto/security environments
relying upon other PKCS#7 or S/MIME messages to periodically distribute
pairwise keys

Obviously, there may be mix and match needs, which good management systems
will enable for the certification system when deployed in a specific context.

One should note that the use of PKCS#10 within PKCS#7
is - at the layering abstraction - an identical design to the DoD/MISSI work
on MMP over MSP in a enviornment of personal presence identity
confirmation. There is nothing unusual about the proposal to
rely upon "static channels" to protect all or part of a certification system; this
contrasts with the proposal to build/bundle a specific protection technology
directly into the certification protocol for no apparent customer benefit. This 
PKIS style design is a technique known to be in use using the Entrust email
std, for example, to pass authenticated msgs around for
use by CAs using PKCS#10. Relying on secure messaging as a std
component, is perhaps the way to go, rather than constructing a specialist
envelope satisying no one particular need, but being insufficeint for everyone.

----

To evaulate the background and opportunity for the issues, and available technology
for constructing *systems* of security, rather than force everyting
into a monolithic application layer service, list members may wish to
consider the following sources of practical technolgy for standards-conformant
componentware.  (Equivalent featured offeringsm, conforming to the same
standards,  are also available from non-Microsoft sources, buts its not as well
presented, in my own view.)

As PKCS#7 and PKCS#10 have been distributed as components
in the Windows product, available worldwide, it seems silly to
to deny use of these very recent/pending deployments of industry standards
- for which much effort has already been expended in the retention of licenses,
export approvals, intergration with weak and strong ciphers etc
by many, many, many parties using the Internet worldwide.

A working copy of PKCS#10 and PKCS#7 can be downloaded for
free from the MS website:http://www.microsoft.com/intdev/security/misf6_6.htm

In generalcomment on PKIX-3 - there is no reason in aa complex INternet/intranet/extranet
enviornment to always force the protection model for the certification system to use a
particular  in-band protection mechanism -  MISPC/PKIX-3 nor PKCS7 nor
any other thing.

Part of the desire to promote PKCS7 as an allowed option is, being a component
technology, that it allows *multiple* localised protection models to be configured.
Having established this as an important goal, it then possible to note that "messaging
security" is itself not even necessary - one might rely on an authenticated
IPSEC channel, else a WINSOCK/SSL channel in those enviornments
were such faciliities are available.

See. perhaps free code on: http://www.microsoft.com/intdev/security/schannel/default.htm

I could go on to suggest how the messages defined for certiifcation might
also pass over DCE RPC relying upon the RPC security for optional privacy
and authentication of the operations passing over the
wire. I think Windows NT4 comes with a free implementation...

Perhaps, in final comment, we should note in the PKIX document that
- to make the point strongly to implementors - that the MOSS protocol
should be assumed as a possible  transport environment used
to protect the PKS messages - be these using certs, using raw RSA keys,
uysing symmetric pairs, using DH, etc whatever that toolkit permits. Then,
one should note that any equivalent protocol to MOSS might similarly be used
between cooperating systems - be it IPSEC - SSL/TLS - S/MIME - PKCS7
or DCE RPC.

We should divorce the service lements from the protection mechanism,
and make architectural allusions to the protection context, but
not standardize it overly allowing mix and match ot occur to suit
lcoal security needs, and relay over well-deployed infrastructures such
as the hihgly secure NT/Entrust secure messaging, for example.

Peter.

---------
From: 	Carlisle Adams
Sent: 	Monday, December 16, 1996 12:31 PM
To: 	[email-masked]'
Subject: 	PKIX-3 San Jose Discussions...

Hi All,

At the San Jose meeting, there was some discussion about the
"proper" relationship between the PKCS series (mainly 7 and
10) and PKIX part 3.

There were two suggestions mooted, which should be 
treated *independently*. The purpose of this mail is to
start the discussion so that we reach consensus on the
two issues. (So if lots of discussion ensues, please 
indicate in the subject line which issue you're addressing).

Before looking at the details it's probably worth stating
that at the S/MIME BOF in San Jose, RSADSI indicated a 
willingness to allow the PKCS series to be recast as
informational RFCs which should remove whatever procedural
problems might otherwise exist.

One proposal which was supported at the meeting was
the requirement contained within the current draft that
proof-of-possession is mandatory where applicable. This means
that proof-of-possession is part of the profile and not
a policy issue. (This has some bearing on the PKCS10 issue.)

1. Use of PKCS7 to protect PKIMessages

The suggestion here is to drop the PKIProtection bit string
and related fields and to call for PKIMessages to be protected
using PKCS7 when required. The idea is to wrap the PKIHeader and
PKIContent as a PKCS7 contentInfo type which contains the signature
(or whatever) which protects the PKIMessage.

It initially appeared that PKCS7, with some modifications, can support 
the various options which we need for protection of PKIMessages 
(i.e. signatures, DH protection, MACs).

This proposal seemed to be supported in a straw-poll in San Jose, which
at the time we were happy with. However, whilst at first sight this 
seems to offer an attractive option to re-use existing technology, 
there are some problems which appear to require modification of any 
existing PKCS7 implementation (see below). 

This means existing applications (e.g., S/MIME user agents) can't be 
used to protect all PKI messages, which, in turn, means the deployed 
base would have to be modified in either case.

So we've changed our minds on this one, and would now propose 
sticking with the protection fields in the current draft.

2. Catering for PKCS10 certification requests

The point here is that there are a lot of existing end-entity
implementations which produce PKCS10 certification requests.
We would like to (and maybe need to?) provide a way for
such end-entity implementations to be able to work within
the internet PKI which we're all developing in this working group.

(Note: it's important to be clear about what PKCS10 supports -
*please* read the PKIX part 3 draft and PKCS10 spec. before getting 
involved in commenting on this one.)

The proposal is to add a new PKIContent type which is a PKCS10
certification request. This is actually already done within
the NIST MISPC document, so you can look there for details of
how to do it. (Actually, we intend cogging their text if the proposal
is accepted and Tim lets us :-)

Some details of how to fit a PKCS10 request into the PKIX part 3
exchanges is still TBD (e.g., we'd need to specify exactly which
header fields should be used, and how they relate to attributes
which may (or may not) be included within the PKCS10 request).

Our sense of the opinion at the meeting was that there was some
support for including PKCS10, but that there wasn't agreement on
how to position it in the document. The choices seemed to be:

	- PKCS10 is included as a "legacy" format which we 
	  discourage end-entity implementors from using and which 
	  in any case is only to be used in requests for certification 
	  of RSA signature key pairs;
	- PKCS10 is included as a "live" format -- possibly instead
          of the existing PKIX-3 format -- in which case we have to 
	  extend and profile it to cater for the remaining 
          proof-of-possession cases (difficult (impossible?) for 
          key pairs which can be used for encryption only);
	- somewhere in between, in which case we discourage its use 
          but profile PKCS10 for use with, e.g., D-H keys as well as
          RSA signature keys.

Our preference is for the first choice. Some arguments are included
below.

Regards,
Stephen and Carlisle.

PKCS7 pros & cons.

1. (Minor pro):  
Using PKCS7 allows for re-use of some existing code (but not as much 
as one would initially expect (which is why the pro is only "minor");
see the following three points). 

2. (con):        
PKCS7 isn't well suited for cases in which one protects a message before
getting allocated a name/certificate.  This is important for
initialization 
and for key recovery, where the end-entity may not know anything about
itself
or its environment prior to the exchange with the CA/RA.  Thus, the
mandatory field IssuerAndSerialNumber in SignerInfo (which is used to
identify the signer's certificate) will require a new (and very liberal)
interpretation in this context, meaning that existing implementations
would
have to be modified to deal with this situation.

3. (con):
It is not at all clear how to use the PKCS7 spec. to do a MAC on a 
message.  "Digesting" seems to apply to hashing only, and MACing does
not appear to fit very well in the SignedData construct.  Given that
MACing is important for some operations (again, initialization and
key recovery come to mind, in which the messages may be protected by
a MAC based on secret out-of-band information), further specification
or profiling of PKCS7 would be necessary before it could be used 
within PKIX-3.

4. (con):
Using D-H to calculate the signature bits for a PKCS7 signedData is 
quite different from using RSA to sign (i.e., although it is quite
possible to force the results into the same syntax, the semantics of
the "encryptedDigest" field of the SignerInfo construct is entirely
changed, resulting in a significant modification to existing PKCS7
implementations).  Thus, for example, an existing S/MIME user agent
will be very unlikely to produce the desired result.

5. (Minor con):
The protection scheme in the draft requires us to profile 2 fields;
using PKCS7 would mean having to profile ~12 fields (or wait on
someone else to produce such a profile).

6. (Minor con):  
Using PKCS7 makes PKIX-3 less self-contained and really relies on the
PKCS documents coming within the IETF (in terms of change-control).
While we have some fairly high assurance that this *will* happen, it is
worth noting that it hasn't *actually* happened yet.

Arguments for our PKCS10 position:

1. (strong):
A single message can never be used to prove possession of an RSA 
decryption-only private key. PKCS10 is a kind of "fire-and-forget"
scheme,
whereas PKIX-3 defines exchanges which do allow for the above proof.  
Therefore, PKCS10 is fine for some cert. requests but will definitely
not 
work for others; PKIX-3 defines a set of exchanges which can be used for
all cert. requests.

2. (strong):
The deployed base only issues PKCS10 requests for a limited set of 
algorithms.  PKIX-3 has no such limitations.

3. (medium):
A non-trivial specification effort is required in order to allow PKCS10
to cover a wider range of cert. request cases (see, for example, the 
proposal for doing a D-H cert. request using PKCS10).  This does little 
more than repeat the work already done to arrive at the current PKIX-3 
draft and, at any rate, still does not cover all cases.

4. (medium):
The effort required to change a PKCS10 implementation to cater for 
a wider range of cases is about the same as implementing the messages
in the current draft (i.e., the code reuse argument begins to look a
bit thin..).

In short, we see fairly little benefit to including either PKCS7 or 
PKCS10 in PKIX-3 (due to the need for a non-trivial amount of
specification 
work from the PKIX group, coupled with a less-than-expected amount of
code reuse).
Since PKCS10 is useful "as-is" for some certification requests, however,
we see no problem in including it as a message type for those purposes
(but recommending migration to the more general/flexible FullCertRequest
exchanges as soon as possible).  The advantage of PKCS7 is even less
clear
(due to the difficulty with unknown DNs and the need for further
specification
on how to do MACing), and our real preference is to stick with the very
simple
and flexible ProtectionBits, as defined in the current draft.

Comments are appreciated (and hereby solicited) on any of the above
points.
[Recall that our goal (as stated at San Jose) is to get a revised draft
out
and into working group last call by January...]

--------------------------------------
Carlisle Adams
Nortel Secure Networks
[email-masked]
---------------------------------------
>

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From: "Mr. Haran Shivkumar" <[email-masked]>
To: "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>
Subject: unsubscribe
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 1996 17:38:26 +0100

unsubscribe

Date: Tue, 17 Dec 96 05:06:23 
From: "Housley, Russ" <[email-masked]>
Encoding: 2571 Text
To: [email-masked], "Michael Myers-P23970" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: The Meaning of Hold

Mike:

You are correct.  In a non-repudiation application, you might need to wait 
for a subsequennt CRL to make a decision about the validity of a signature 
associated with an "on hold" certificate.  We should point this out in PKIX 
Part 1.

Russ

______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________
Subject: RE: The Meaning of Hold
Author:  "Michael Myers-P23970" <[email-masked]> at internet
Date:    12/11/96 8:47 AM

I agree with Russ, noting that support for hold as it's currently defined 
yields a (reasonably modest) increment to the technical complexity of the 
dispute resolution process.  In an infrastructure which does not deploy hold 
functionality, once a cert appears on a CRL, one has a stopping condition. 
 In context of hold, however, it will be necessary to examine CRLs forward 
of a hold entry to determine: 1) was the certification reinstated; 2) was it 
ever again placed on hold; and 3) was it subsequently revoked for cause?
 ----------
>From: [email-masked]
>To: [email-masked]
>Subject: The Meaning of Hold
>Date: Tuesday, December 10, 1996 5:08AM 
>
>All:
>
>At the IETF PKIX session on Monday, 9 December 1996, Denis Pinkas raised a 
>question about the handling of signatures that were generated when a 
>particular certificate was marked "on hold" in a CRL.
>
>Here is the scenario:
>  - At time T0, the CA issues a certificate for user A.
>  - At time T1, the CA issues a CRL without an entry for user A's cert. 
>  - At time T2, the CA issues a CRL with an "on hold" entry for user
>    A's cert.
>  - At time T3, the CA issues a CRL without an entry for user A's cert. 
>
>Following time T3, Denis asks how are signatures generated by user A 
>handled?
>
>In my opinion, the answer is simple.  The decision is always made based on 
>the most recent CRL.  If the most recent CRL includes an entry for user A's 

>certificate (whether it is a revocation or "on hold" entry), then the 
>certificate is treated as revoked.  Alternatively, if the most recent CRL 
>does not include an entry for user A's certificate, then the certificate is 

>treated as valid.
>
>Russ
>
>P.S.  After thinking about this, I do believe that the PKIX Profile should 
>state that a certificate that is placed "on hold" and subsequently revoked, 

>then the revocation date for that certificate should be the same within 
>both of the CRLs (the CRL that contains the "on hold" entry and the CRL 
>taht contains revocation entry).
>

Date: Tue, 17 Dec 96 05:06:27 
From: "Housley, Russ" <[email-masked]>
Encoding: 534 Text
To: "Charles W. Gardiner" <[email-masked]>
CC: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Time Encoding

Charlie:

I am glad that we agree to pick a single date.  I picked 2050 because that 
was the year discussed in previous messages by Warwick.

Russ

______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________
Subject: Re: Time Encoding 
Author:  "Charles W. Gardiner" <[email-masked]> at internet
Date:    12/11/96 6:54 AM

    No problem with a single encoding -- in fact it is a good idea -- but why
wait until 2050?  How about 2050 or 2010?  TSTB from my point of view.

Charlie Gardiner

Date: Mon, 16 Dec 1996 18:24:14 -0500
To: [email-masked]
From: Hal Lockhart <[email-masked]>
Subject: Comments on draft-ietf-pkix-apki-00.txt

Good job!  Just some minor comments.

1. A. 1. vii. - "The PKI shall support aging, revocation, and repudiation of
keys."

Does the fact that this is under Key Recovery imply that there is some
special role in Key Recovery for meeting this requirement?  The requirements
for revocation and repudiation appear elsewhere in the requirements.  The
term aging is neither defined nor used elsewhere in the document.  Perhaps
you mean expiration?

1. A. 3. iv. - What the heck does this requirement mean?  In particular what
is the intent of the word "force". (Does it involve the use of lethal
weapons? ;-)

1. A. 4. i. (the first one, check the numbering of this section) Law
enforcement retrieval is only "subject to policy conditions", whereas
corporate agency and individual retrieval are "subject to policy and
authorizations".  I realize the external legal situation is currently murky,
but shouldn't law enforcement be authorized as well?

Regards,

Hal
=================================================================
Harold W. Lockhart Jr.            PLATINUM Solutions, Inc.
Chief Technical Architect         8 New England Executive Park
Email: [email-masked]            Burlington, MA 01803 USA
Voice: (617)273-6406              Fax: (617)229-2969
=================================================================

From: Carlisle Adams <[email-masked]>
To: "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>
Subject: PKIX-3 San Jose Discussions...
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 1996 15:31:54 -0500
Encoding: 206 TEXT

Hi All,

At the San Jose meeting, there was some discussion about the
"proper" relationship between the PKCS series (mainly 7 and
10) and PKIX part 3.

There were two suggestions mooted, which should be 
treated *independently*. The purpose of this mail is to
start the discussion so that we reach consensus on the
two issues. (So if lots of discussion ensues, please 
indicate in the subject line which issue you're addressing).

Before looking at the details it's probably worth stating
that at the S/MIME BOF in San Jose, RSADSI indicated a 
willingness to allow the PKCS series to be recast as
informational RFCs which should remove whatever procedural
problems might otherwise exist.

One proposal which was supported at the meeting was
the requirement contained within the current draft that
proof-of-possession is mandatory where applicable. This means
that proof-of-possession is part of the profile and not
a policy issue. (This has some bearing on the PKCS10 issue.)

1. Use of PKCS7 to protect PKIMessages

The suggestion here is to drop the PKIProtection bit string
and related fields and to call for PKIMessages to be protected
using PKCS7 when required. The idea is to wrap the PKIHeader and
PKIContent as a PKCS7 contentInfo type which contains the signature
(or whatever) which protects the PKIMessage.

It initially appeared that PKCS7, with some modifications, can support 
the various options which we need for protection of PKIMessages 
(i.e. signatures, DH protection, MACs).

This proposal seemed to be supported in a straw-poll in San Jose, which
at the time we were happy with. However, whilst at first sight this 
seems to offer an attractive option to re-use existing technology, 
there are some problems which appear to require modification of any 
existing PKCS7 implementation (see below). 

This means existing applications (e.g., S/MIME user agents) can't be 
used to protect all PKI messages, which, in turn, means the deployed 
base would have to be modified in either case.

So we've changed our minds on this one, and would now propose 
sticking with the protection fields in the current draft.

2. Catering for PKCS10 certification requests

The point here is that there are a lot of existing end-entity
implementations which produce PKCS10 certification requests.
We would like to (and maybe need to?) provide a way for
such end-entity implementations to be able to work within
the internet PKI which we're all developing in this working group.

(Note: it's important to be clear about what PKCS10 supports -
*please* read the PKIX part 3 draft and PKCS10 spec. before getting 
involved in commenting on this one.)

The proposal is to add a new PKIContent type which is a PKCS10
certification request. This is actually already done within
the NIST MISPC document, so you can look there for details of
how to do it. (Actually, we intend cogging their text if the proposal
is accepted and Tim lets us :-)

Some details of how to fit a PKCS10 request into the PKIX part 3
exchanges is still TBD (e.g., we'd need to specify exactly which
header fields should be used, and how they relate to attributes
which may (or may not) be included within the PKCS10 request).

Our sense of the opinion at the meeting was that there was some
support for including PKCS10, but that there wasn't agreement on
how to position it in the document. The choices seemed to be:

	- PKCS10 is included as a "legacy" format which we 
	  discourage end-entity implementors from using and which 
	  in any case is only to be used in requests for certification 
	  of RSA signature key pairs;
	- PKCS10 is included as a "live" format -- possibly instead
          of the existing PKIX-3 format -- in which case we have to 
	  extend and profile it to cater for the remaining 
          proof-of-possession cases (difficult (impossible?) for 
          key pairs which can be used for encryption only);
	- somewhere in between, in which case we discourage its use 
          but profile PKCS10 for use with, e.g., D-H keys as well as
          RSA signature keys.

Our preference is for the first choice. Some arguments are included
below.

Regards,
Stephen and Carlisle.

PKCS7 pros & cons.

1. (Minor pro):  
Using PKCS7 allows for re-use of some existing code (but not as much 
as one would initially expect (which is why the pro is only "minor");
see the following three points). 

2. (con):        
PKCS7 isn't well suited for cases in which one protects a message before
getting allocated a name/certificate.  This is important for
initialization 
and for key recovery, where the end-entity may not know anything about
itself
or its environment prior to the exchange with the CA/RA.  Thus, the
mandatory field IssuerAndSerialNumber in SignerInfo (which is used to
identify the signer's certificate) will require a new (and very liberal)
interpretation in this context, meaning that existing implementations
would
have to be modified to deal with this situation.

3. (con):
It is not at all clear how to use the PKCS7 spec. to do a MAC on a 
message.  "Digesting" seems to apply to hashing only, and MACing does
not appear to fit very well in the SignedData construct.  Given that
MACing is important for some operations (again, initialization and
key recovery come to mind, in which the messages may be protected by
a MAC based on secret out-of-band information), further specification
or profiling of PKCS7 would be necessary before it could be used 
within PKIX-3.

4. (con):
Using D-H to calculate the signature bits for a PKCS7 signedData is 
quite different from using RSA to sign (i.e., although it is quite
possible to force the results into the same syntax, the semantics of
the "encryptedDigest" field of the SignerInfo construct is entirely
changed, resulting in a significant modification to existing PKCS7
implementations).  Thus, for example, an existing S/MIME user agent
will be very unlikely to produce the desired result.

5. (Minor con):
The protection scheme in the draft requires us to profile 2 fields;
using PKCS7 would mean having to profile ~12 fields (or wait on
someone else to produce such a profile).

6. (Minor con):  
Using PKCS7 makes PKIX-3 less self-contained and really relies on the
PKCS documents coming within the IETF (in terms of change-control).
While we have some fairly high assurance that this *will* happen, it is
worth noting that it hasn't *actually* happened yet.

Arguments for our PKCS10 position:

1. (strong):
A single message can never be used to prove possession of an RSA 
decryption-only private key. PKCS10 is a kind of "fire-and-forget"
scheme,
whereas PKIX-3 defines exchanges which do allow for the above proof.  
Therefore, PKCS10 is fine for some cert. requests but will definitely
not 
work for others; PKIX-3 defines a set of exchanges which can be used for
all cert. requests.

2. (strong):
The deployed base only issues PKCS10 requests for a limited set of 
algorithms.  PKIX-3 has no such limitations.

3. (medium):
A non-trivial specification effort is required in order to allow PKCS10
to cover a wider range of cert. request cases (see, for example, the 
proposal for doing a D-H cert. request using PKCS10).  This does little 
more than repeat the work already done to arrive at the current PKIX-3 
draft and, at any rate, still does not cover all cases.

4. (medium):
The effort required to change a PKCS10 implementation to cater for 
a wider range of cases is about the same as implementing the messages
in the current draft (i.e., the code reuse argument begins to look a
bit thin..).

In short, we see fairly little benefit to including either PKCS7 or 
PKCS10 in PKIX-3 (due to the need for a non-trivial amount of
specification 
work from the PKIX group, coupled with a less-than-expected amount of
code reuse).
Since PKCS10 is useful "as-is" for some certification requests, however,
we see no problem in including it as a message type for those purposes
(but recommending migration to the more general/flexible FullCertRequest
exchanges as soon as possible).  The advantage of PKCS7 is even less
clear
(due to the difficulty with unknown DNs and the need for further
specification
on how to do MACing), and our real preference is to stick with the very
simple
and flexible ProtectionBits, as defined in the current draft.

Comments are appreciated (and hereby solicited) on any of the above
points.
[Recall that our goal (as stated at San Jose) is to get a revised draft
out
and into working group last call by January...]

--------------------------------------
Carlisle Adams
Nortel Secure Networks
[email-masked]
---------------------------------------
>

Date: Mon, 16 Dec 1996 15:24:09 -0500
From: [email-masked] (David P. Kemp)
To: [email-masked]
Subject: PKIX 3 Certificate Request format
Cc: [email-masked]

The PKIX meeting minutes, promptly submitted by Steve Kent, said:

> 	The presentation on the Part 3 document was made by its
> authors, S. Farrell and C. Adams.
>  [...]
> There is
> a separate issue about use of PKCS-10, which is somewhat less powerful
> than what is currently offered.  Thus the suggestion is to make
> PKCS-10 a format option, but not the only format option for
> certificate request messages.

At the WG meeting, Dave Solo heartily endorsed the idea of adding
PKCS-10 certificate requests in addition to the PKIX-3 certificate
requests, and Russ Housley suggested replacing the PKIX request with
the PKCS-10 request.

In addition, Tim Polk's Minimum Interoperability Specification (MISPC)
document includes certificate requests in both PKIX and encapsulated
PKCS-10 formats.

For reference, the core of the two request formats are as follows:

PKIX-3/MISPC:
    CertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE {
	version		[0] Version		OPTIONAL,
	serial		[1] INTEGER		OPTIONAL,
	signingAlg	[2] AlgorithmIdentifier	OPTIONAL,
	subject		[3] Name		OPTIONAL,
	validity	[4] OptionalValidity	OPTIONAL,
	issuer		[5] Name		OPTIONAL,
	publicKey	[6] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL, --required :-)
	issuerUID	[7] UniqueIdentifier	OPTIONAL, -- not supported
	subjectUID	[8] UniqueIdentifier	OPTIONAL, -- not supported
	extensions	[9] Extensions		OPTIONAL
    }

PKCS-10:
    CertificationRequestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	version		Version,
	subject		Name,
	subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
	attributes	[0] IMPLICIT Attributes
    }

The PKIX-3 format appears to be a proper superset of the PKCS-10
format, i.e. every possible certificate that could be requested
using PKCS-10 can also be requested using PKIX-3, however PKCS-10
cannot support several of the PKIX-3 request fields.

IMO, the PKIX-3 certificate request should remain as it is. Replacing the
current request format with PKCS-10 would reduce functionality; adding
PKCS-10 requests in addition to the current format would increase
complexity without offering any corresponding benefit. Creating a
protocol with two non-orthogonal messages to perform a single function
is a poor design practice.

The argument was made that PKCS-10 needs to be added to PKIX-3 in order
to accommodate existing legacy implementations.  This is not true -
all implementations are free to use either PKIX-3 or PKCS-10 or
both, without modifying either specification.  There is no need
to create a muddy hybrid specification to enable interoperability
with legacy apps - implementations can continue to support PKCS-10
for as long as there is a market need to do so.

Moreover, no existing PKCS-10 implementations will conform to
the MISPC spec.  They will all need to be modified to add the
PKIMessage encapsulation around the PKCS-10 cert request.  This
is a major, non-trivial modification to the code - if you are going
to expend that amount of development effort you might as well also
make the tiny additional change to put the request in PKIX-3 format.

In summary, the PKIX-3 specification should not have its existing
certificate request replaced or augmented by a PKCS-10-format message.
The MISPC specification should not include an encapsulated PKCS-10
message, instead it should state that either PKIX-3 PKIMessage's
or raw PKCS-10 messages should be supported for interoperability,
with a sunset date for the PKCS-10 support.

         dpk

From: Ray Sidney <[email-masked]>
To: "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>
To: "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>
Subject: RSA Laboratories seeks contributions for the "next generation" of PKCS
Date: Fri, 13 Dec 1996 10:07:47 -0800

>Comments and suggestions are invited for the next generation of the
>Public-Key Cryptography Standards, the intervendor specifications developed
>starting in 1991 by RSA Laboratories in conjunction with industry and
>universities.
>
The Public-Key Cryptography Standards were established to provide a
>catalyst for interoperable security based on public-key cryptographic
>techniques, and
>they have become the basis for many formal standards and are implemented
>widely. With several years' experience and review, and with many new
>developments in cryptography since 1991, it is now time to update PKCS.
>
>Suggestions are invited in the following areas:
>
>    * improvements to the current suite of standards
>    * contributions for new standards, including standards for transport and
>      local storage of personal information such as private keys and
>      certificates, and standards for platform-independent cryptographic
>      programming interfaces
>
>PKCS documents are low-level standards stating precisely how one may
>accomplish specific cryptographic or cryptography-related tasks.  Most are
>concerned with specifying byte-level recipes (often in ASN.1) for formatting
>various types of data (such as a block which is to be RSA-encrypted), rather
than making general security-related recommendations ("An RSA modulus
>should be at least XXX bits long.").
>
RSA Laboratories is actively soliciting suggestions and contributions
>for the "next generation" of PKCS from now until the end of April 1997.  If
>you have written up a document detailing extensions you've made to an
>existing PKCS, and you feel that others could benefit from the use of your
>extensions, then we'd like to see your document.  If you have an idea for a
>new PKCS, we'd like to hear that, too.  And if you have something somewhere
>in between, send it along; of course, detailed, well-developed contributions
>are generally preferred.  Suggestions should be sent either to the
[email-masked] mailing list (you can subscribe to this list by sending
>email with "subscribe pkcs-tng" in the message body to [email-masked];
>unsubscribe with "unsubscribe pkcs-tng") or to [email-masked], whichever
>is deemed more appropriate.
>
>Current PKCS documents are:
>
>PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Standard.
>PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard.
>PKCS #5: Password-Based Encryption Standard.
>PKCS #6: Extended-Certificate Syntax Standard.
>PKCS #7: Cryptographics Message Syntax Standard.
>PKCS #8: Private-Key Information Syntax Standard.
>PKCS #9: Selected Attribute Types.
>PKCS #10: Certificate Request Syntax Standard.
>PKCS #11: Cryptographic Token Interface Standard (CRYPOKI).
>
>The above documents are available from RSADSI's web site, and links to them
>may be found at http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/pubs/PKCS/.
>
>All contributions received shall be examined, and, if appropriate, a workshop
>(or several workshops) shall be held to further determine the content of the
>"next generation" of PKCS.
>
>

Date: Thu, 12 Dec 1996 10:28:18 -0500
To: [email-masked]
From: Stephen Kent <[email-masked]>
Subject: PKIX meeting minutes

The following text constitutes the minutes for the PKIX WG meeting that
took place this week.  Please respond with comments by 12/23 if you wish
the minutes to be revised.

Thanks,

Steve

=============================================================================

		       PKIX WG Meeting Minutes
			(December 9-10, 1996)

	The PKIX WG met for two days at the December IETF meeting in
San Jose.  Approximately 200 IETF members attended the two meetings.
The main agenda topics were status/update briefings on Parts 1 and 3
of the PKIX document set, and an initial briefing on certification
policies, the focus of the Part 4 document.  There also was a presentation
on a technique for requesting a certificate containing a Diffie-Hellman
key, which requires a mathematically different approach to verifying that
the requester holds the corresponding private key.

	There were also several informational briefings on topics of
interest to the PKIX WG.  M. Polk provided a status update of the NIST
MISPC activity, and B. Blakley provided an extensive briefing on the
APKI Working Group (not an IETF WG) activity, relating this
architecture to IETF standards activities.  This presentation
generated a substantial number of questions, at least in part because
of its inclusion of facilities for key escrow/recovery.

	The Part 1 document is nearing completion, and was briefed by
a new document editor, M. Polk, and by R. Housley.  Major changes
include a revision of the validity interval syntax (to better deal
with the year-2000 problem), inclusion of syntax for the PKIX
(private) extensions, etc.  Still, several suggestions for changes
(most minor) were made after the briefing, by D. Pinkas.  It was
agreed that these changes would be discussed on the WG mailing list
after the meeting.  The WG chairs called for rapid resolution of these
issues and document completion, to enable a WG last call early in
1997.

	M. Polk provided a brief update on the status of the MISPC
activity at NIST, as a successor to a similar briefing provided in
Montreal.  For the most part, the resulting NIST specs match the PKIX
specs (parts 1 and 3), with minor differences.  For example, there are
no private extensions defined and there is a requirement for non-null
subject and issuer DN fields.  With regard to algorithms, ECDSA, DSA,
and RSA are all defined and support for at least one of these is
required.  LDAP is required for repository access, and the NIST spec
does not include any CA-repository protocols; it also accommodates
PKCS-10 request formats, embedded in PXIK message formats.  90-day
comment period began 12/2, and after review a NIST Special Publication
will be produced.

	D. Solo provided a brief presentation on certificate requests
that contain Diffie-Hellman keys.  The focus here is on the means by
which the requester uses his private key to "sign" the request, since
D-H does not support signatures.  The context for this certificate
request is the PKCS-10 specification.  The basis of the "signature" is
a D-H key generated between the requester and the CA (the CA must have
a D-H certificate for this purpose), which is then input to a hash
including the requester and issuer names, and the resulting output is
used as a key for an HMAC computation covering the text of the request
message.

	The presentation on the Part 3 document was made by its
authors, S. Farrell and C. Adams.  Major changes include
simplification of the ASN.1 syntax, added message types (e.g.,
information requests and responses, publication, private key archive),
some new security services for RA/user-CA communication.  There are
some differences between proposed "proof of possession" approaches for
D-H keys, vs. what D. Solo presented.  This difference needs to be
resolved.  Also, there was some concern that this protocol might be
"close" to the Bellovin-Meritt encrypted key exchange, which is a
patented algorithm.  An issue was raised about using PKCS-7 as a
security envelope technique, in lieu of some of the current Part 3
format This would simplify the document and re-uses existing code,
although it also creates a dependency on another document.  A straw
poll suggests widespread support for PKCS-7 in this context. There is
a separate issue about use of PKCS-10, which is somewhat less powerful
than what is currently offered.  Thus the suggestion is to make
PKCS-10 a format option, but not the only format option for
certificate request messages.

	The PKIX Part 4 presentation was the first on this part of the
PKIX document set, and was provided by S. Chokhani.  This was a
informational briefing on the topic of certificate policies, as well
as providing technical details for a proposed certificate policy
framework.  The framework encompasses 9 top-level elements: community
definition and applicability, I&A policy for subjects/RAs/CAs, key
management policy, non-technical security policy, technical security
policy, operations policy, legal & business provisions, certificate
and CRL profiles, and policy administration.  This is all viewed as
human, not machine, readable.  The machine readable aspect is
captured by the use of the policy OIDs and policy qualifiers.

	The meeting concluded with a brief announcement of the
formation of a BOF and a mailing list to address the topic of
certificate (and private key) storage.

Date: Thu, 12 Dec 1996 08:18:16 -0700
To: "Meggison, Tim" <[email-masked]>
From: Chris Harman <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: The Meaning of Hold
Cc: <[email-masked]>

At 07:32 AM 12/12/96 -0500, Meggison, Tim wrote:
>How does hold work with delta CRLs?
>
>If a certificate is given a hold status on a delta CRL, and that hold
>status applies over the generation of many delta CRLs, then it seems the
>certificate must be contained on all subsequent delta CRLs.  If not,
>then how would one know that the hold is still in effect?

There's a CRLReason code of removeFromCRL in the reasonCode CRL entry
extension. The hold status applies until a future delta CRL specifically
removes it (or changes it to a revocation of some sort).  Take a look at
clause 12.5.2.2 of X.509.

Chris
--
Chris Harman              [email-masked]
Pretty Good Privacy, Inc.
Phone: (602) 944-0773     Fax: (602) 943-2601

From: "Meggison, Tim" <[email-masked]>
To: "'Michael Myers-P23970'" <[email-masked]>, "'Stephen Kent'" <[email-masked]>
Cc: "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: The Meaning of Hold
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 1996 07:32:59 -0500
Encoding: 34 TEXT

How does hold work with delta CRLs?

If a certificate is given a hold status on a delta CRL, and that hold
status applies over the generation of many delta CRLs, then it seems the
certificate must be contained on all subsequent delta CRLs.  If not,
then how would one know that the hold is still in effect?
>----------
>From: 	Stephen Kent[SMTP:[email-masked]]
>Sent: 	Wednesday, December 11, 1996 11:53 PM
>To: 	Michael Myers-P23970
>Cc: 	[email-masked]; [email-masked]
>Subject: 	RE: The Meaning of Hold
>
>Mike,
>
>Hold adds some compexity for non-repudiation applications, but probably not
>much for simple authentication and access control applications.  In the
>latter case, at the time the data is checked or access is requested, one
>just looks at the current CRL.  In the N-R case, it is always critical to
>have a transaction time stamped, and to collect the relevant certs and
>CRLs.  If the CRL that covers the time at which the transaction took place
>does not have any of the relevant certs in question on it, even in hold
>status, then you're done.  If one of the relevant certs is added later,
>it's not your problem: you already have the needed data to substantiate
>your claim.  The potentially transient nature of a cert on a CRL due to the
>hold condition is bothersome to me, as it complicates the model and makes
>it harder to explain to folks, but in practice I don't think it unduly
>complicates processing in either case.
>
>Steve
>
>
>
>

Date: Wed, 11 Dec 1996 22:53:45 -0500
To: "Michael Myers-P23970" <[email-masked]>
From: Stephen Kent <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: The Meaning of Hold
Cc: [email-masked], [email-masked]

Mike,

Hold adds some compexity for non-repudiation applications, but probably not
much for simple authentication and access control applications.  In the
latter case, at the time the data is checked or access is requested, one
just looks at the current CRL.  In the N-R case, it is always critical to
have a transaction time stamped, and to collect the relevant certs and
CRLs.  If the CRL that covers the time at which the transaction took place
does not have any of the relevant certs in question on it, even in hold
status, then you're done.  If one of the relevant certs is added later,
it's not your problem: you already have the needed data to substantiate
your claim.  The potentially transient nature of a cert on a CRL due to the
hold condition is bothersome to me, as it complicates the model and makes
it harder to explain to folks, but in practice I don't think it unduly
complicates processing in either case.

Steve

From: Mark Bartel <[email-masked]>
To: "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: Time Encoding
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 1996 19:51:35 -0500

I would personally prefer stronger language about the rule, for the same =
reason that X.509 has DER-like rules.  I think it's nice to be able to =
encode a certificate from some internal format without having to keep =
track of what the original format was.

(Just bringing up a point people frequently seem to forget; DER is there =
for a reason.)

- Mark Bartel

----------
From: 	Michael Myers-P23970[SMTP:[email-masked]]
Sent: 	Wednesday, December 11, 1996 11:34 AM
To: 	[email-masked]; [email-masked]
Subject: 	RE: Time Encoding

Russ--

I agree.  This would better align PKIX with other activities.

Text regarding applicability of the rule to cert generation vs. cert=20
processing would be useful guidance.  I would expect the rule to =
strictly=20
apply to PKIX-conformant CAs, while apps must minimally comply in the =
sense=20
that they may choose a more tolerant implementation.

 --Mike

 ----------
>From: [email-masked]
>To: [email-masked]
>Subject: Time Encoding
>Date: Tuesday, December 10, 1996 11:50PM
>
>PKIX Participants:
>
>Tim Polk presented the changes to PKIX Part 1 at the IETF meeting in
>San Jose.  This presentation included the change from UTCTime to
>CHOICE { UTCTime, GeneralizedTime }.  The current draft of Part 1
>includes a "sliding window" approach to determining which of the two
>encoding alternatives will be used.  This approach is documented in
>draft-ietf-pkix-part1-03.txt that was mailed to the list by Tim.
>
>I disagree with the approach presented in the document.  In my opinion,
>any particular date value should only have one encoding.  To this end,
>I suggest that we replace the "sliding window" approach with the
>following rules:
>
>          IF the value of the year to be encoded is less than 2050,
>          THEN use the UTCTime encoding.
>
>          IF the value of the year to be encoded is greater than or
>             equal to 2050,
>          THEN use the GeneralizedTime encoding.
>
>By adopting these rules, there is only one encoding possible for any
>date.  Of course, a certificate user could be forgiving about the =
format
>received in a certificate.  But, I think that we should mandate the =
above
>rules for CAs conforming to PKIX.
>
>Comments?
>
>Russ
>

Date: Wed, 11 Dec 1996 10:34:24 -0600
From: "Michael Myers-P23970" <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: Time Encoding
To: [email-masked], [email-masked]
X400-Mts-Identifier: [ /P=MOT/A=MOT/C=US/ ; m\gstmd\961211103424c ]

Russ--

I agree.  This would better align PKIX with other activities.

Text regarding applicability of the rule to cert generation vs. cert 
processing would be useful guidance.  I would expect the rule to strictly 
apply to PKIX-conformant CAs, while apps must minimally comply in the sense 
that they may choose a more tolerant implementation.

 --Mike

 ----------
>From: [email-masked]
>To: [email-masked]
>Subject: Time Encoding
>Date: Tuesday, December 10, 1996 11:50PM
>
>PKIX Participants:
>
>Tim Polk presented the changes to PKIX Part 1 at the IETF meeting in
>San Jose.  This presentation included the change from UTCTime to
>CHOICE { UTCTime, GeneralizedTime }.  The current draft of Part 1
>includes a "sliding window" approach to determining which of the two
>encoding alternatives will be used.  This approach is documented in
>draft-ietf-pkix-part1-03.txt that was mailed to the list by Tim.
>
>I disagree with the approach presented in the document.  In my opinion,
>any particular date value should only have one encoding.  To this end,
>I suggest that we replace the "sliding window" approach with the
>following rules:
>
>          IF the value of the year to be encoded is less than 2050,
>          THEN use the UTCTime encoding.
>
>          IF the value of the year to be encoded is greater than or
>             equal to 2050,
>          THEN use the GeneralizedTime encoding.
>
>By adopting these rules, there is only one encoding possible for any
>date.  Of course, a certificate user could be forgiving about the format
>received in a certificate.  But, I think that we should mandate the above
>rules for CAs conforming to PKIX.
>
>Comments?
>
>Russ
>

Date: Wed, 11 Dec 1996 10:25:51 -0600
From: "Michael Myers-P23970" <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: The Meaning of Hold
To: [email-masked], [email-masked]
X400-Mts-Identifier: [ /P=MOT/A=MOT/C=US/ ; m\gstmd\961211102551a ]

I agree with Russ, noting that support for hold as it's currently defined 
yields a (reasonably modest) increment to the technical complexity of the 
dispute resolution process.  In an infrastructure which does not deploy hold 
functionality, once a cert appears on a CRL, one has a stopping condition. 
 In context of hold, however, it will be necessary to examine CRLs forward 
of a hold entry to determine: 1) was the certification reinstated; 2) was it 
ever again placed on hold; and 3) was it subsequently revoked for cause?
 ----------
>From: [email-masked]
>To: [email-masked]
>Subject: The Meaning of Hold
>Date: Tuesday, December 10, 1996 5:08AM
>
>All:
>
>At the IETF PKIX session on Monday, 9 December 1996, Denis Pinkas raised a
>question about the handling of signatures that were generated when a
>particular certificate was marked "on hold" in a CRL.
>
>Here is the scenario:
>  - At time T0, the CA issues a certificate for user A.
>  - At time T1, the CA issues a CRL without an entry for user A's cert.
>  - At time T2, the CA issues a CRL with an "on hold" entry for user
>    A's cert.
>  - At time T3, the CA issues a CRL without an entry for user A's cert.
>
>Following time T3, Denis asks how are signatures generated by user A
>handled?
>
>In my opinion, the answer is simple.  The decision is always made based on
>the most recent CRL.  If the most recent CRL includes an entry for user A's 

>certificate (whether it is a revocation or "on hold" entry), then the
>certificate is treated as revoked.  Alternatively, if the most recent CRL
>does not include an entry for user A's certificate, then the certificate is 

>treated as valid.
>
>Russ
>
>P.S.  After thinking about this, I do believe that the PKIX Profile should
>state that a certificate that is placed "on hold" and subsequently revoked, 

>then the revocation date for that certificate should be the same within
>both of the CRLs (the CRL that contains the "on hold" entry and the CRL
>taht contains revocation entry).
>

Date: Wed, 11 Dec 1996 07:25:23 -0500
To: [email-masked]
From: Rodney Thayer <[email-masked]>
Subject: Time Encoding

I thought it sounded strange when he presented it, because the message I
got was "UTCTime is bad and you should not be doing it but you must use it
until 2005".  If it's bad, kill it.  If it's not bad and we want a graceful
transition, then let's say that (Note I think Russ' approach does this).

>Date: Tue, 10 Dec 96 21:57:42 
>From: "Housley, Russ" <[email-masked]>
>Encoding: 1218 Text
>To: [email-masked]
>Subject: Time Encoding
>
>
>PKIX Participants:
>
>Tim Polk presented the changes to PKIX Part 1 at the IETF meeting in 
>San Jose.  This presentation included the change from UTCTime to 
>CHOICE { UTCTime, GeneralizedTime }.  The current draft of Part 1
>includes a "sliding window" approach to determining which of the two
>encoding alternatives will be used.  This approach is documented in 
>draft-ietf-pkix-part1-03.txt that was mailed to the list by Tim.
>
>I disagree with the approach presented in the document.  In my opinion,
>any particular date value should only have one encoding.  To this end, 
>I suggest that we replace the "sliding window" approach with the 
>following rules:
>
>          IF the value of the year to be encoded is less than 2050,
>          THEN use the UTCTime encoding.
>          
>          IF the value of the year to be encoded is greater than or 
>             equal to 2050,
>          THEN use the GeneralizedTime encoding.
>
>By adopting these rules, there is only one encoding possible for any
>date.  Of course, a certificate user could be forgiving about the format
>received in a certificate.  But, I think that we should mandate the above 
>rules for CAs conforming to PKIX.
>
>Comments?
>
>Russ
>
>

               Rodney Thayer <[email-masked]>       +1 617 332 7292
               Sable Technology Corp, 246 Walnut St., Newton MA 02160 USA
               Fax: +1 617 332 7970           http://www.shore.net/~sable
                           "Developers of communications software"

To: "Housley, Russ" <[email-masked]>
cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Time Encoding 
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 1996 09:51:49 -0500
From: "Charles W. Gardiner" <[email-masked]>

    No problem with a single encoding -- in fact it is a good idea -- but why
wait until 2050?  How about 2050 or 2010?  TSTB from my point of view.

Charlie Gardiner

Date: Tue, 10 Dec 96 21:57:42 
From: "Housley, Russ" <[email-masked]>
Encoding: 1218 Text
To: [email-masked]
Subject: Time Encoding

PKIX Participants:

Tim Polk presented the changes to PKIX Part 1 at the IETF meeting in 
San Jose.  This presentation included the change from UTCTime to 
CHOICE { UTCTime, GeneralizedTime }.  The current draft of Part 1
includes a "sliding window" approach to determining which of the two
encoding alternatives will be used.  This approach is documented in 
draft-ietf-pkix-part1-03.txt that was mailed to the list by Tim.

I disagree with the approach presented in the document.  In my opinion,
any particular date value should only have one encoding.  To this end, 
I suggest that we replace the "sliding window" approach with the 
following rules:

          IF the value of the year to be encoded is less than 2050,
          THEN use the UTCTime encoding.
          
          IF the value of the year to be encoded is greater than or 
             equal to 2050,
          THEN use the GeneralizedTime encoding.

By adopting these rules, there is only one encoding possible for any
date.  Of course, a certificate user could be forgiving about the format
received in a certificate.  But, I think that we should mandate the above 
rules for CAs conforming to PKIX.

Comments?

Russ

Date: Tue, 10 Dec 1996 18:31:58 -0800
From: [email-masked] (Hemma Prafullchandra)
To: [email-masked]
Subject: Establishing ownership of DH value
Cc: [email-masked]

----------
X-Sun-Data-Type: text
X-Sun-Data-Description: text
X-Sun-Data-Name: text
X-Sun-Charset: us-ascii
X-Sun-Content-Lines: 18

>From the IETF PKIX session today, I'm told (by Dave Solo,
thanks for presenting Dave) that I needed to send out the
presented proposal.

I believe two separate issues need to be resolved:
1) is the attached proposal satisfactory for establishing ownership
   of a Diffie-Hellman public value ?

and

2) how should we capture this: where, when and who ?
   (I am completely open to suggestions - I simply would like
    a scheme published for this, asap).

Thanks,
Hemma
----------
X-Sun-Data-Type: default
X-Sun-Data-Description: default
X-Sun-Data-Name: dhcertreq.proposal
X-Sun-Encoding-Info: uuencode
X-Sun-Content-Lines: 165

Date: Tue, 10 Dec 1996 13:34:10 -0800
To: [email-masked], [email-masked]
From: Kaye Caldwell <[email-masked]>

With apologies to those on multiple lists, I have just posted the Draft
Illinois Digital Signatures Legislation at:

http://www.SoftwareIndustry.org/issues/1digsig.html#sl

It is a Word File.

========================================================================
Kaye Caldwell - (408) 479-8743 - Fax: (408) 479-9247 - E-mail:
[email-masked]
Editor, Software Industry Issues (www.SoftwareIndustry.org/issues/)
President & Policy Director, Software Industry Coalition
(www.SoftwareIndustry.org/coalition/)
Chair, Advocacy & Public Policy Committee, CommerceNet
(www.commerce.net/work/appc.html)
President, Computer Software Industry Association
(www.SoftwareIndustry.org/csia/)
Legislative Director, Software Forum  (www.SoftwareForum.org/)
========================================================================

Comments: Authenticated sender is <[email-masked]>
From: Nick Pope <[email-masked]>
To: "Housley, Russ" <[email-masked]>, [email-masked]
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 1996 14:05:43 +0000
Subject: Re: The Meaning of Hold
Priority: normal

In reply to your message of 10 Dec 96, 3:05:

I agree with your interpretation with regards to hold.  And I believe 
that was what was intended when the X.509 DAM was written.

 In X.509 DAM 12.5.2.2 3rd major 
paragraph, it states as one of the actions subsequent to hold is that 
the certificate:

 "c) be explicetly released and the entry removed from the CRL."

If a certificate hasn't been placed on hold I don't believe that it 
should be removed from the CRL until the revoked certificate validity 
period has expired.

Nick
> 
> All:
> 
> At the IETF PKIX session on Monday, 9 December 1996, Denis Pinkas
> raised a question about the handling of signatures that were generated
> when a particular certificate was marked "on hold" in a CRL.
> 
> Here is the scenario:
>   - At time T0, the CA issues a certificate for user A.
>   - At time T1, the CA issues a CRL without an entry for user A's
>   cert. - At time T2, the CA issues a CRL with an "on hold" entry for
>   user
>     A's cert.
>   - At time T3, the CA issues a CRL without an entry for user A's
>   cert.
> 
> Following time T3, Denis asks how are signatures generated by user A
> handled?
> 
> In my opinion, the answer is simple.  The decision is always made
> based on the most recent CRL.  If the most recent CRL includes an
> entry for user A's certificate (whether it is a revocation or "on
> hold" entry), then the certificate is treated as revoked. 
> Alternatively, if the most recent CRL does not include an entry for
> user A's certificate, then the certificate is treated as valid.
> 
> Russ
> 
> P.S.  After thinking about this, I do believe that the PKIX Profile
> should state that a certificate that is placed "on hold" and
> subsequently revoked, then the revocation date for that certificate
> should be the same within both of the CRLs (the CRL that contains the
> "on hold" entry and the CRL taht contains revocation entry). 

-------------------------------------

Security & Standards
Suite A
191 Moulsham St.
Chelmsford
Essex
CM2 0LG
U.K.

Tel: +44 1245 495018
Fax: +44 1245 494517

Comments: Authenticated sender is <[email-masked]>
From: Nick Pope <[email-masked]>
To: "Housley, Russ" <[email-masked]>, [email-masked]
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 1996 13:39:16 +0000
Subject: Re: The Meaning of Hold
Priority: normal

In reply to your message of 10 Dec 96, 3:05:

I agree with your interpretation with regards to hold.  And I believe 
that was what was intended when the X.509 DAM was written.

 In X.509 DAM 12.5.2.2 3rd major 
paragraph, it states as one of the actions subsequent to hold is that 
the certificate:

 "c) be explicetly released and the entry removed from the CRL."

If a certificate hasn't been placed on hold I don't believe that it 
should be removed from the CRL until the revoked certificate validity 
period has expired.

Nick
> 
> All:
> 
> At the IETF PKIX session on Monday, 9 December 1996, Denis Pinkas
> raised a question about the handling of signatures that were generated
> when a particular certificate was marked "on hold" in a CRL.
> 
> Here is the scenario:
>   - At time T0, the CA issues a certificate for user A.
>   - At time T1, the CA issues a CRL without an entry for user A's
>   cert. - At time T2, the CA issues a CRL with an "on hold" entry for
>   user
>     A's cert.
>   - At time T3, the CA issues a CRL without an entry for user A's
>   cert.
> 
> Following time T3, Denis asks how are signatures generated by user A
> handled?
> 
> In my opinion, the answer is simple.  The decision is always made
> based on the most recent CRL.  If the most recent CRL includes an
> entry for user A's certificate (whether it is a revocation or "on
> hold" entry), then the certificate is treated as revoked. 
> Alternatively, if the most recent CRL does not include an entry for
> user A's certificate, then the certificate is treated as valid.
> 
> Russ
> 
> P.S.  After thinking about this, I do believe that the PKIX Profile
> should state that a certificate that is placed "on hold" and
> subsequently revoked, then the revocation date for that certificate
> should be the same within both of the CRLs (the CRL that contains the
> "on hold" entry and the CRL taht contains revocation entry). 

-------------------------------------

Security & Standards
Suite A
191 Moulsham St.
Chelmsford
Essex
CM2 0LG
U.K.

Tel: +44 1245 495018
Fax: +44 1245 494517

Date: Tue, 10 Dec 96 03:05:01 
From: "Housley, Russ" <[email-masked]>
Encoding: 1357 Text
To: [email-masked]
Subject: The Meaning of Hold

All:

At the IETF PKIX session on Monday, 9 December 1996, Denis Pinkas raised a 
question about the handling of signatures that were generated when a 
particular certificate was marked "on hold" in a CRL.

Here is the scenario:
  - At time T0, the CA issues a certificate for user A.
  - At time T1, the CA issues a CRL without an entry for user A's cert.
  - At time T2, the CA issues a CRL with an "on hold" entry for user
    A's cert.
  - At time T3, the CA issues a CRL without an entry for user A's cert.

Following time T3, Denis asks how are signatures generated by user A 
handled?

In my opinion, the answer is simple.  The decision is always made based on 
the most recent CRL.  If the most recent CRL includes an entry for user A's 
certificate (whether it is a revocation or "on hold" entry), then the 
certificate is treated as revoked.  Alternatively, if the most recent CRL 
does not include an entry for user A's certificate, then the certificate is 
treated as valid.

Russ

P.S.  After thinking about this, I do believe that the PKIX Profile should 
state that a certificate that is placed "on hold" and subsequently revoked, 
then the revocation date for that certificate should be the same within 
both of the CRLs (the CRL that contains the "on hold" entry and the CRL 
taht contains revocation entry). 

To: "Brian M. Thomas" <[email-masked]>
Cc: [email-masked], [email-masked], [email-masked], [email-masked], [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Security hole 
Date: Mon, 09 Dec 1996 10:46:24 +0100
From: Borka Jerman-Blazic <[email-masked]>

> I think we're talking about two different issues here: character sets
> and fonts.  The character set and its interpretation are one thing, and
> their interpretation is a matter of standard.  The font issue is another,
> however, and unless a signature covered the font data completely, the
> defense that your signature covered something different from what you
> saw is without support.

 Sorry, but fonts are images of a characters in particular 
character set. Yhey are a part of so called character - glyph maping.
But, I see your point, if you download the font as we do
with Power Pont presentations then you can somehow guarntee 
safeness.
> 

> 
> As I think I made clear above, this really is about malicious code, in
> the fonts that are downloaded with the form to be signed.  It's
> probably a very good idea to specify the entire content of a form, as
> displayed, that you fill out and sign, just as when you sign a paper
> document "as displayed", since proof of material modification of the
> document after your signature can void it.
> 

The only problem I am seeing here is before you see what the
other party is offering (displaying) you must download the appropriate font 
in order to see what you are going to sign. If it is so simple then
this should be added in the standard.

Regards,

Borka

Date: Sun, 8 Dec 1996 14:02:41 -0500
From: Tim Polk <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked]
Subject: new PKIX-1 Draft...
Content-Length: 135588

A new draft of PKIX Part 1 is now available.  Due to the late timing,
I have simply appended it to this email message.  For those who prefer
hardcopy, I will have copies by the Tuesday PKIX session at the latest.

(I will have to find a reasonable copy shop in San Jose.  Monday 1:30
is quite unlikely.)

The draft includes proposed semantics for the "private" certificate
extensions, new policy qualifiers, a lot of new detail on algorithms
and the associated ASN.1 structures/data encodings, and a first pass
at 1988 ASN.1 without macros or imports.  There is also new detail
on conformance requirements.

We are still missing examples of certificates and CRLs, ASN.1 syntax 
for ORAddress  (I have it but haven't typed it in!) and a couple of
references.

Thanks,

Tim Polk

=======================cut here==============================

PKIX Working Group                                   R. Housley (SPYRUS)
Internet Draft                                        W. Ford (Verisign)
                                                          W. Polk (NIST)
                                                           D. Solo (BBN)
expires in six months                                      December 1996

                   Internet Public Key Infrastructure

               Part I:  X.509 Certificate and CRL Profile

                  <draft-ietf-pkix-ipki-part1-03.txt>

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft.  Internet-Drafts are working
   documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
   and its working groups.  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the
   "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet- Drafts Shadow
   Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), nic.nordu.net (Europe),
   munnari.oz.au Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or
   ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast).

Abstract

   This is the second draft of the Internet Public Key Infrastructure
   X.509 Certificate and CRL Profile.  Since the first version was
   distributed, ISO has completed work on X.509 Version 3 Certificates
   and X.509 Version 2 Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).  Many of the
   Internet community requirements that were in the previous version of
   this document have been included in the final ISO document.  As a
   result, this document has gotten simpler.  Please send comments on
   this document to the [email-masked] mail list.

Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo                                     [Page 1]

INTERNET DRAFT                                             December 1996

1  Executive Summary

   This specification is Part 1 of a four part standard for development
   of a Public Key Infrastructure for the Internet.  This specification
   is a standalone document; implementations of this standard may
   proceed before completion of parts two through four.

   This specification profiles the format and semantics of certificates
   and certificate revocation lists for the Internet PKI.  Procedures
   are described for processing of certification paths in the Internet
   environment.  Encoding rules are provided for popular cryptographic
   algorithms.  Finally, a comprehensive ASN.1 module is provided in the
   appendices for all data structure defined or referenced.

   The specification presents profiles of the X.509 version 3
   certificate and version 2 certificate revocation lists. The profiles
   include the identification of ISO and ANSI extensions which may be
   useful in the Internet PKI and definition of new extensions to meet
   the Internet's requirements. The profiles are presented in the 1988
   Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) rather than the 1993 syntax used
   in the ISO standards.

   This specification also includes path validation procedures.  These
   procedures are based upon the ISO definition, but incorporate the
   Internet defined extensions.  Implementations are required to derive
   the same results but are not required to use the specified
   procedures.

   Finally, the specification describes procedures for identification
   and encoding of public key materials and digital signatures.
   Implementations are not required to use any particular cryptographic
   algorithms.  However, conforming implementations which use the
   identified algorithms are required to identify and encode the public
   key materials and digital signatures as described.

   An Appendix is provided containing all ASN.1 structures defined or
   referenced within this specification.  As above, the material is
   presented in the 1988 Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) rather
   than the 1993 syntax.

2  Requirements and Assumptions

   Goal is to develop a profile and associated management structure to
   facilitate the adoption/use of X.509 certificates within Internet
   applications for those communities wishing to make use of X.509
   technology. Such applications may include WWW, electronic mail, user
   authentication, and IPSEC, as well as others.  In order to relieve
   some of the obstacles to using X.509 certificates, this document

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   defines a profile to promote the development of certificate
   management systems; development of application tools; and
   interoperability determined by policy, as opposed to syntax.

   Some communities will need to supplement, or possibly replace, this
   profile in order to meet the requirements of specialized application
   domains or environments with additional authorization, assurance, or
   operational requirements.  However, for basic applications, common
   representations of frequently used attributes are defined so that
   application developers can obtain necessary information without
   regard to the issuer of a particular certificate or certificate
   revocation list (CRL).

   As supplemental authorization and attribute management tools emerge,
   such as attribute certificates, it may be appropriate to limit the
   authenticated attributes that are included in a certificate.  These
   other management tools may be more appropriate method of conveying
   many authenticated attributes.

2.1  Communication and Topology

   The users of certificates will operate in a wide range of
   environments with respect to their communication topology, especially
   users of secure electronic mail.  This profile supports users without
   high bandwidth, real-time IP connectivity, or high connection
   availablity.  In addition, the profile allows for the presence of
   firewall or other filtered communication.

   This profile does not assume the deployment of an X.500 Directory
   system.  The profile does not prohibit the use of an X.500 Directory,
   but other means of distributing certificates and certificate
   revocation lists (CRLs) are supported.

2.2  Acceptability Criteria

   The goal of the Internet Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is to meet
   the needs of deterministic, automated identification, authentication,
   access control, and authorization functions. Support for these
   services determines the attributes contained in the certificate as
   well as the ancillary control information in the certificate such as
   policy data and certification path constraints.

2.3  User Expectations

   Users of the Internet PKI are people and processes who use client
   software and are the subjects named in certificates.  These uses
   include readers and writers of electronic mail, the clients for WWW
   browsers, WWW servers, and the key manager for IPSEC within a router.

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   This profile recognizes the limitations of the platforms these users
   employ and the sophistication/attentiveness of the users themselves.
   This manifests itself in minimal user configuration responsibility
   (e.g., root keys, rules), explicit platform usage constraints within
   the certificate, certification path constraints which shield the user
   from many malicious actions, and applications which sensibly automate
   validation functions.

2.4  Administrator Expectations

   As with users, the Internet PKI profile is structured to support the
   individuals who generally operate Certification Authorities (CAs).
   Providing administrators with unbounded choices increases the chances
   that a subtle CA administrator mistake will result in broad
   compromise.  Also, unbounded choices greatly complicates the software
   that must process and validate the  certificates created by the CA.

3  Overview of Approach

   Following is a simplified view of the architectural model assumed by
   the PKIX specifications.

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      +---+
      | C |                       +------------+
      | e | <-------------------->| End entity |
      | r |       Operational     +------------+
      | t |       transactions         ^
      |   |      and management        |  Management
      | / |       transactions         |  transactions
      |   |                            |
      | C |    PKI users               v
      | R |             -------+-------+--------+------
      | L |   PKI management   ^                ^
      |   |      entities      |                |
      |   |                    v                |
      | R |                 +------+            |
      | e | <-------------- | RA   | <-----+    |
      | p |   certificate   |      |       |    |
      | o |       publish   +------+       |    |
      | s |                                |    |
      | I |                                v    v
      | t |                            +------------+
      | o | <--------------------------|     CA     |
      | r |   certificate publish      +------------+
      | y |           CRL publish             ^
      |   |                                   |
      +---+                                   |    Management
                                              |    transactions
                                              v
                                          +------+
                                          |  CA  |
                                          +------+

                          Figure 1 - PKI Entities

   The components in this model are:

   end entity:  user of PKI certificates and/or end user system that
                the PKI certifies;
   CA:          certification authority;
   RA:          registration authority, i.e., an optional system to
                which a CA delegates certain management functions;
   repository:  a system or collection of distributed systems that
                store certificates and CRLs and serves as a means of
                distributing these certificates and CRLs to end
                entities.

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3.1  X.509 Version 3 Certificate

   Application of public key technology requires the user of a public
   key to be confident that the public key belongs to the correct remote
   subject (person or system) with which an encryption or digital
   signature mechanism will be used.  This confidence is obtained
   through the use of public key certificates, which are data structures
   that bind public key values to subject identities.  The binding is
   achieved by having a trusted certification authority (CA) digitally
   sign each certificate.  A certificate has a limited valid lifetime
   which is indicated in its signed contents.  Because a certificate's
   signature and timeliness can be independently checked by a
   certificate-using client, certificates can be distributed via
   untrusted communications and server systems, and can be cached in
   unsecured storage in certificate-using systems.

   The standard known as ITU-T X.509 (formerly CCITT X.509) or ISO/IEC
   9594-8, which was first published in 1988 as part of the X.500
   Directory recommendations, defines a standard certificate format. The
   certificate format in the 1988 standard is called the version 1 (v1)
   format.  When X.500 was revised in 1993, two more fields were added,
   resulting in the version 2 (v2) format. These two fields are used to
   support directory access control.

   The Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) proposals, published in
   1993, include specifications for a public key infrastructure based on
   X.509 v1 certificates [RFC 1422].  The experience gained in attempts
   to deploy RFC 1422 made it clear that the v1 and v2 certificate
   formats are deficient in several respects.  Most importantly, more
   fields were needed to carry information which PEM design and
   implementation experience has proven necessary.  In response to these
   new requirements, ISO/IEC and ANSI X9 developed the X.509 version 3
   (v3) certificate format.  The v3 format extends the v2 format by
   adding provision for additional extension fields.  Particular
   extension field types may be specified in standards or may be defined
   and registered by any organization or community. In June 1996,
   standardization of the basic v3 format was completed [X.509-AM].

   ISO/IEC and ANSI X9 have also developed a set of standard extensions
   for use in the v3 extensions field [X.509-AM][X9.55].  These
   extensions can convey such data as additional subject identification
   information, key attribute information, policy information, and
   certification path constraints.

   However, the ISO/IEC and ANSI standard extensions are very broad in
   their applicability.  In order to develop interoperable
   implementations of X.509 v3 systems for Internet use, it is necessary
   to specify a profile for use of the X.509 v3 extensions tailored for

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   the Internet.  It is one goal of this document to specify a profile
   for Internet WWW, electronic mail, and IPSEC applications.
   Environments with additional requirements may build on this profile
   or may replace it.

3.2  Certification Paths and Trust

   A user of a security service requiring knowledge of a public key
   generally needs to obtain and validate a certificate containing the
   required public key.  If the public-key user does not already hold an
   assured copy of the public key of the CA that signed the certificate,
   then it might need an additional certificate to obtain that public
   key.  In general, a chain of multiple certificates may be needed,
   comprising a certificate of the public key owner (the end entity)
   signed by one CA, and zero or more additional certificates of CAs
   signed by other CAs.  Such chains, called certification paths, are
   required because a public key user is only initialized with a limited
   number (often one) of assured CA public keys.

   There are different ways in which CAs might be configured in order
   for public key users to be able to find certification paths.  For
   PEM, RFC 1422 defined a rigid hierarchical structure of CAs.  There
   are three types of PEM certification authority:

   (a)  Internet Policy Registration Authority (IPRA):  This authority,
   operated under the auspices of the Internet Society, acts as the root
   of the PEM certification hierarchy at level 1.  It issues
   certificates only for the next level of authorities, PCAs.  All
   certification paths start with the IPRA.

   (b)  Policy Certification Authorities (PCAs):  PCAs are at level 2 of
   the hierarchy, each PCA being certified by the IPRA.  A PCA must
   establish and publish a statement of its policy with respect to
   certifying users or subordinate certification authorities.  Distinct
   PCAs aim to satisfy different user needs. For example, one PCA (an
   organizational PCA) might support the general electronic mail needs
   of commercial organizations, and another PCA (a high-assurance PCA)
   might have a more stringent policy designed for satisfying legally
   binding signature requirements.

   (c)  Certification Authorities (CAs):  CAs are at level 3 of the
   hierarchy and can also be at lower levels. Those at level 3 are
   certified by PCAs.  CAs represent, for example, particular
   organizations, particular organizational units (e.g., departments,
   groups, sections), or particular geographical areas.

   RFC 1422 furthermore has a name subordination rule which requires
   that a CA can only issue certificates for entities whose names are

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   subordinate (in the X.500 naming tree) to the name of the CA itself.
   The trust associated with a PEM certification  path is implied by the
   PCA name. The name subordination rule ensures that CAs below the PCA
   are sensibly constrained as to the set of subordinate entities they
   can certify (e.g., a CA for an organization can only certify entities
   in that organization's name tree). Certificate user systems are able
   to mechanically check that the name subordination rule has been
   followed.

   The RFC 1422 CA hierarchical model has been found to have several
   deficiencies, including:

   (a)  The pure top-down hierarchy, with all certification paths
   starting from the root, is too restrictive for many purposes.  For
   some applications, verification of certification paths should start
   with a public key of a CA in a user's own domain, rather than
   mandating that verification commence at the top of a hierarchy. In
   many environments, the local domain is often the most trusted.  Also,
   initialization and key-pair-update operations can be more effectively
   conducted between an end entity and a local management system.

   (b)  The name subordination rule introduces undesirable constraints
   upon the X.500 naming system an organization may use.

   (c)  Use of the PCA concept requires knowledge of individual PCAs to
   be built into certificate chain verification logic.  In the
   particular case of Internet mail, this is not a major problem -- the
   PCA name can always be displayed to the human user who can make a
   decision as to what trust to imply from a particular chain.  However,
   in many commercial applications, such as electronic commerce or EDI,
   operator intervention to make policy decisions is impractical.  The
   process needs to be automated to a much higher degree.  In fact, the
   full process of certificate chain processing needs to be
   implementable in trusted software.

   Because of the above shortcomings, it is proposed that more flexible
   CA structures than the RFC 1422 hierarchy be supported by the PKIX
   specifications.  In fact, the main reason for the structural
   restrictions imposed by RFC 1422 was the restricted certificate
   format provided with X.509 v1.  With X.509 v3, most of the
   requirements addressed by RFC 1422 can be addressed using certificate
   extensions, without a need to restrict the CA structures used.  In
   particular, the certificate extensions relating to certificate
   policies obviate the need for PCAs and the constraint extensions
   obviate the need for the name subordination rule.

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3.3  Revocation

   When a certificate is issued, it is expected to be in use for its
   entire validity period.  However, various circumstances may cause a
   certificate to become invalid prior to the expiration of the validity
   period. Such circumstances might include change of name, change of
   association between subject and CA (e.g., an employee terminates
   employment with an organization), and compromise or suspected
   compromise of the corresponding private key.  Under such
   circumstances, the CA needs to revoke the certificate.

   X.509 defines one method of certificate revocation.  This method
   involves each CA periodically issuing a signed data structure called
   a certificate revocation list (CRL).  A CRL is a time stamped list
   identifying revoked certificates which is signed by a CA and made
   freely available in a public repository.  Each revoked certificate is
   identified in a CRL by its certificate serial number. When a
   certificate-using system uses a certificate (e.g., for verifying a
   remote user's digital signature), that system not only checks the
   certificate signature and validity but also acquires a suitably-
   recent CRL and checks that the certificate serial number is not on
   that CRL.  The meaning of "suitably-recent" may vary with local
   policy, but it usually means the most recently-issued CRL.  A CA
   issues a new CRL on a regular periodic basis (e.g., hourly, daily, or
   weekly).  Entries are added to CRLs as revocations occur, and an
   entry may be removed when the certificate expiration date is reached.

   An advantage of this revocation method is that CRLs may be
   distributed by exactly the same means as certificates themselves,
   namely, via untrusted communications and server systems.

   One limitation of the CRL revocation method, using untrusted
   communications and servers, is that the time granularity of
   revocation is limited to the CRL issue period.  For example, if a
   revocation is reported now, that revocation will not be reliably
   notified to certificate-using systems until the next periodic CRL is
   issued -- this may be up to one hour, one day, or one week depending
   on the frequency that the CA issues CRLs.

   Another potential problem with CRLs is the risk of a CRL growing to
   an entirely unacceptable size.  In the 1988 and 1993 versions of
   X.509, the CRL for the end-user certificates needed to cover the
   entire population of end-users for one CA.  It is desirable to allow
   such populations to be in the range of thousands, tens of thousands,
   or possibly even hundreds of thousands of users. The end-user CRL is
   therefore at risk of growing to such sizes, which present major
   communication and storage overhead problems.  With the version 2 CRL
   format, introduced along with the v3 certificate format, it becomes

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   possible to arbitrarily divide the population of certificates for one
   CA into a number of partitions, each partition being associated with
   one CRL distribution point (e.g., directory entry or URL) from which
   CRLs are distributed.  Therefore, the maximum CRL size can be
   controlled by a CA.  Separate CRL distribution points can also exist
   for different revocation reasons.  For example, routine revocations
   (e.g., name change) may be placed on a different CRL to revocations
   resulting from suspected key compromises, and policy may specify that
   the latter CRL be updated and issued more frequently than the former.

   As with the X.509 v3 certificate format, in order to facilitate
   interoperable implementations from multiple vendors, the X.509 v2 CRL
   format needs to be profiled for Internet use.  It is one goal of this
   document to specify such profiles.

   Furthermore, it is recognized that on-line methods of revocation
   notification may be applicable in some environments as an alternative
   to the X.509 CRL.  On-line revocation checking eliminates the latency
   between a revocation report and CRL the next issue.  Once the
   revocation is reported, any query to the on-line service will
   correctly reflect the certificate validation impacts of the
   revocation.  Therefore, this profile will also consider standard
   approaches to on-line revocation notification.

3.4  Operational Protocols

   Operational protocols are required to deliver certificates and CRLs
   to certificate using client systems. Provision is needed for a
   variety of different means of certificate and CRL delivery, including
   request/delivery procedures based on E-mail, http, X.500, and
   WHOIS++.  These specifications include definitions of, and/or
   references to, message formats and procedures for supporting all of
   the above operational environments, including definitions of or
   references to appropriate MIME content types.

3.5  Management Protocols

   Management protocols are required to support on-line interactions
   between Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) components.  For example,
   management protocol might be used between a CA and a client system
   with which a key pair is associated, or between two CAs which cross-
   certify each other.  The set of functions which potentially need to
   be supported by management protocols include:

   (a)  registration:  This is the process whereby a user first makes
   itself known to a CA, prior to that CA issuing  a certificate or
   certificates for that user.

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   (b)  initialization:  Before a client system can operate securely it
   is necessary to install in it necessary key materials which have the
   appropriate relationship with keys stored elsewhere in the
   infrastructure.  For example, the client needs to be securely
   initialized with the public key of a CA, to be used in validating
   certificate paths.  Furthermore, a client typically needs to be
   initialized with its own key pair(s).

   (c)  certification:  This  is the process in which a CA issues a
   certificate for a user's public key, and returns that certificate to
   the user's client system and/or posts that certificate in a public
   repository.

   (d)  key pair recovery:  As an option, user client key materials
   (e.g., a user's private key used for encryption purposes) may be
   backed up by a CA or a key backup system associated with a CA.  If a
   user needs to recover these backed up key materials (e.g., as a
   result of a forgotten password or a lost key chain file), an on-line
   protocol exchange may be needed to support such recovery.

   (e)  key pair update:  All key pairs need to be updated regularly,
   i.e., replaced with a new key pair, and new certificates issued.

   (f)  revocation request:  An authorized person advises a CA of an
   abnormal situation requiring certificate revocation.

   (g)  cross-certification:  Two CAs exchange the information necessary
   to establish cross-certificates between those CAs.

   Note that on-line protocols are not the only way of implementing the
   above functions.  For all functions there are off-line methods of
   achieving the same result, and this specification does not mandate
   use of on- line protocols.  For example, when hardware tokens are
   used, many of the functions may be achieved through as part of the
   physical token delivery.  Furthermore, some of the above functions
   may be combined into one protocol exchange.  In particular, two or
   more of the registration, initialization, and certification functions
   can be combined into one protocol exchange.

   Part 3 of the PKIX series of specifications defines a set of standard
   message formats supporting the above functions.  The protocols for
   conveying these messages in different environments (on-line, e-mail,
   and WWW) are also specified.

4  Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile

   This section presents a profile for public key certificates that will
   foster interoperability and a reusable public key infrastructure.

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   This section is based upon the X.509 V3 certificate format and the
   standard certificate extensions defined in the Amendment [X.509-AM].
   The ISO definitions use the 1993 version of ASN.1; while this
   document uses the older ASN.1 syntax, the encoded certificate and
   standard extensions are equivalent.  This section also defines
   private extensions required to support a public key infrastructure
   for the Internet community.

   Certificates may be used in a wide range of applications and
   environments covering a broad spectrum of interoperability goals and
   a broader spectrum of operational and assurance requirements.  The
   goal of this document is to establish a common baseline for generic
   applications requiring broad interoperability and limited special
   purpose requirements.  In particular, the emphasis will be on
   supporting the use of X.509 v3 certificates for informal internet
   electronic mail, IPSEC, and WWW applications.  Other efforts are
   looking at certificate profiles for payment systems.

4.1  Basic Certificate Fields

   The X.509 v3 certificate basic syntax is as follows.  For signature
   calculation, the certificate is encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
   encoding rules (DER) [X.208].  ASN.1 DER encoding is a tag, length,
   value encoding system for each element.

   Certificate  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
        tbsCertificate       TBSCertificate,
        signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
        signature            BIT STRING  }

   TBSCertificate  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
        version         [0]  Version DEFAULT v1,
        serialNumber         CertificateSerialNumber,
        signature            AlgorithmIdentifier,
        issuer               Name,
        validity             Validity,
        subject              Name,
        subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
        issuerUniqueID  [1]  IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
                             -- If present, version must be v2 or v3
        subjectUniqueID [2]  IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
                             -- If present, version must be v2 or v3
        extensions      [3]  Extensions OPTIONAL
                             -- If present, version must be v3
        }

   Version  ::=  INTEGER  {  v1(0), v2(1), v3(2)  }

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   CertificateSerialNumber  ::=  INTEGER

   Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
        notBefore      CertificateValidityDate,
        notAfter       CertificateValidityDate }

   CertificateValidityDate ::= CHOICE {
        utcTime        UTCTime,
        generalTime    GeneralizedTime }

   UniqueIdentifier  ::=  BIT STRING

   SubjectPublicKeyInfo  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
        algorithm            AlgorithmIdentifier,
        subjectPublicKey     BIT STRING  }

   Extensions  ::=  SEQUENCE OF Extension

   Extension  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
        extnID      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
        critical    BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
        extnValue   OCTET STRING  }

   The following items describe a proposed use of the X.509 v3
   certificate for the Internet.

4.1.1  Certificate Fields

   The Certificate is a SEQUENCE of three required fields. The fields
   are are described in detail in the following subsections

4.1.1.1  tbsCertificate

   The first field in the sequence is the tbsCertificate.  This is a
   itself a sequence, and contains the names of the subject and issuer,
   a public key associated with the subject an expiration date, and
   other associated information.  The fields of the basic tbsCertificate
   are described in detail in section 4.1.2; the tbscertificate may also
   include extensions which are described in section 4.2.

4.1.1.2  signatureAlgorithm

   The signatureAlgorithm field contains the algorithm identifier for
   the algorithm used by the CA to sign the certificate.  Section 7.2
   lists the supported signature algorithms.

   This field should contain the same algorithm identifier as the field
   signature in the sequence tbsCertificate (see section 4.1.2.3)

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4.1.1.3  signature

   The signature field contains a digital signature computed upon the
   ASN.1 DER encoded TBSCertificate.  The ASN.1 DER encoded
   TBSCertificate is used as the input to a one-way hash function.  The
   one-way hash function output value is ASN.1 encoded as an OCTET
   STRING and the result is encrypted (e.g., using RSA Encryption) to
   form the signed quantity.  This signature value is then ASN.1 encoded
   as a BIT STRING and included in the Certificate's signature field.

   By generating this signature, a CA certifies the validity of the
   information in tbscertificate.  In particular, the CA certifies the
   binding between the public key material and the subject of the
   certificate.

4.1.2  TBSCertificate

   The sequence TBSCertificate is a sequence which contains information
   associated with the subject of the certificate and the CA who issued
   it.  Every TBSCertificate contains the names of the subject and
   issuer, a public key associated with the subject, an expiration date,
   a version number and a serial number; some will contain optional
   unique identifier fields.  The remainder of this section describes
   the syntax and semantics of these fields.  A TBSCertificate may also
   include extensions.  Extensions for the Internet PKI are described in
   Section 4.2.

4.1.2.1  Version

   This field describes the version of the encoded certificate.  When
   extensions are used, as expected in this profile, use X.509 version 3
   (value is 2).  If no extensions are present, but a UniqueIdentifier
   is present, use version 2 (value is 1).  If only basic fields are
   present, use version 1 (the value is omitted from the certificate as
   the default value).

   Implementations should be prepared to accept any version certificate.
   In particular, at a minimum, implementations must recognize version 3
   certificates; determine whether any critical extensions are present;
   and accept certificates without critical extensions even if they
   don't recognize any extensions.  A certificate with an unrecognized
   critical extension must always be rejected.

   Generation of version 2 certificates is not expected by
   implementations based on this profile.

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4.1.2.2  Serial number

   The serial number is an integer assigned by the certification
   authority to each certificate.  It must be unique for each
   certificate issued by a given CA (i.e., the issuer name and serial
   number identify a unique certificate).

4.1.2.3  Signature

   This field contains the algorithm identifier for the algorithm used
   by the CA to sign the certificate.  Section 7.2 lists the supported
   signature algorithms.

4.1.2.4  Issuer Name

   The issuer name identifies the entity who has signed (and issued the
   certificate).  The issuer identity may be carried in the issuer name
   field and/or the issuerAltName extension.  If identity information is
   present only in the issuerAltName extension, then the issuer name may
   be an empty sequence and the issuerAltName extension must be
   critical.

4.1.2.5  Validity

   This field indicates the dates on which the certificate becomes valid
   (notBefore) and on which the certificate ceases to be valid
   (notAfter).  Both notBefore and notAfter may be encoded as UTCTime or
   GeneralizedTime.

   CAs conforming to this profile shall not issue certificates where
   notAfter or notBefore is encoded as GeneralizedTime before the year
   2005. CAs conforming to this profile shall not issue certificates
   where notAfter or notBefore is encoded as UTCTime after the year
   2015.

4.1.2.5.1  UTCTime

   The universal time type, UTCTime, is a standard ASN.1 type intended
   for international applications where local time alone is not
   adequate. UTCTime specifies the year through the two low order digits
   and time is specified to the precision of one minute or one second.
   UTCTime includes either Z (for Zulu, or Greenwich Mean Time) or a
   time differential.

   For the purposes of this profile, UTCTime values shall be expressed
   Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu) and shall include< seconds (i.e., times
   are YYMMDDHHMMSSZ), even where the number of seconds is zero.
   Conforming systems shall interpret the year field (YY) as follows:

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      Where YY is greater than 50, the year shall be interpreted as
      19YY; and

      Where YY is less than or equal to 50, the year shall be
      interpreted as 20YY.

4.1.2.6  GeneralizedTime

   The generalized time type, GeneralizedTime, is a standard ASN.1 type
   for variable precision representation of time.  Optionally, the
   GeneralizedTime field can include a representation of the time
   differential between local and Greenwich Mean Time.

   For the purposes of this profile, GeneralizedTime values shall be
   expressed Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu) and shall include seconds (i.e.,
   times are YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ), even where the number of seconds is zero.
   GeneralizedTime values shall not include fractional seconds.

4.1.2.6  Subject Name

   The subject name identifies the entity associated with the public key
   stored in the subject public key field. The subject identity may be
   carried in the subject field and/or the subjectAltName extension.  If
   identity information is present only in the subjectAltName extension
   (e.g., a key bound only to an email address or URI), then the subject
   name may be an empty sequence and the subjectAltName extension must
   be critical.

4.1.2.7  Subject Public Key Info

   This field is used to carry the public key and identify the algorithm
   with which the key is used.

4.1.2.8  Unique Identifiers

   The subject and issuer unique identifier are present in the
   certificate to handle the possibility of reuse of subject and/or
   issuer names over time.  This profile recommends that names not be
   reused and that Internet certificates not make use of unique
   identifiers.  CAs conforming to this profile should not generate
   certificates with unique identifiers.  Applications conforming to
   this profile should be capable of parsing unique identifiers and
   making comparisons.

4.2  Certificate Extensions

   The extensions defined for X.509 v3 certificates provide methods for
   associating additional attributes with users or public keys, for

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   managing the certification hierarchy, and for managing CRL
   distribution.  The X.509 v3 certificate format also allows
   communities to define private extensions to carry information unique
   to those communities.  Each extension in a certificate may be
   designated as critical or non-critical.  A certificate using system
   (an application validating a certificate) must reject the certificate
   if it encounters a critical extension it does not recognize.  A non-
   critical extension may be ignored if it is not recognized.  The
   following presents recommended extensions used within Internet
   certificates and standard locations for information.  Communities may
   elect to use additional extensions; however, caution should be
   exercised in adopting any critical extensions in certificates which
   might be used in a general context.

   Each extension includes an object identifier and an ASN.1 structure.
   When an extension appears in a certificate, the object identifier
   appears as the field extnID and the corresponding ASN.1 encoded
   structure is the value of the bit string extnValue.  Only one
   instance of a particular extension may appear in a particular
   certificate. For example, a certificate may contain only one
   authority key identifier extension (4.2.1.1).  An extension may also
   include the optional boolean critical; critical's default value is
   FALSE.  The text for each extension specifies the acceptable values
   for the critical field.

   Conforming CAs are required to support the Basic Constraints
   extension (Section 4.2.1.10).  If the CA issues certificates with an
   empty sequence for the subject field, the CA must support the
   altSubjectName extension.  If the CA issues certificates with an
   empty sequence for the issuer field, the CA must support the
   altIssuerName extension.  Support for the remaining extensions is
   optional. Conforming CAs may support extensions that are not
   identified within this specification; certificate issuers are
   cautioned that marking such extensions as critical may inhibit
   interoperability.

   At a minimum, applications conforming to this profile shall recognize
   extensions which shall or may be critical. These extensions are:  key
   usage (4.2.1.3), certificate policies (4.2.1.5), the alternative
   subject name (4.2.1.7), issuer alternative name (4.2.1.8), basic
   constraints (4.2.1.10), name constraints (4.2.1.11), policy
   constraints (4.2.1.12), authority information access (4.2.2.2), and
   CA information access (4.2.2.3).

   In addition, this profile recommends support for key identifiers
   (4.2.1.2 and 4.2.1.3) and CRL distribution points (4.2.1.13).

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4.2.1  Standard Extensions

   This section identifies standard certificate extensions defined in
   [X.509-AM] for use in the Internet Public Key Infrastructure.  Each
   extension is associated with an object identifier defined in [X.509-
   AM].  These object identifiers are members of the
   certificateExtension arc, which is defined by the following:

   certificateExtension  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 29}
   id-ce                 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  certificateExtension

   4.2.1.1  Authority Key Identifier

   The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
   identifying the particular public key used to sign a certificate.
   This extension would be used where an issuer has multiple signing
   keys (either due to multiple concurrent key pairs or due to
   changeover).  In general, this extension should be included in
   certificates.

   The identification can be based on either the key identifier (the
   subject key identifier in the issuer's certificate) or on the issuer
   name and serial number.  The key identifier method is recommended in
   this profile. Conforming CAs that generate this extension shall
   include or omit both authorityCertIssuer and
   authorityCertSerialNumber. If authorityCertIssuer and
   authorityCertSerialNumber are omitted, the keyIdentifier field shall
   be present.

   This extension shall not be marked critical.

   id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 35 }

   AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
        keyIdentifier                   [0] KeyIdentifier               OPTIONAL,
        authorityCertIssuer             [1] GeneralNames                OPTIONAL,
        authorityCertSerialNumber       [2] CertificateSerialNumber     OPTIONAL
    }

   KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING

4.2.1.2  Subject Key Identifier

   The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying
   the particular public key used in an application.  Where a reference
   to a public key identifier is needed (as with an Authority Key
   Identifier) and one is not included in the associated certificate, a
   SHA-1 hash of the subject public key shall be used.  The hash shall

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   be calculated over the value (excluding tag and length) of the
   subject public key field in the certificate.  This extension should
   be marked non-critical.

   id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 14 }

   SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= KeyIdentifier

4.2.1.3  Key Usage

   The key usage extension defines the purpose (e.g., encipherment,
   signature, certificate signing) of the key contained in the
   certificate.  The usage restriction might be employed when a
   multipurpose key is to be restricted (e.g., when an RSA key should be
   used only for signing or only for key encipherment).  The profile
   recommends that when used, this be marked as a critical extension.

   id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 15 }

   KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING {
        digitalSignature        (0),
        nonRepudiation          (1),
        keyEncipherment         (2),
        dataEncipherment        (3),
        keyAgreement            (4),
        keyCertSign             (5),
        cRLSign                 (6) }

4.2.1.4  Private Key Usage Period

   The private key usage period extension allows the certificate issuer
   to specify a different validty period for the private key than the
   certificate. This extension is intended for use with digital
   signature keys.  This extension consists of two optional components
   notBefore and notAfter.  The private key associated with the
   certificate should not be used to sign objects before or after the
   times specified by the two components, respectively. CAs conforming
   to this profile shall not generate certificates with private key
   usage period extensions unless at least one of the two components is
   present.

   This profile recommends against the use of this extension.  CAs
   conforming to this profile shall not generate certificates with
   critical private key usage period extensions.

   id-ce-privateKeyUsagePeriod OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 16 }

   PrivateKeyUsagePeriod ::= SEQUENCE {

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        notBefore       [0]     GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
        notAfter        [1]     GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }

4.2.1.5  Certificate Policies

   The certificate policies extension contains a sequence of policy
   information terms, each of which consists of an object identifier
   (OID) and optional qualifiers.  These policy information terms
   indicate the policy under which the certificate has been issued and
   the purposes for which the certificate may be used.  This profile
   strongly recommends that a simple OID be present in this field.
   Optional qualifiers which may be present are expected to provide
   information about obtaining CA rules, not change the definition of
   the policy.

   Applications with specific policy requirements are expected to have a
   list of those policies which they will accept and to compare the
   policy OIDs in the certificate to that list.  If this extension is
   critical, the path validation software must be able to interpret this
   extension, or must reject the certificate.  (Applications are free to
   ignore the policy field, even if the extension is marked critical.)

   This specification defines two policy qualifiers types for use by
   certificate policy writers and certificate issuers at their own
   discretion. The quailfier types are the CPS Pointer qualifier, and
   the User Notice qualifier.

   The CPS Pointer qualifier contains a pointer to a Certification
   Practice Statement (CPS) published by the CA.  The pointer is in the
   form of a URI.

   The User Notice qualifier contains a text string that is to be
   displayed to a certificate user (including subscribers and relying
   parties) prior to the use of the certificate.  The text string may be
   an IA5String or a BMPString - a subset of the ISO 100646-1 multiple
   octet coded character set.  A CA may invoke a procedure that requires
   that the certficate user acknowledge that the applicable terms and
   conditions have been disclosed or accepted.

   id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 32 }

   certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation

   PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
        policyIdentifier   CertPolicyId,
        policyQualifiers   SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL }

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   CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

   PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        policyQualifierId   PolicyQualifierId,
        qualifier           ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId }

   -- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers

   id-pkix-cps      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { pkix 4 }
   id-pkix-unotice  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { pkix 5 }

   PolicyQualifierId ::= ENUMERATED { id-pkix-cps, id-pkix-unotice }

   Qualifier ::= CHOICE {
        cPSuri    CPSuri,
        userNotice     UserNotice }

   CPSuri ::= IA5String

   UserNotice ::= CHOICE {
     ia5String     IA5String,
     bmpString     ANY }

4.2.1.6  Policy Mappings

   This extension is used in CA certificates.  It lists pairs of
   obbjectidentifiers; each pair includes an issuerDomainPolicy and a
   subjectDomainPolicy. The pairing indicates the issuing CA considers
   its issuerDomainPolicy equivalent to the subject CA's
   subjectDomainPolicy.

   The issuing CA's users may accept an issuerDomainPolicy for certain
   applications. The policy mapping tells the issuing CA's users which
   policies associated with the subject CA are comparable to the policy
   they accept.

   This extension may be supported by CAs and/or applications, and it is
   always non-critical.

   id-ce-policyMappings OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 33 }

   PolicyMappings ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SEQUENCE {
        issuerDomainPolicy      CertPolicyId,
        subjectDomainPolicy     CertPolicyId }

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4.2.1.7  Subject Alternative Name

   The subject alternative names extension allows additional identities
   to be bound to the subject of the certificate.  Defined options
   include an rfc822 name (electronic mail address), a DNS name, an IP
   address, and a URI.  Other options exist, including completely local
   definitions.  Multiple instances of a name and multiple name forms
   may be included.  Whenever such identities are to be bound into a
   certificate, the subject alternative name (or issuer alternative
   name) extension shall be used.  (Note: a form of such an identifier
   may also be present in the subject distinguished name; however, the
   alternative name extension is the preferred location for finding such
   information.)

   Further, if the only subject identity included in the certificate is
   an alternative name form (e.g., an electronic mail address), then the
   subject distinguished name should be empty (an empty sequence), the
   subjectAltName extension should be used. If the subject field
   contains an empty squence, the subjectAltName extension shall be
   marked critical.

   Alternative names may be constrained in the same manner as subject
   distinguished names using the name constraints extension as described
   in section 4.2.1.11.

   id-ce-subjectAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 17 }

   SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames

   GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName

   GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
        otherName                       [0]     ANY,
        rfc822Name                      [1]     IA5String,
        dNSName                         [2]     IA5String,
        x400Address                     [3]     ORAddress,
        directoryName                   [4]     Name,
        ediPartyName                    [5]     EDIPartyName,
        uniformResourceIdentifier       [6]     IA5String,
        iPAddress                       [7]     OCTET STRING,
        registeredID                    [8]     OBJECT IDENTIFIER }

   EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE {
        nameAssigner            [0]     DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
        partyName               [1]     DirectoryString }

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4.2.1.8  Issuer Alternative Name

   As with 4.2.1.7, this extension is used to associate Internet style
   identities with the certificate issuer.  If the only issuer identity
   included in the certificate is an alternative name form (e.g., an
   electronic mail address), then the issuer distinguished name should
   be empty (an empty sequence), the issuerAltName extension should be
   used. If the issuer field is empty and more than one issuerAltName
   extension is included in the certificate, the issuerAltName extension
   shall be marked critical.

   id-ce-issuerAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 18 }

   IssuerAltName ::= GeneralNames

4.2.1.9  Subject Directory Attributes

   The subject directory attributes extension is not recommended as an
   essential part of this profile, but it may
   be used in local environments.  This extension is always non-critical.

   id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 9 }

   SubjectDirectoryAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute

4.2.1.10  Basic Constraints

   The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the
   certificate is a CA and how deep a certification path may exist
   through that CA.  This profile requires the use of this extension,
   and it shall be critical for all certificates issued to CAs.

   id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 19 }

   BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
        cA                      BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
        pathLenConstraint       INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL }

4.2.1.11  Name Constraints

   The name constraints extension provides permitted and excluded
   subtrees that place restrictions on names that may be included within
   a certificate issued by a given CA.  Restrictions may apply to the
   subject distringuished name or subject alternative names.  Any name
   matching a restriction in the excluded subtrees field is invalid
   regardless of information appearing in the permitted subtrees. This
   extension may be critical or non-critical.

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   Restrictions for the rfc822, dNSName, and uri name forms are all
   expressed in terms of strings with wild card matching.  An "*" is the
   wildcard character.  The minimum and maximum fields in general
   subtree are not used for these name forms.  For uris and rfc822
   names, the restriction applies to the host part of the name.
   Examples would be foo.bar.com; www*.bar.com; *.xyz.com.

   Restrictions of the form directoryName shall be applied to the
   subject field in the certificate and to the subjectAltName extensions
   of type directoryName.  Restrictions of the form x400Address shall be
   applied to subjectAltName extensions of type x400Address.

   The syntax and semantics for name constraints for otherName,
   ediPartyName, and registeredID are not defined by this specification.

   id-ce-nameConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 30 }

   NameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
        permittedSubtrees       [0]     GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL,
        excludedSubtrees        [1]     GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL }

   GeneralSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree

   GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE {
        base                    GeneralName,
        minimum         [0]     BaseDistance DEFAULT 0,
        maximum         [1]     BaseDistance OPTIONAL }

   BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)

4.2.1.12  Policy Constraints

   The policy constraints extension can be used in certificates issued
   to CAs.  The policy constraints extension constrains path validation
   in two ways. It can be used to prohibit policy mapping or limit the
   set of poicies that can in subsequent certificates. This extension
   may be critical or non-critical.

   id-ce-policyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 34 }

   PolicyConstraints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SEQUENCE {
        policySet                       [0] CertPolicySet OPTIONAL,
        requireExplicitPolicy           [1] SkipCerts OPTIONAL,
        inhibitPolicyMapping            [2] SkipCerts OPTIONAL }

   SkipCerts ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)

   CertPolicySet ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertPolicyId

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4.2.1.13  CRL Distribution Points

   The CRL distribution points extension identifies how CRL information
   is obtained.  The extension shall be non-critical, but this profile
   recommends support for this extension by CAs and applications.
   Further discussion of CRL management is contained in section 5.

   id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 31 }

   cRLDistributionPoints ::= {
        CRLDistPointsSyntax }

   CRLDistPointsSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint

   DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
        distributionPoint       [0]     DistributionPointName OPTIONAL,
        reasons                 [1]     ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,
        cRLIssuer               [2]     GeneralNames OPTIONAL }

   DistributionPointName ::= CHOICE {
        fullName                [0]     GeneralNames,
        nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1]     RelativeDistinguishedName }

   ReasonFlags ::= BIT STRING {
        unused                  (0),
        keyCompromise           (1),
        cACompromise            (2),
        affiliationChanged      (3),
        superseded              (4),
        cessationOfOperation    (5),
        certificateHold         (6) }

4.2.2  Private Internet Extensions

   This section defines new extensions for use in the Internet Public
   Key Infrastructure.  These extensions may be used to direct
   applications to additional information about the certificate's
   subject or issuer. This extension includes the type of information,
   where it is located, and a method for obtaining the information. The
   types of information include certificate status, CA policy
   information, and related certificates.

   The object identifiers associated with the private extensions are
   defined under the iso (1), org (3), dod (6), internet (1),
   security(5) or 1.3.6.1.5, branch of the name space.  These extensions
   make use of OIDs of the form {applTCPProtoID port}, which identify
   TCP-based protocols that don't have OIDs assigned by other means, to
   identify common methods for retrieving information.

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   The following ASN.1 defines object identifiers which may be used by
   applications that implement the private extensions; additional access
   methods may be used, but the semantics are undefined by this
   document.

   pkix  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) org(3) dod (6) internet (1)
                  security(5) pkix(?) }

   -- Object identifiers for ftp, http, smtp and ldap protocols

   applTCPProto OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 6 1 2 1 27 4 }

   ftpID    OBJECT-IDENTIFIER ::= {applTCPProtoID 21}
   httpID   OBJECT-IDENTIFIER ::= {applTCPProtoID 80}
   smtpID   OBJECT-IDENTIFIER ::= {applTCPProtoID 25}
   ldapID   OBJECT-IDENTIFIER ::= {applTCPProtoID 389}

   -- Object identifier for the X.500 directory access protocol

   dap OBJECT-IDENTIFIER ::= { 2 5 3 1 }

4.2.2.1  Subject Information Access

   The name information in the certificate identifies the entity to
   which the public key is bound.  In some instances, it may also be
   necessary to know where to find additional information about the
   named entity.  In the case of X.500 names, this relationship is
   automatic.  The subject information access extension provides a means
   of identifying where and how to find information about the subject.
   The extension specifies a method of obtaining information and a
   general name form indicating where.  This extension shall always be
   non-critical.

   id-pkix-subjectInfoAccess OBJECT-IDENTIFIER ::= { pkix 1}

   -- subjectInfoAccess ::=  { SubjectInfoAccessSyntax }

   SubjectInfoAccessSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription

   AccessDescription  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
        accessMethod          OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
        accessLocation        GeneralName  }

   This specification defines the following values for accessMethod:
   ftpID, httpID, smtpID, ldapID, and dap. The accessMethod value
   indicates the protocol required to obtain the information. If
   accessMethod is ftpID, then the information must available through
   anonymous ftp.  If accessMethod is ftpID, httpID, smtpID, or ldapID,

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   then the accessLocation shall be a uniformResourceIndicator (i.e., a
   URI). The URI shall specify all information required to retrieve the
   information.  If accessMethod is dap, then the accessLocation shall
   be a directoryName.

4.2.2.2  Authority Information Access

   The authority information access extension indicates how to access CA
   information and services for the issuer of the certificate in which
   the extension appears.  Information and services include certificate
   status or on-line validation services, certificate retrieval, CA
   policy data, and CA certificates (certificates certifying the target
   CA to aid in certification path navigation).  This extension may be
   included in subject or CA certificates and may be critical or non-
   critical.

   id-pkix-authorityInfoAccess OBJECT-IDENTIFIER ::= { pkix 2}

   -- authorityInfoAccess ::=  { AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax  }

   AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
        certStatus        [0] SEQUENCE OF AccessDescription OPTIONAL,
        certRetrieval     [1] SEQUENCE OF AccessDescription OPTIONAL,
        caPolicy          [2] SEQUENCE OF AccessDescription OPTIONAL,
        caCerts           [3] SEQUENCE OF AccessDescription OPTIONAL  }

   If certStatus is present, each entry in that sequence describes a
   mechanism and location for

      on-line verification of the status of this certificate, or

      the CRL on which this certificate would appear if revoked.

   If certRetrieval is present, each entry in the sequence describes how
   to retrieve all current certificates whose subject is the issuer of
   the certificate in which this extension appears.

   If caPolicy is present, each entry in the sequence describes how to
   retrieve the policy that was in effect when this certificate was
   issued.

   If caCerts is present, each entry in the sequence describes a
   mechanism and location for retrieval of certificates the issuer has
   issued to other CAs.

   If the certStatus, certRetrieval, caPolicy, or caCerts sequence has
   more than one value, conforming applications are not required to
   process all the values. Successful processing of any one

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   AccessDescritpion shall be sufficient.  It is the responsibility of
   the certificate issuer to ensure all mechanisms provide the same
   information.

   The expected values for AccessDescription are the values defined in
   4.2.2.1. Processing rules for other values for accessMethod are not
   defined.

   If this extension is critical, applications are required to use the
   information in the certStatus field (if present) to check the
   revocation status of this certificate, the certRetrieval field (if
   present) to obtain the issuer's current certificates, and the caCerts
   field (if present) to obtain certificates issued by the subject to
   other CAs.

   There are no additional processing requirements for cAPolicy if the
   extension is marked as critical.

4.2.2.3  CA Information Access

   Where the subject of a certificate is a CA, the subjectInfoAccess
   extension may be insufficient.  The CA information access extension
   indicates how to access CA information and services for the subject
   of the certificate in which the extension appears.  Information and
   services include certificate status or on-line validation services,
   certificate retrieval, CA policy data, and CA certificates
   (certificates certifying the target CA to aid in cert path
   navigation).  This extension is syntactically identical to
   authorityInfoAccess, but is identified by a different OID.  This
   extension may be included only in CA certificates and may be critical
   or non-critical.  CA certificates may include both an authority and a
   caInfoAccess extension to describe access methods for both the CA and
   its issuer.

   id-pkix-caInfoAccess OBJECT-IDENTIFIER ::= { pkix 3 }

   -- caInfoAccess ::=  { AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax  }

   If certStatus is present, each entry in that sequence describes a
   mechanism and location for

      on-line verification of the status of this certificate, or

      CRL issued by the subject of this certificate.

   If certRetrieval is present, each entry in the sequence describes how
   to retrieve all current certificates whose subject is the subject of
   the certificate in which this extension appears.

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   If caPolicy is present, each entry in the sequence describes how to
   retrieve the current policy tssociated with the subject of this
   certificate.

   If caCerts is present, each entry in the sequence describes a
   mechanism and location for retrieval of certificates the subject has
   issued to other CAs.

   If the certStatus, certRetrieval, caPolicy, or caCerts sequence has
   more than one value, conforming applications are not required to
   process all the values. Successful processing of any one
   AccessDescritpion shall be sufficient.  It is the responsibility of
   the certificate issuer to ensure all mechanisms provide the same
   information.

   The legal values for AccessDescription shall be as defined in
   4.2.2.1.

   If this extension is critical, applications are required to use the
   information in the certStatus field (if present) to check the
   revocation status of this certificate, the certRetrieval field (if
   present) to obtain the subject's other current certificates, and the
   caCerts field (if present) to obtain certificates issued by the
   subject to other CAs.

   There are no additional processing requirements for cAPolicy if the
   extension is marked as critical.

4.3  Examples

   << Certificate samples including descriptive text and ASN.1 encoded
   blobs will be inserted. >>

   4.3.1 Simple certificate, no extensions

   <<TBD>>

   4.3.2 Certificate with Private extensions

   <<TBD>>

   4.3.3 certificate with no subject DN

   <<TBD>>

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5  CRL and CRL Extensions Profile

   As described above, one goal of this X.509 v2 CRL profile is to
   foster the creation of an interoperable and reusable Internet PKI.
   To achieve this goal, guidelines for the use of extensions are
   specified, and some assumptions are made about the nature of
   information included in the CRL.

   CRLs may be used in a wide range of applications and environments
   covering a broad spectrum of interoperability goals and an even
   broader spectrum of operational and assurance requirements.  This
   profile establishes a common baseline for generic applications
   requiring broad interoperability.  Emphasis is placed on support for
   X.509 v2 CRLs.  The profile defines a baseline set of information
   that can be expected in every CRL.  Also, the profile defines common
   locations within the CRL for frequently used attributes, and common
   representations for these attributes.

   This profile does not define any private Internet CRL extensions or
   CRL entry extensions.

   Environments with additional or special purpose requirements may
   build on this profile or may replace it.

   Conforming CAs are not required to issue CRLs if other revocation or
   status mechanisms are provided.  Conforming CAs that issue CRLs are
   required to issue version 2 CRLs.  Conforming applications are
   required to process version 1 and 2 certificates.

5.1  CRL Fields

   The X.509 v2 CRL syntax is as follows.  For signature calculation,
   the data that is to be signed is ASN.1 DER encoded.  ASN.1 DER
   encoding is a tag, length, value encoding system for each element.

   CertificateList  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
        tbsCertList          TBSCertList,
        signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
        signature            BIT STRING  }

   TBSCertList  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
        version                 Version OPTIONAL,
                                     -- if present, must be v2
        signature               AlgorithmIdentifier,
        issuer                  Name,
        thisUpdate              ChoiceOfTime,
        nextUpdate              ChoiceOfTime,
        revokedCertificates     SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE  {

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             userCertificate         CertificateSerialNumber,
             revocationDate          ChoiceOfTime,
             crlEntryExtensions      Extensions OPTIONAL
                                                 -- if present, must be v2
                                  }  OPTIONAL,
        crlExtensions           [0]  Extensions OPTIONAL
                                                 -- if present, must be v2
                                  }

   ChoiceOfTime ::= CHOICE {
        utcTime        UTCTime,
        generalTime    GeneralizedTime }

   Version  ::= INTEGER  {  v1(0), v2(1), v3(2)  }

   AlgorithmIdentifier  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
        algorithm               OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
        parameters              ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL  }
                                     -- contains a value of the type
                                     -- registered for use with the
                                     -- algorithm object identifier value

   CertificateSerialNumber  ::=  INTEGER

   Extensions  ::=  SEQUENCE OF Extension

   Extension  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
        extnId                  OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
        critical                BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
        extnValue               OCTET STRING  }
                                     -- contains a DER encoding of a value
                                     -- of the type registered for use with
                                     -- the extnId object identifier value

   The following items describe the proposed use of the X.509 v2 CRL in
   the Internet PKI.

5.1.1  CertificateList Fields

   The CertificateList is a SEQUENCE of three required fields. The
   fields are are described in detail in the following subsections

5.1.1.1  tbsCertList

   The first field in the sequence is the tbsCertList.  This is a itself
   a sequence, and is generally thought of as the X.509 CRL. It contains
   the names of the subject and issuer, a public key associated with the
   subject an expiration date, and other associated information.  The

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   fields of the basic tbsCertificate are described in detail in section
   4.1.2; the tbscertificate may also include extensions which are
   described in section 4.2.

5.1.1.2  signatureAlgorithm

   The signatureAlgorithm field contains the algorithm identifier for
   the algorithm used by the CA to sign the CertificateList.  Section
   7.2 lists the supported signature algorithms.

5.1.1.3  signature

   The signature field contains a digital signature computed upon the
   ASN.1 DER encoded TBSCertList.  The ASN.1 DER encoded  TBSCertificate
   is used as the input to a one-way hash function.  The one-way hash
   function output value is ASN.1 encoded as an OCTET STRING and the
   result is encrypted (e.g., using RSA Encryption) to form the signed
   quantity.  This signature value is then ASN.1 encoded as a BIT STRING
   and included in the Certificate's signature field.

5.1.2  Certificate List "To Be Signed"

   The certificate list to be signed, or tBSCertList, is a SEQUENCE of
   required and optional fields.  The required fields identify the CRL
   issuer, the algorithm used to sign the CRL, the date and time the CRL
   was issued, and the date and time by which the CA will issue the next
   CRL.

   Optional fields include lists of revoked certificates and CRL
   extensions.  The revoked certificate list is optional to support the
   special case where a CA has not revoked any unexpired certificates it
   has issued.  It is expected that nearly all CRLs issued in the
   Internet PKI will contain one or more lists of revoked certificates.
   Similarly, the profile requires conforming CAs to use of one CRL
   extension (CRL number) in all CRLs issued.

5.1.2.1  Version

   This field describes the version of the encoded CRL.  When extensions
   are used, as expected in this profile, use version 2 (the integer
   value is 1).  If neither CRL extensions nor CRL entry extensions are
   present, version 1 CRLs are recommended (e.g., the integer value
   should be omitted).

5.1.2.2  Signature

   This field contains the algorithm identifier for the algorithm used
   to sign the CRL.  Section 7.2 lists the signature algorithms used in

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   the Internet PKI.

5.1.2.3  Issuer Name

   The issuer name identifies the entity who has signed (and issued the
   CRL).  The issuer identity may be carried in the issuer name field
   and/or the issuerAltName extension.  If identity information is
   present only in the issuerAltName extension, then the issuer name may
   be an empty sequence and the issuerAltName extension must be
   critical.

5.1.2.4  This Update

   This field indicates the issue date of this CRL. ThisUpdate may be
   encoded as UTCTime or GeneralizedTime.

   CAs conforming to this profile shall not issue CRLs where thisUpdate
   is encoded as GeneralizedTime before the year 2005. CAs conforming to
   this profile shall not issue CRLs where thisUpdate is encoded as
   UTCTime after the year 2015.

   Where encoded as UTCTime, thisUpdate shall be specified and
   interpreted as defined in Section 4.1.2.5.1.  Where encoded as
   GeneralizedTime, thisUpdate shall be specified and interpreted as
   defined in Section 4.1.2.5.2.

5.1.2.5  Next Update

   This field indicates the date by which the next CRL will be issued.
   The next CRL could be issued before the indicated date, but it will
   not be issued any later than the indicated date. nextUpdate may be
   encoded as UTCTime or GeneralizedTime.

   CAs conforming to this profile shall not issue CRLs where nextUpdate
   is encoded as GeneralizedTime before the year 2005. CAs conforming to
   this profile shall not issue CRLs where nextUpdate is encoded as
   UTCTime after the year 2015.

   Where encoded as UTCTime, nextUpdate shall be specified and
   interpreted as defined in Section 4.1.2.5.1.  Where encoded as
   GeneralizedTime, nextUpdate shall be specified and interpreted as
   defined in Section 4.1.2.5.2.

5.1.2.6  Revoked Certificates

   Revoked certificates are listed.  The revoked certificates are named
   by their serial numbers.  Certificates are uniquely identified by the
   combination of the issuer name or issuer alternative name along with

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   the user certificate serial number.  The date on which the revocation
   occured is specified.  The time for revocationDate shall be expressed
   as described in section 5.1.2.4. Additional information may be
   supplied in CRL entry extensions; CRL entry extensions are discussed
   in section 5.3.

5.2  CRL Extensions

   The extensions defined by ANSI X9 and ISO for X.509 v2 CRLs [X.509-
   AM] [X9.55] provide methods for associating additional attributes
   with CRLs.  The X.509 v2 CRL format also allows communities to define
   private extensions to carry information unique to those communities.
   Each extension in a CRL may be designated as critical or non-
   critical.  A CRL validation must fail if it encounters an critical
   extension which it does not know how to process.  However, an
   unrecognized non-critical extension may be ignored.  The following
   presents those extensions used within Internet CRLs.  Communities may
   elect to include extensions in CRLs which are not defined in this
   specification. However, caution should be exercised in adopting any
   critical extensions in CRLs which might be used in a general context.

   Conforming CAs that issue CRLs are required to support the CRL number
   extension (5.2.3), and include it in all CRLs issued. Conforming
   applications are required to support the critical and optionally
   critical CRL extensions issuer alternative name (5.2.2), issuing
   distribution point (5.2.4) and delta CRL indicator (5.2.5).

5.2.1  Authority Key Identifier

   The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
   identifying the particular public key used to sign a CRL.  The
   identification can be based on either the key identifier (the subject
   key identifier in the CRL signer's certificate) or on the issuer name
   and serial number.  The key identifier method is recommended in this
   profile.  This extension would be used where an issuer has multiple
   signing keys, either due to multiple concurrent key pairs or due to
   changeover.  In general, this non-critical extension should be
   included in certificates.

   The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in Section 4.2.1.1.

5.2.2  Issuer Alternative Name

   The issuer alternative names extension allows additional identities
   to be associated with the issuer of the CRL.  Defined options include
   an rfc822 name (electronic mail address), a DNS name, an IP address,
   and a URI.  Multiple instances of a name and multiple name forms may
   be included.  Whenever such identities are used, the issuer

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   alternative name extension shall be used.

   Further, if the only issuer identity included in the CRL is an
   alternative name form (e.g., an electronic mail address), then the
   issuer distinguished name should be empty (an empty sequence), the
   issuerAltName extension should be used, and the issuerAltName
   extension must be marked critical. If more than one issuerAltName
   extension appears in the CRL and the issuer distinguished name is
   empty, exactly one issuerAltName extension must be marked critical.

   The object identifier and syntax for this CRL extension are defined
   in Section 4.2.1.8.

5.2.3  CRL Number

   The CRL number is a non-critical CRL extension which conveys a
   monotonically increacing sequence number for each CRL issued by a
   given CA through a specific CA X.500 Directory entry or CRL
   distribution point.  This extension allows users to easily determine
   when a particular CRL supercedes another CRL.  CAs conforming to this
   profile shall include this extension in all CRLs.

   id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 20 }

   cRLNumber ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)

5.2.4  Issuing Distribution Point

   The issuing distribution point is a critical CRL extension that
   identifies the CRL distribution point for a particular CRL, and it
   indicates whether the CRL covers revocation for end entity
   certificates only, CA certificates only, or a limitied set of reason
   codes.  Since this extension is critical, all certificate users must
   be prepared to receive CRLs with this extension.

   The CRL is signed using the CA's private key.  CRL Distribution
   Points do not have their own key pairs.  If the CRL is stored in the
   X.500 Directory, it is stored in the Directory entry corresponding to
   the CRL distribution point, which may be different that the Directory
   entry of the CA.

   CRL distribution points, if used by a CA, should be partition the CRL
   on the basis of compromise and routine revocation.  That is, the
   revocations with reason code keyCompromise (1) shall appear in one
   distribution point, and the revocations with other reason codes shall
   appear in another distribution point.

   id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 28 }

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   issuingDistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
        distributionPoint       [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL,
        onlyContainsUserCerts   [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
        onlyContainsCACerts     [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
        onlySomeReasons         [3] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,
        indirectCRL             [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE }

5.2.5  Delta CRL Indicator

   The delta CRL indicator is a critical CRL extension that identifies a
   delta-CRL.  The use of delta-CRLs can significantly improve
   processing time for applications which store revocation information
   in a format other than the CRL structure.  This allows changes to be
   added to the local database while ignoring unchanged information that
   is already in the local databse.

   When a delta-CRL is issued, the CAs shall also issue a complete CRL.

   The value of BaseCRLNumber identifies the CRL number of the base CRL
   that was used as the starting point in the generation of this delta-
   CRL.  The delta-CRL contains the changes between the base CRL and the
   current CRL issued along with the delta-CRL.  It is the decision of a
   CA as to whether to provide delta-CRLs.  Again, a delta-CRL shall not
   be issued without a corresponding CRL.  The value of CRLNumber for
   both the delta-CRL and the corresponding CRL shall be identical.

   A CRL user constructing a locally held CRL from delta-CRLs shall
   consider the constructed CRL incomplete and unusable if the CRLNumber
   of the received delta-CRL is more that one greater that the CRLnumber
   of the delta-CRL last processed.

   id-ce-deltaCRLIndicator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 27 }

   deltaCRLIndicator ::= BaseCRLNumber

   BaseCRLNumber ::= CRLNumber

5.3  CRL Entry Extensions

   The CRL entry extensions already defined by ANSI X9 and ISO for X.509
   v2 CRLs [X.509-AM] [X9.55] provide methods for associating additional
   attributes with CRL entries.  The X.509 v2 CRL format also allows
   communities to define private CRL entry extensions to carry
   information unique to those communities.  Each extension in a CRL
   entry may be designated as critical or non-critical.  A CRL
   validation must fail if it encounters a critical CRL entry extension
   which it does not know how to process.  However, an unrecognized
   non-critical CRL entry extension may be ignored.  The following

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   presents recommended extensions used within Internet CRL entries and
   standard locations for information.  Communities may elect to use
   additional CRL entry extensions; however, caution should be exercised
   in adopting any critical extensions in CRL entries which might be
   used in a general context.

   All CRL entry extensions are non-critical; support for these
   extensions is optional for conforming CAs and applications.  However,
   CAs that issue CRLs are strongly encouraged to include reason codes
   (5.3.1) whenever this information is available.

5.3.1  Reason Code

   The reasonCode is a non-critical CRL entry extension that identifies
   the reason for the certificate revocation. CAs are strongly
   encouraged to include reason codes in CRL entries; however, the
   reason code CRL entry extension should be absent instead of using the
   unspecified (0) reasonCode value.

   id-ce-cRLReason OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 21 }

   -- reasonCode ::= { CRLReason }

   CRLReason ::= ENUMERATED {
        unspecified             (0),
        keyCompromise           (1),
        cACompromise            (2),
        affiliationChanged      (3),
        superseded              (4),
        cessationOfOperation    (5),
        certificateHold         (6),
        removeFromCRL           (8) }

5.3.2  Hold Instruction Code

   The hold instruction code is a non-critical CRL entry extension that
   provides a registered instruction identifier which indicates the
   action to be taken after encountering a certificate that has been
   placed on hold.

   id-ce-holdInstructionCode OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 23 }

   holdInstructionCode ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

   The following instruction codes have been defined.  Conforming applications
   that process this extension shall recognize the following instruction codes.

   holdInstruction    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=

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                          { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) 2 }

   id-holdinstruction-none       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {holdInstruction 1}
   id-holdinstruction-callissuer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {holdInstruction 2}
   id-holdinstruction-reject     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {holdInstruction 3}

   Conforming applications which encounter a id-holdinstruction-
   callissuer must call the certificate issuer or reject the
   certificate.  Conforming applications which encounter a id-
   holdinstruction-reject ID shall reject the transaction. id-
   holdinstruction-none is semantically equivalent to the absence of a
   holdInstructionCode.  Its use is strongly deprecated for the Internet
   PKI.

   <<Note: I didn't think id-holdinstruction-pickupToken was appropriate
   for the Internet PKI>>

5.3.3  Invalidity Date

   The invalidity date is a non-critical CRL entry extension that
   provides the date on which it is known or suspected that the private
   key was compromised or that the certificate otherwise became invalid.
   This date may be earlier than the revocation date in the CRL entry,
   but it must be later than the issue date of the previously issued
   CRL.  Remember that the revocation date in the CRL entry specifies
   the date that the CA revoked the certificate.  Whenever this
   information is available, CAs are strongly encouraged to share it
   with CRL users.

   The GeneralizedTime values included in this field shall be expressed
   in Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu) and omit trailing zeros in fractional
   seconds.  GeneralizedTime shall be expressed as YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ.

   id-ce-invalidityDate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 24 }

   invalidityDate ::=  GeneralizedTime

5.4  Examples

   5.4.1 Empty CRL

   <<TBD>>

   5.4.2 CRL with entries, no extensions

   <<TBD>>

   5.4.3 CRL with extensions

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   <<TBD>>

6  Certificate Path Validation

   Certification path validation procedures for the Internet PKI are
   based on Section 12.4.3 of [X.509-AM].

   Certification path processing verifies the binding between the
   subject distinguished name and subject public key.  The basic
   constraints and policy constraints extensions facilitate automated,
   self-contained implementation of certification path processing logic.

   The following is an outline of a procedure for validating
   certification paths.  An implementation shall be functionally
   equivalent to the external behaviour resulting from this procedure.
   Any algorithm may be used by a particular implementation so long as
   it derives the correct result.

   The inputs to the certification path processing procedure are:

      (a)  a set of certificates comprising a certification path;

      (b)  a CA name and trusted public key value (or an identifier of
      such a key if the key is stored internally to the certification
      path processing module) for use in verifying the first certificate
      in the certification path;

      (c)  a set of initial-policy identifiers (each comprising a
      sequence of policy element identifiers), which identifies one or
      more certificate policies, any one of which would be acceptable
      for the purposes of certification path processing; and

      (d)  the current date/time (if not available internally to the
      certification path processing module).

   The outputs of the procedure are:

      (a)  an indication of success or failure of certification path
      validation;

      (b)  if validation failed, a reason for failure; and

      (c)  if validation was successful, a (possibly empty) set of
      policy qualifiers obtained from CAs on the path.

   The procedure makes use of the following set of state variables:

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      (a)  acceptable policy set:  A set of certificate policy
      identifiers comprising the policy or policies recognized by the
      public key user together with policies deemed equivalent through
      policy mapping;

      (b)  constrained subtrees:  A set of root names defining a set of
      subtrees within which all subject names in subsequent certificates
      in the certification path shall fall; if no restriction is in
      force this state variable takes the special value unbounded; and

      (c)  excluded subtrees:  A set of root names defining a set of
      subtrees within which no subject name in subsequent certificates
      in the certification path may fall; if no restriction is in force
      this state variable takes the special value empty.

      The procedure involves an initialization step, followed by a
      series of certificate-processing steps.  The initialization step
      comprises:

      (a)  Initialize the constrained subtress to unbounded;

      (b)  Initialize the excluded subtrees indicator to empty; and

      (c)  Initialize the acceptable policy set to the set of initial-
      policy identifiers.

   Each certificate is then processed in turn, starting with the
   certificate signed using the trusted CA public key which was input to
   this procedure.  The last certificate is processed as an end-entity
   certificate; all other certificates (if any) are processed as CA-
   certificates.

   The following checks are applied to all certificates:

      (a)  Check that the signature verifies, that dates are valid, that
      the subject and issuer names chain correctly, and that the
      certificate has not been revoked;

      If the certificate has an empty sequence in the name field, name
      chaining will use the critical altSubjectNames and altIssuerNames
      fields. If the certificate has a critical authorityInfoAccess or
      caInfoAccess extension, the information in that extension must be
      used to determine the status of the certificates.

      (b)  If a key usage restriction extension is present in the
      certificate and contains a certPolicySet component, check that at
      least one member of the acceptable policy set appears in the
      field;

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      (c)  Check that the subject name or critical AltSubjectName
      extension is consistent with the constrained subtrees state
      variables; and

      (d)  Check that the subject name or critical AltSubjectName
      extension is consistent with the excluded subtrees state
      variables.

   If any one of the above checks fails, the procedure terminates,
   returning a failure indication and an appropriate reason.  If none of
   the above checks fail on the end-entity certificate, the procedure
   terminates, returning a success indication together with the set of
   all policy qualifier values encountered in the set of certificates.

   For a CA-certificate, the following constraint recording actions are
   then performed, in order to correctly set up the state variables for
   the processing of the next certificate:

      (a)  If permittedSubtrees is present in the certificate, set the
      constrained subtrees state variable to the intersection of its
      previous value and the value indicated in the extension field.

      (b)  If excludedSubtrees is present in the certificate, set the
      excluded subtrees state variable to the union of its previous
      value and the value indicated in the extension field.

      Note:  It is possible to specify an extended version of the above
      certification path processing procedure which results in default
      behaviour identical to the rules of Privacy Enhanced Mail [RFC
      1422].  In this extended version, additional inputs to the
      procedure are a list of one or more Policy Certification Authority
      (PCA) names and an indicator of the position in the certification
      path where the PCA is expected.  At the nominated PCA position,
      the CA name is compared against this list.  If a recognized PCA
      name is found, then a constraint of SubordinateToCA is implicitly
      assumed for the remainder of the certification path and processing
      continues.  If no valid PCA name is found, and if the
      certification path cannot be validated on the basis of identified
      policies, then the certification path is considered invalid.

7  Algorithm Support

   This section describes cryptographic alogrithms which may be used
   with this standard.  The section describes one-way hash functions and
   digital signature algorithms which may be used to sign certificates
   and CRLs, and identifies object identifiers for public keys contained
   in a certificate.

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   Conforming CAs and applications are not required to support the
   algorithms or algorithm identifiers described in this section.
   However, this profile requires conforming CAs and applications to
   conform when they use the algorithms identified here.

7.1  One-way Hash Functions

   This section identifies one-way hash functions for use in the
   Internet PKI.  One-way hash functions are also called message digest
   algorithms. SHA-1 is the preferred one-way hash function for the
   Internet PKI.  However, PEM uses MD2 for certificates [RFC 1422] [RFC
   1423].  For this reason, MD2 is included in this profile.

7.1.1  MD2 One-way Hash Function

   MD2 was developed by Ron Rivest, but RSA Data Security has not placed
   the MD2 algorithm in the public domain.  Rather, RSA Data Security
   has granted license to use MD2 for non-commerical Internet Privacy-
   Enhanced Mail.  For this reason, MD2 may continue to be used with PEM
   certificates, but SHA-1 is preferred.  MD2 is fully described in RFC
   1319 [RFC 1319].

   At the Selected Areas in Cryptography '95 conference in May 1995,
   Rogier and Chauvaud presented an attack on MD2 that can nearly find
   collisions [RC95].  Collisions occur when two different messages
   generate the same message digest.  A checksum operation in MD2 is the
   only remaining obstacle to the success of the attack.  For this
   reason, the use of MD2 for new applications is discouraged.  It is
   still reasonable to use MD2 to verify existing signatures, as the
   ability to find collisions in MD2 does not enable an attacker to find
   new messages having a previously computed hash value.

   << More information on the attack and its implications can be
   obtained from a RSA Laboratories security bulletin.  These bulletins
   are available from <http://www.rsa.com/>. >>

7.1.2  SHA-1 One-way Hash Function

   SHA-1 was developed by the U.S. Government.  SHA-1 is fully described
   in FIPS 180-1 [FIPS 180-1].

   SHA-1 is the one-way hash function of choice for use with both the
   RSA and DSA signature algorithms.

7.2  Signature Algorithms

   Certificates and CRLs described by this standard may be signed with
   any public key signature algorithm.  The certificate or CRL indicates

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   the algorithm through an algorithmidentifier which appears in the
   signatureAlgorithm field in a Certificate or CertificateList.  This
   algorithmidentfier is an OID and has optionally associated
   parameters.  This section identifies algorithm identifiers and
   parameters that shall be used in the signatureAlgorithm field in a
   Certificate or CertificateList.

   RSA and DSA are the most popular signature algorithms used in the
   Internet.  Signature algorithms are always used in conjunction with a
   one-way hash function identified in Section 7.1.

   The signature algorithm (and one-way hash function) used to sign a
   certificate or CRL is indicated by use of an algorithm identifier.
   An algorithm identifier is an object identifier, and may include
   associated parameters.  This section identifies OIDS for RSA and DSA
   and the corresponding parameters.

   The data to be signed (e.g., the one-way hash function output value)
   is first ASN.1 encoded as an OCTET STRING and the result is encrypted
   (e.g., using RSA Encryption) to form the signed quantity.  This
   signature value is then ASN.1 encoded as a BIT STRING and included in
   the Certificate or CertificateList (in the signature field).

7.2.1  RSA Signature Algorithm

   A patent statement regarding the RSA algorithm can be found at the
   end of this profile.

   The RSA algorithm is named for it's inventors: Rivest, Shamir, and
   Adleman.  The RSA signature algorithm combines either the MD2 or the
   SHA-1 one-way hash function with the RSA asymmetric encryption
   algorithm.  The RSA signature algorithm with MD2 and the RSA
   encryption algorithm is defined in PKCS #1 [PKCS#1].  As defined in
   PKCS #1, the ASN.1 object identifier used to identify this signature
   algorithm is:

        md2WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  {
            iso(1) member-body(2) US(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
            pkcs-1(1) 2  }

   The RSA signature algorithm with SHA-1 and the RSA encryption
   algorithm is defined in by the OSI Ineroperability Workshop in []. As
   defined in [OIW], the ASN.1 object identifier used to identify this
   signature algorithm is:

        sha-1WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  {
            iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14)
            secsig(3) algorithm(2) 29  }

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   When either of these object identifiers is used within the ASN.1 type
   AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters component of that type shall be
   the ASN.1 type NULL.

   When signing, the RSA algorithm generates an integer y.  This value
   is converted to a bit string such that the most significant bit in y
   is the first bit in the bit string and the least significant bit in y
   is the last bit in the bit string.

   (In general this occurs in two steps.  The integer y is converted to
   an octect string such that the first octect has the most significance
   and the last octect has the least significance. The octet string is
   converted into a bit string such that the most significant bit of the
   first octect shall become the first bit in the bit string, and the
   least significant bit of the last octect is the last bit in the BIT
   STRING.

7.2.2  DSA Signature Algorithm

   A patent statement regarding the DSA can be found at the end of this
   profile.

   The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) is also called the Digital
   Signature Standard (DSS).  DSA was developed by the U.S. Government,
   and DSA is used in conjunction with the the SHA-1 one-way hash
   function.  DSA is fully described in FIPS 186 [FIPS 186].  The ASN.1
   object identifiers used to identify this signature algorithm are:

           id-dsa-with-sha1 ID  ::=  {
                   iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57 (10040) secsig(2)
                   x9algorithm(4) 3 }

   The id-dsa-with-sha1 algorithm syntax has NULL parameters. The DSA
   parameters in the subjectPublicKeyInfo field of the certificate of
   the issuer shall apply to the verification of the signature.

   If the subjectPublicKeyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier field has NULL
   parameters and the CA signed the subject certificate using DSA, then
   the certificate issuer's parameters apply to the subject's DSA key.
   If the subjectPublicKeyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier field has NULL
   parameters and the CA signed the subject with a signature algorithm
   other than DSA, then clients shall not validate the certificate.

   When signing, the DSA algorithm generates two values.  These values
   are commonly referred to as r and s.  To easily transfer these two
   values as one signature, they shall be ASN.1 encoded using the
   following ASN.1 structure:

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           Dss-Sig-Value  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
                   r       INTEGER,
                   s       INTEGER  }

7.3  Subject Public Key Algorithms

   Certificates described by this standard may convey a public key for
   any public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the algorithm
   through an algorithmidentifier.  This algorithmidentfieier is an OID
   and optionally associated parameters.

   This section identifies preferred OIDs and parameters for the RSA,
   DSA, KEA, and Diffie-Hellman algorithms.  Conforming CAs shall use
   the identified OIDs when issuing certificates containing public keys
   for these algorithms. Conforming applications supporting any of these
   algorithms shall, at a minimum, recognize the OID identified in this
   section.

7.3.1 RSA  Keys

   The object identifier rsaEncryption identifies RSA public keys.

        pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) US(840)
                       rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 }

        rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { pkcs-1 1}

   The rsaEncryption object identifier is intended to be used in the
   algorithm field of a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier. The
   parameters field shall have ASN.1 type NULL for this algorithm
   identifier.

   The rsa public key shall be encoded using the ASN.1 type
   RSAPublicKey:

      RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
         modulus       INTEGER, -- n
         publicExponent     INTEGER  -- e
                             }

   where modulus is the modulus n, and publicExponent is the public
   exponent e.  The DER encoded RSAPublicKey is  the value of the BIT
   STRING subjectPubliKey.

   This object identifier is used in public key certificates for both
   RSA signature keys and RSA encryption keys. The intended application
   for the key may be indicated in the key usage field (see Section
   4.2.1.3).  The use of a single key for both signature and encryption

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   purposes is not recommended, but is not forbidden.

7.3.2 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Key

   This diffie-hellman object identifier supported by this standard is
   defined by ANSI X9.42.

        dhpublicnumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
                  US(840) ansi-x942(10046) number-type(2) 1 }

        DHParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
             prime INTEGER, -- p
             base INTEGER, -- g }

   The dhpublicnumber object identifier is intended to be used in the
   algorithm field of a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier. The
   parameters field of that type, which has the algorithm-specific
   syntax ANY DEFINED BY algorithm, would have ASN.1 type DHParameter
   for this algorithm.

        DHParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
          prime INTEGER, -- p
          base INTEGER, -- g }

   The fields of type DHParameter have the following meanings:

      prime is the prime p.

      base is the base g.

   The Diffie-Hellman public key (an INTEGER) is mapped to a
   subjectPublicKey (a BIT STRING) as follows: the most significant bit
   (MSB) of the INTEGER becomes the MSB of the BIT STRING; the least
   significant bit (LSB) of the INTEGER becomes the LSB of the BIT
   STRING.

7.3.3 DSA Signature Keys

   The object identifier supported by this standard is

        id-dsa ID ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040)
                  secsig(2) x9algorithm(4) 1 }

   The id-dsa algorithm syntax includes optional parameters.  These
   parameters are commonly referred to as p, q, and g.  If the DSA
   algorithm parameters are absent from the subjectPublicKeyInfo
   AlgorithmIdentifier and the CA signed the subject certificate using
   DSA, then the certificate issuer's DSA parameters apply to the

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   subject's DSA key.  If the DSA algorithm parameters are absent from
   the subjectPublicKeyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier and the CA signed the
   subject certificate using a signature algorithm other than DSA, then
   the subject's DSA parameters are distributed by other means.  The
   parameters are included using the following ASN.1 structure:

        Dss-Parms  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
            p             INTEGER,
            q             INTEGER,
            g             INTEGER  }

   If the subjectPublicKeyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier field has NULL
   parameters and the CA signed the subject certificate using DSA, then
   the certificate issuer's parameters apply to the subject's DSA key.
   If the subjectPublicKeyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier field has NULL
   parameters and the CA signed the subject with a signature algorithm
   other than DSA, then clients shall not validate the certificate.

   When signing, DSA algorithm generates two values.  These values are
   commonly referred to as r and s.  To easily transfer these two values
   as one signature, they are ASN.1 encoded using the following ASN.1
   structure:

        Dss-Sig-Value  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
            r             INTEGER,
            s             INTEGER  }

   The encoded signature is conveyed as the value of the BIT STRING
   signature in a Certificate or CertificateList.

   The DSA public key shall be ASN.1 encoded as an INTEGER; this
   encoding shall be used as the contents (i.e., the value) of the
   subjectPublicKey component (a BIT STRING) of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo
   data element.

        DSAPublicKey ::= INTEGER -- public key Y

7.3.4 Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA)

   The Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA) is a classified algorithm for
   exchanging keys.  A KEA "pairwise key" may be generated between two
   users if their KEA public keys were generated with the same KEA
   parameters.  The KEA parameters are not included in a certificate;
   instead a "domain identifier" is supplied in the parameters field.

   When the subjectPublicKeyInfo field contains a KEA key, the algorithm
   identifier and parameters shall be as defined in [sdn.701r]:

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      id-keyEncryptionAlgorithm  OBJECT IDENTIFIER   ::=
             { 2 16 840 1 101 2 1 1 22 }

      KEA-Parms-Id     ::= OCTET STRING

   The Kea-Parms-Id shall always appear when the subjectPublicKeyInfo
   field algorithm identifier is id-keyEncryptionAlgorithm. Kea-Parms-Id
   is the "domain identifier" and is ten octets in length. If the Kea-
   Parms-Id of two KEA keys are equivalent, the subjects possess the
   same KEA parameter values and may exchange keys.

   <<Need encoding of KEA key>>

8. ASN.1 Structures and OIDs

   PKIX1 DEFINITIONS ::=

   BEGIN

   -- need ASN.1 for:
   -- AlgorithmIdentifier
   -- ORAddress

   -- attribute data types --

   Attribute       ::=     SEQUENCE {
           type    AttributeValue,
           values  SET OF AttributeValue
                   -- at least one value is required -- }

   AttributeType           ::=     OBJECT IDENTIFIER

   AttributeValue          ::=     ANY

   AttributeTypeAndValue           ::=     SEQUENCE {
           type    AttributeValue,
           value   AttributeValue }

   AttributeValueAssertion ::=     SEQUENCE {AttributeType, AttributeValue}

   -- naming data types --

   Name            ::=     CHOICE { -- only one possibility for now --

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                                                   rdnSequence  RDNSequence }

   RDNSequence     ::=     SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName

   DistinguishedName       ::=     RDNSequence

   RelativeDistinguishedName  ::=  SET SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue

   -- Directory string type --

   DirectoryString ::= CHOICE {
           teletexString           TeletexString (SIZE (1..maxSize)),
           printableString         PrintableString (SIZE (1..maxSize)),
           universalString         ANY -- the '93 ASN.1 type UniversalString
                                                }

   -- basic stuff starts here

   Certificate  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
        tbsCertificate       TBSCertificate,
        signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
        signature            BIT STRING  }

   TBSCertificate  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
        version         [0]  Version DEFAULT v1,
        serialNumber         CertificateSerialNumber,
        signature            AlgorithmIdentifier,
        issuer               Name,
        validity             Validity,
        subject              Name,
        subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
        issuerUniqueID  [1]  IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
                             -- If present, version must be v2 or v3
        subjectUniqueID [2]  IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
                             -- If present, version must be v2 or v3
        extensions      [3]  Extensions OPTIONAL
                             -- If present, version must be v3
        }

   Version  ::=  INTEGER  {  v1(0), v2(1), v3(2)  }

   CertificateSerialNumber  ::=  INTEGER

   Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
        notBefore      CertificateValidityDate,
        notAfter       CertificateValidityDate }

   CertificateValidityDate ::= CHOICE {

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        utcTime        UTCTime,
        generalTime    GeneralizedTime }

   UniqueIdentifier  ::=  BIT STRING

   SubjectPublicKeyInfo  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
        algorithm            AlgorithmIdentifier,
        subjectPublicKey     BIT STRING  }

   Extensions  ::=  SEQUENCE OF Extension

   Extension  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
        extnID      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
        critical    BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
        extnValue   OCTET STRING  }

   -- Extension ::= { {id-ce 15}, ... , keyUsage }

   ID                  ::=  OBJECT IDENTIFIER
   joint-iso-ccitt     ID   ::=  { 2 }
   ds             ID   ::=  {joint-iso-ccitt 5}
   certificateExtension  ID ::=  {ds 29}
   -- id-ce          ID   ::=  certificateExtension
   id-ce          ID   ::= {ds 29}

   AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
         keyIdentifier                   [0] KeyIdentifier               OPTIONAL,
         authorityCertIssuer             [1] GeneralNames                OPTIONAL,
         authorityCertSerialNumber       [2] CertificateSerialNumber     OPTIONAL
     }
          ( WITH COMPONENTS       {..., authorityCertIssuer PRESENT,
                                          authorityCertSerialNumber PRESENT} |
           WITH COMPONENTS        {..., authorityCertIssuer ABSENT,
                                          authorityCertSerialNumber ABSENT} )

   -- authorityKeyIdentifier ::= AuthorityKeyIdentifier

   KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING

   -- subjectKeyIdentifier ::= KeyIdentifier

   KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING {
        digitalSignature        (0),
        nonRepudiation          (1),
        keyEncipherment         (2),
        dataEncipherment        (3),
        keyAgreement            (4),
        keyCertSign             (5),

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        cRLSign                 (6) }

   id-ce-privateKeyUsagePeriod OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 16 }

   PrivateKeyUsagePeriod ::= SEQUENCE {
        notBefore       [0]     GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
        notAfter        [1]     GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }
        ( WITH COMPONENTS       {..., notBefore PRESENT} |
        WITH COMPONENTS         {..., notAfter PRESENT} )

   id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 32 }

   CertificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation

   PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
        policyIdentifier   CertPolicyId,
        policyQualifiers   SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL }

   CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

   -- PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
   --       policyQualifierId  CERT-POLICY-QUALIFIER.&id
   --                                ({SupportedPolicyQualifiers}),
   --       qualifier          CERT-POLICY-QUALIFIER.&Qualifier
   --
   -- ({SupportedPolicyQualifiers}{@policyQualifierId})
   --                                         OPTIONAL }

   -- SupportedPolicyQualifiers CERT-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::= { ... }

   PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
          policyQualifierId  PolicyQualifierId,
          qualifier        ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId }

   PolicyQualifierId ::= ENUMERATED {
           qualId1 (1), qualId2 (2), qualId3 (3), qualId4 (4), qualId5 ( 5 ) }

   id-ce-policyMappings OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 33 }

   PolicyMappings ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SEQUENCE {
        issuerDomainPolicy      CertPolicyId,
        subjectDomainPolicy     CertPolicyId }

   id-ce-subjectAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 17 }

   SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames

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   GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName

   GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
        otherName                       [0]     ANY,
        rfc822Name                      [1]     IA5String,
        dNSName                         [2]     IA5String,
        x400Address                     [3]     ORAddress,
        directoryName                   [4]     Name,
        ediPartyName                    [5]     EDIPartyName,
        uniformResourceIdentifier       [6]     IA5String,
        iPAddress                       [7]     OCTET STRING,
        registeredID                    [8]     OBJECT IDENTIFIER }

   -- OTHER-NAME ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER  note: not supported in '88 ASN.1
   --              substituted ANY where used [GeneralName otherName]

   EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE {
        nameAssigner            [0]     DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
        partyName               [1]     DirectoryString }

   id-ce-issuerAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 18 }

   IssuerAltName ::= GeneralNames

   id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 9 }

   SubjectDirectoryAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute

   id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 19 }

   BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
        cA                      BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
        pathLenConstraint       INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL }

   id-ce-nameConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 30 }

   NameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
        permittedSubtrees       [0]     GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL,
        excludedSubtrees        [1]     GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL }

   GeneralSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree

   GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE {
        base                    GeneralName,
        minimum         [0]     BaseDistance DEFAULT 0,
        maximum         [1]     BaseDistance OPTIONAL }

   BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)

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   id-ce-policyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 34 }

   PolicyConstraints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SEQUENCE {
        policySet                       [0] CertPolicySet OPTIONAL,
        requireExplicitPolicy           [1] SkipCerts OPTIONAL,
        inhibitPolicyMapping            [2] SkipCerts OPTIONAL }

   SkipCerts ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)

   CertPolicySet ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertPolicyId

   -- cRLDistributionPoints CRLDistPointsSyntax ::=
   --              SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint

   CRLDistPointsSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint

   DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
        distributionPoint       [0]     DistributionPointName OPTIONAL,
        reasons                 [1]     ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,
        cRLIssuer               [2]     GeneralNames OPTIONAL }

   DistributionPointName ::= CHOICE {
        fullName                [0]     GeneralNames,
        nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1]     RelativeDistinguishedName }

   ReasonFlags ::= BIT STRING {
        unused                  (0),
        keyCompromise           (1),
        cACompromise            (2),
        affiliationChanged      (3),
        superseded              (4),
        cessationOfOperation    (5),
        certificateHold         (6) }

   pkix  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 6 1 5 3 }

   -- Object identifiers for ftp, http, smtp and ldap protocols

   applTCPProto OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 6 1 2 1 27 4 }

   ftpID    OBJECT-IDENTIFIER ::= {applTCPProtoID 21}
   httpID   OBJECT-IDENTIFIER ::= {applTCPProtoID 80}
   smtpID   OBJECT-IDENTIFIER ::= {applTCPProtoID 25}
   ldapID   OBJECT-IDENTIFIER ::= {applTCPProtoID 389}

   -- Object identifier for the X.500 directory access protocol

   dap OBJECT-IDENTIFIER ::= { 2 5 3 1 }

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   id-pkix-subjectInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkix 1 }

   AccessDescription  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
        accessMethod          OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
        accessLocation        GeneralName  }

   --subjectInfoAccess SubjectInfoAccessSyntax ::=
   --              SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription
   SubjectInfoAccessSyntax ::=
                   SEQUENCE OF AccessDescription

   id-pkix-authorityInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkix 2 }

   AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
        certStatus        [0] SEQUENCE OF AccessDescription OPTIONAL,
        certRetrieval     [1] SEQUENCE OF AccessDescription OPTIONAL,
        caPolicy          [2] SEQUENCE OF AccessDescription OPTIONAL,
        caCerts           [3] SEQUENCE OF AccessDescription OPTIONAL  }

   id-pkix-caInfoAccess OBJECT-IDENTIFIER ::= { pkix 3 }

   -- caInfoAccess ::=  {
   --     AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax  }

   -- CRL structures

   CertificateList  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
        tbsCertList          TBSCertList,
        signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
        signature            BIT STRING  }

   TBSCertList  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
        version                 Version OPTIONAL,
                                     -- if present, must be v2
        signature               AlgorithmIdentifier,
        issuer                  Name,
        thisUpdate              ChoiceOfTime,
        nextUpdate              ChoiceOfTime,
        revokedCertificates     SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE  {
             userCertificate         CertificateSerialNumber,
             revocationDate          ChoiceOfTime,
             crlEntryExtensions      Extensions OPTIONAL
                                                 -- if present, must be v2
                                  }  OPTIONAL,
        crlExtensions           [0]  Extensions OPTIONAL
                                                 -- if present, must be v2
                                  }

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   Version  ::= INTEGER  {  v1(0), v2(1), v3(2)  }

   AlgorithmIdentifier  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
        algorithm               OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
        parameters              ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL  }
                                     -- contains a value of the type
                                     -- registered for use with the
                                     -- algorithm object identifier value

   ChoiceOfTime ::= CHOICE {
        utcTime        UTCTime,
        generalTime    GeneralizedTime }

   CertificateSerialNumber  ::=  INTEGER

   Extensions  ::=  SEQUENCE OF Extension

   Extension  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
        extnId                  OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
        critical                BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
        extnValue               OCTET STRING  }
                                     -- contains a DER encoding of a value
                                     -- of the type registered for use with
                                     -- the extnId object identifier value

   id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 20 }

   CRLNumber ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)

   id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 28 }

   IssuingDistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
        distributionPoint       [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL,
        onlyContainsUserCerts   [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
        onlyContainsCACerts     [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
        onlySomeReasons         [3] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,
        indirectCRL             [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE }

   id-ce-deltaCRLIndicator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 27 }

   -- deltaCRLIndicator ::= BaseCRLNumber

   BaseCRLNumber ::= CRLNumber

   id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 20 }

   -- reasonCode EXTENSION ::= {

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   --      SYNTAX  CRLReason
   --      IDENTIFIED BY { id-ce 21 } }

   CRLReason ::= ENUMERATED {
        unspecified             (0),
        keyCompromise           (1),
        cACompromise            (2),
        affiliationChanged      (3),
        superseded              (4),
        cessationOfOperation    (5),
        certificateHold         (6),
        removeFromCRL           (8) }

   id-ce-holdInstructionCode OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 23 }

   HoldInstructionCode ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

   member-body ID ::= { iso 2 }
   us ID ::= { member-body 840 }
   x9cm ID ::= { us 10040 }
   holdInstruction ID ::= {x9cm 2}

   id-holdinstruction-none ID ::= {holdInstruction 1}
   id-holdinstruction-callissuer ID ::= {holdInstruction 2}
   id-holdinstruction-reject ID ::= {holdInstruction 3}

   id-ce-invalidityDate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 24 }

   InvalidityDate ::=  GeneralizedTime

   -- Algorithm strustures

        md2WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  {
            iso(1) member-body(2) US(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
            pkcs-1(1) 2  }

        sha-1WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  {
            iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
            algorithm(2) 29  }

           id-dsa-with-sha1 ID  ::=  {
                   iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57 (10040) secsig(2)
                   x9algorithm(4) 3 }

           Dss-Sig-Value  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
                   r       INTEGER,
                   s       INTEGER  }

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        pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) US(840)
                       rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 }

        rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { pkcs-1 1}

        dhpublicnumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
                  US(840) ansi-x942(10046) 1 }

        DHParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
             prime INTEGER, -- p
             base INTEGER -- g
                   }

        id-dsa ID ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040)
                  secsig(2) x9algorithm(4) 1 }

        Dss-Parms  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
            p             INTEGER,
            q             INTEGER,
            g             INTEGER  }

        Dss-Sig-Value  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
            r             INTEGER,
            s             INTEGER  }

      id-keyEncryptionAlgorithm  OBJECT IDENTIFIER   ::=
             { 2 16 840 1 101 2 1 1 22 }

      KEA-Parms-Id     ::= OCTET STRING

   id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 35 }
   id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 14 }
   id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 15 }
   id-pkix-policy-CPS OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkix 4 }

   CPSuri ::= IA5String

   id-pkix-policy-userNotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkix 5 }

   UserNotice ::= CHOICE {
     ia5String     IA5String,
     bnpString     ANY -- defined as BMPString in '93 ASN.1
                           }

   END

   References

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   [X9.57]    ANSI X9.57

   [FIPS 180-1]  Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
              (FIPS PUB) 180-1, Secure Hash Standard, 17 April 1995.
              [Supersedes FIPS PUB 180 dated 11 May 1993.]

   [FIPS 186] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
              (FIPS PUB) 186, Digital Signature Standard, 18 May 1994.

   [PKCS#1]   PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Standard, Version 1.4, RSA Data
              Security, Inc., 3 June 1991.

   [RC95]     Rogier, N. and Chauvaud, P., "The compression function of
              MD2 is not collision free," Presented at Selected Areas in
              Cryptography '95, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada,
              18-19 May 1995.

   [RFC 1319] Kaliski, B., "The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm," RFC 1319,
              RSA Laboratories, April 1992.

   [RFC 1422] Kent, S.,  "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic
              Mail: Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management," RFC
              1422, BBN Communications, February 1993.

   [RFC 1423] Balenson, D., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic
              Mail: Part III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers,"
              RFC 1423, Trusted Information Systems, February 1993.

   [RFC 1959] T. Howes, M. Smith, "An LDAP URL Format", RFC 1959,
              June 1996.

   [SDN.701R] SDN.701, "Message Security Protocol", Revision 4.0
              1996-06-07 with "Corrections to Message Security Protocol,
           SDN.701, Rev 4.0, 96-06-07." August 30, 1996.

   [X.208]    << Do we want to reference the 1988 or 1993 version? >>

   [X.509-AM] << Need final reference >>

   [X9.55]    << Need final reference >>

Patent Statements

   The Internet PKI relies on the use of patented public key technology.
   The Internet Standards Process as defined in RFC 1310 requires a
   written statement from the Patent holder that a license will be made
   available to applicants under reasonable terms and conditions prior
   to approving a specification as a Proposed, Draft or Internet

Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo                                    [Page 58]

INTERNET DRAFT                                             December 1996

   Standard.

   Patent statements for DSA, RSA, and Diffie-Hellman follow.  These
   statements have been supplied by the patent holders, not the authors
   of this profile.

   Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)

      The U.S. Government holds patent 5,231,668 on the Digital
      Signature Algorithm (DSA), which has been incorporated into
      Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 186.  The patent
      was issued on July 27, 1993.

      The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has a
      long tradition of supplying U.S. Government-developed techniques
      to committees and working groups for inclusion into standards on a
      royalty-free basis.  NIST has made the DSA patent available
      royalty-free to users worldwide.

      Regarding patent infringement, FIPS 186 summarizes our position;
      the Department of Commerce is not aware of any patents that would
      be infringed by the DSA.  Questions regarding this matter may be
      directed to the Deputy Chief Counsel for NIST.

   RSA Signature and Encryption

      << Now that PKP has dissolved, a revised patent statement for RSA
      from RSADSI is needed. >>

   Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement

      << Now that PKP has dissolved, a revised patent statement for
      Diffie-Hellman from Cylink is needed. >>

   Obsolete PKP Patent Statement

      << This statement is included here until a replacement from RSADSI
      and Cylink can be obtained. >>

      The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Board of
      Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University have granted
      Public Key Partners (PKP) exclusive sub-licensing rights to the
      following patents issued in the United States, and all of their
      corresponding foreign patents:

         Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
         ("Diffie-Hellman")......................... No. 4,200,770

Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo                                    [Page 59]

INTERNET DRAFT                                             December 1996

         Public Key Cryptographic Apparatus
         and Method ("Hellman-Merkle").............. No. 4,218,582

         Cryptographic Communications System and
         Method ("RSA")............................. No. 4,405,829

         Exponential Cryptographic Apparatus
         and Method ("Hellman-Pohlig").............. No. 4,424,414

      These patents are stated by PKP to cover all known methods of
      practicing the art of Public Key encryption, including the
      variations collectively known as El Gamal.

      Public Key Partners has provided written assurance to the Internet
      Society that parties will be able to obtain, under reasonable,
      nondiscriminatory terms, the right to use the technology covered
      by these patents.  This assurance is documented in RFC 1170 titled
      "Public Key Standards and Licenses".  A copy of the written
      assurance dated April 20, 1990, may be obtained from the Internet
      Assigned Number Authority (IANA).

      The Internet Society, Internet Architecture Board, Internet
      Engineering Steering Group and the Corporation for National
      Research Initiatives take no position on the validity or scope of
      the patents and patent applications, nor on the appropriateness of
      the terms of the assurance. The Internet Society and other groups
      mentioned above have not made any determination as to any other
      intellectual property rights which may apply to the practice of
      this standard.  Any further consideration of these matters is the
      user's own responsibility.

Security Considerations

   This entire memo is about security mechanisms.
Author Addresses:

   Russell Housley
   SPYRUS
   PO Box 1198
   Herndon, VA 20172
   USA
   [email-masked]

   Warwick Ford
   VeriSign, Inc.
   One Alewife Center
   Cambridge, MA 02140
   [email-masked]

Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo                                    [Page 60]

INTERNET DRAFT                                             December 1996

   Tim Polk
   NIST
   Building 820, Room 426
   Gaithersburg, MD 20899
   [email-masked]

   David Solo
   BBN
   150 CambridgePark Drive
   Cambridge, MA 02140
   USA
   [email-masked]

Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo                                    [Page 61]

Date: Sat, 07 Dec 1996 16:48:13 -0500
To: [email-masked], [email-masked], [email-masked], [email-masked], [email-masked], [email-masked]
From: Warwick Ford <[email-masked]>
Subject: W. Ford E-mail Address Change

For the information of anyone sending me e-mail:  Effectively immediately,
please send all e-mail to [email-masked]  (intranet.ca is no longer
operational).

Regards,
Warwick
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Warwick Ford: [email-masked]  Tel: (613)2253487 Fax: (613)2256361
       VeriSign, Inc., One Alewife Center, Cambridge, MA 02140
---------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Sat, 07 Dec 1996 08:52:18
From: plipp <[email-masked]>
To: Marc Branchaud <[email-masked]>, PASZTOR Miklos <[email-masked]>
Cc: [email-masked], [email-masked]
Subject: Antw: Re: Security hole: Digital Signing + Downloadable fonts

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>It's not a question of character sets, as the font just takes a value and
>spews out a corresponding bitmap.  Whether the underlying encoding is
>ASCII, UNICODE or some other thing makes no difference.  (Not to
>trivialize character set issues -- I just don't think they quite apply
>here.)
>
>In my mind, this is also a separate issue from PKIs or digital signatures. 
>If someone's going to intentionally set out to mislead people, there's not
>much technology can do about it.  Even if a solution is found for this
>particular problem, something else is bound to crop up.  Just because
>someone can make an authenticable digital signature doesn't mean that they
>can't lie.

I fully agree. Thats what I meant with the need for trust into the applic=
ation.
This can be handled only by other means, e.g. by some process of verifyin=
g that
the code used for signing takes care that situations as described cannot =
occur and that
the user always signs what he sees.

Peter

Peter Lipp, IAIK, University of Technology, Graz
Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications
Klosterwiesgasse 32/I, A-8010 Graz, +43 316 873 5513
________________________________________________________________________
Was n=FCtzt die beste Erziehung, die Kinder machen uns ja doch alles nach.

Date: Fri, 06 Dec 1996 20:20:32 -0500
To: [email-masked]
From: Warwick Ford <[email-masked]>
Subject: ABA Info Sec Ctee Meeting Notice

For the information of ietf-pkix subscribers...

==========================================================
                       MEETING NOTICE
==========================================================

                       Please correspond with:
                                Michael S. Baum, Esq.
                                One Alewife Center  Suite 350
                                Cambridge, MA  02140  USA
                                V: +1 617.661.1234
                                F: +1 617.661.0716
                                E: [email-masked]

Subject:     INFORMATION SECURITY COMMITTEE MEETING NOTICE - JAN. 26-27 '97

Dear Committee Member and Prospective Members:

You are cordially invited to participate in a meeting of the Information
Security Committee, Section of Science & Technology, American Bar
Association, on Sunday and Monday, January 26-27, 1997, at the Fairmont
Hotel in San Francisco.  The Committee will continue its advancement of
public key infrastructure legal and control issues, as outlined below.  This
meeting will include further work on commercial key escrow guidelines,
digital signature legislative initiatives, CA and user liability, PKI
accreditation, and consider the question of a "version II" to the Digital
Signature Guidelines, among other matters.

Consistent with Section policy, ISC meeting participants MUST be members of
both the ABA and the ABA Section of Science and Technology.  Please contact
Ann Kowalsky, Manager Section of Science & Technology, at ABA offices in
Chicago by phone: +1 312.988.5599, fax: +1 312.988.5628, or email:
[email-masked] for membership information.  It is possible to
become a paid member of the ABA and the ISC at the meeting -- and affiliate
ABA membership is also available for non-lawyers.

Meeting details appear below. I look forward to seeing you in San Francisco. 

Sincerely,

Michael S. Baum
Chair, Information Security Committee
Section of Science & Technology, ABA

---------------

INFORMATION SECURITY COMMITTEE
Section of Science & Technology, ABA 
January 26-27, 1997

Tentative Agenda
(see "Meeting Details," next page)
(In extended sessions, breaks will be taken as needed.)

January 26, 1997  Sunday

 8:30-9:00   Greetings, breakfast, administrative matters
 9:00-9:30   Introductions, meeting logistics, general announcements
 9:30-10:30  Key Escrow Work Group update 
10:30-12:00  Legislative Work Group update; "global" conference call; and
             update on the draft Cal. Dig. Sig. Regulation by Kaye Caldwell
12:15-13:30  Lunch speakers: 
	       Ira Rubenstein, Esq. Microsoft, "Key recovery by any other name";
		Bob Danials, Esq., SSA, "Federal PKI legal efforts"
13:30-18:00  Breakout sessions
18:00-????   Watering hole discussions; possible continuation of work
             group meeting

January 27, 1997  Monday

 8:30-9:00   Breakfast, et cetera.
 9:00-12:00  UNCITRAL Update; Breakout sessions
12:00-13:00  Lunch speaker/Discussion: 
	      Miles Smid, NIST -- (informally) speaking on accreditation;
             and updating NIST's key escrow standards efforts
13:00-15:00  Presentations by work groups
15:00-15:30  Path forward; wrap-up

Information Security Committee
San Francisco MEETING DETAILS
January 26-27, 1997

Members are urged to participate in one of the work groups that will be
presenting/meeting during the ISC's meeting. Please contact Ruven Schwartz,
Esq. ([email-masked]) for further information.

    **"Addendum" Work Group
        Contact: Ruven Schwartz, Esq. ([email-masked])
              Tom Smedinghoff, Esq. ([email-masked])
              Joe Wackerman, Esq. ([email-masked])

       The Addendum Work Group will continue drafting a digital signature
       trading partner agreement -- integrating the principles of the
       Digital Signature Guidelines, and developing additional  practical
       commentary for this model form of electronic commerce agreement.

    **Evidentiary Work Group
       Contact: Stan Kurzban, Esq. ([email-masked]) or 
             	Serge Parisien, Esq. ([email-masked])

       The Evidentiary Work Group will continue working on the
       document it is preparing to acquaint jurists, practitioners,
       and those participating in electronic commerce with evidentiary
       implications of digitally signed documents.

    **Key Escrow Work Group (KEWG)
       Contact: Dwight Olson, Esq. ([email-masked]) or
                Randy Sabett, Esq. ([email-masked])

       The KEWG will focus on the legal and technical aspects 
       of commercial key escrow.  The group will seek to accurately 
       explore all major issues surrounding this topic, and produce
       a set of draft guidelines for comment.  The proposed guidelines
       are intended to facilitate secure electronic commerce by
       clarifying the rights and obligations of the parties involved 
       in voluntary commercial key escrow. The work product may take 
       one or more forms including:
       (i)   a "restatement" of the relevant law and practice,
       (ii)  a model state or federal law or international convention,
       (iii) a set of principles that can be incorporated by reference 
               into agreements or used for the interpretation of legal 
               aspects of voluntary key escrow, or
       (iv)  a set of "gap filler" provisions.

      The group has set up a temporary website which shows 
      contributions to date.	

    **Liability Work Group
       Contact: Maureen Adamache, Esq. ([email-masked])

       The liability work group will continue its review and discussion
       of the apportionment of liabilities among PKI providers and
       users. Previously, this task was considered in the ISC's own
       work-product, the Digital Signature Guidelines.  Future 
       documents that will be considered include Certification 
       Practice Statements, and digital signature legislative and 
       regulatory work product on this subject and interoperability
arrangements.

    **Digital Signatures Laws & Regulations Work Group
       Contact: Dan Greenwood, Esq. ([email-masked])

      The digital signature legislative and regulatory work group
      is compiling and evaluating the various emerging digital 
      signature legislative/regulatory approaches by states and 
      other jurisdictions in order to develop recommendations.  
      Additionally, the work group will hold another live "global"
      conference call with representatives from the various
      jurisdictions engaged in drafting legislation/regulation
      concerning digital and electronic signatures.  The group has
      posted its developing work product at
      http://www.magnet.state.ma.us/itd/legal/.  The website is
      intended to provide a reasonably comprehensive resource for
      such information.

    **Accreditation Work Group
       Contact: Rick Hornbeck ([email-masked])
              Lynn McNulty ([email-masked])
              Chas Merrill, Esq. ([email-masked])

      There will be an organizational meeting of an accreditation
      work group. This group will develop legal infrastructure for
      the global assessment of quality of certification authorities.

First time participants planning to attend the 26-27 January 1997 meeting
must contact Ruven Schwartz, ISC ViceChair, at 612-687-8095 or
[email-masked], to coordinate work-product contributions for
the upcoming meeting.

Meeting Location:
Fairmont Hotel -- "French Room" (Sun.); "Hunt Room" (Mon.)
950 Mason Street
San Francisco, CA 94108

Meals:  TBA

Lodging: When calling the Fairmont (+1 415.772.5000) please let them know
you are with the ABA Information Security Committee and they may be able to
offer you a special rate.  If available, the rates are as follows: 169$ per
night for a single, 189$ for a deluxe, and 209$ for a super deluxe.  If you
are planning on having an additional person stay with you, it will be 20$
extra for each room rate.  Other hotels in the area include: 1) the Ramada
Inn by Fisherman's Wharf with rooms starting at 95$ (+1 415-885-4700),  2)
the Monticello Inn with rooms starting at $129 (+1 415-392-8800), or 3) King
George Hotel with rooms starting at $99 (+1 415-781-5050).  Please let all
hotels know that you are with the ABA's Information Security Committee to
take advantage of these rates.

RSVP:  Please confirm your intention to participate to Ann Kowalsky, Section
Manager, Section of Science and Technology ([email-masked]) as soon
as possible.

See you in San Francisco

===========================================================================

From: Barbara Jennings <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Security hole: Digital Signing + Downloadable fonts
To: [email-masked]
Date: Fri, 6 Dec 1996 13:05:46 -0700 (MST)
Cc: [email-masked], [email-masked], [email-masked]
Content-Length: 952

As with other newly introduced technologies, this sounds as though
there is need for a "How to.. " document.  In which for example, one
may find the strong recommendation to sign for $amounts that are
written both numerically and textually as on a standard bank check
or draft document.

> > 
> >  My guess is that people generally  want to sign their own material 
> >  produced on their PC, and not web pages and similar things downloaded 
> >  from anywhere.
> >  To tell the truth I do not see any reason to do that.
> > 
> 
> That's not the way I read the problem.  Imagine a signed document served
> up by a web server that says "you agree to pay $50023" but the line is in
> a FONT command that tells your browser to display it in a particular font,
> also on the web server.  Now, that font could do a mapping that translates
> all 5's and 0's into spaces.  When you see the line in your browser then,
> you'll read "you agree to pay $   23".

Date: Fri, 6 Dec 1996 14:18:36 -0500 (EST)
From: Marc Branchaud <[email-masked]>
Reply-To: Marc Branchaud <[email-masked]>
To: PASZTOR Miklos <[email-masked]>
cc: [email-masked], [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Security hole: Digital Signing + Downloadable fonts

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Fri, 6 Dec 1996, PASZTOR Miklos wrote:
> 
>  My guess is that people generally  want to sign their own material 
>  produced on their PC, and not web pages and similar things downloaded 
>  from anywhere.
>  To tell the truth I do not see any reason to do that.
> 

That's not the way I read the problem.  Imagine a signed document served
up by a web server that says "you agree to pay $50023" but the line is in
a FONT command that tells your browser to display it in a particular font,
also on the web server.  Now, that font could do a mapping that translates
all 5's and 0's into spaces.  When you see the line in your browser then,
you'll read "you agree to pay $   23".

The document's signature would check out, so you might think that what
you're seeing is valid, and agree to pay $50023 without knowing it.

It's not a question of character sets, as the font just takes a value and
spews out a corresponding bitmap.  Whether the underlying encoding is
ASCII, UNICODE or some other thing makes no difference.  (Not to
trivialize character set issues -- I just don't think they quite apply
here.)

In my mind, this is also a separate issue from PKIs or digital signatures. 
If someone's going to intentionally set out to mislead people, there's not
much technology can do about it.  Even if a solution is found for this
particular problem, something else is bound to crop up.  Just because
someone can make an authenticable digital signature doesn't mean that they
can't lie.

		Marc

========================================   ---- I'M LOOKING FOR A JOB! ---
             Marc Branchaud                I'm looking for a full-time
            [email-masked]               career, and I'm willing to move
         www.zoo.net/~marcnarc/            almost anywhere.  You can see
========================================   my CV on my web site.

Date: Fri, 06 Dec 1996 16:43:26 +0000
To: Borka Jerman-Blazic <[email-masked]>, plipp <[email-masked]>
From: Bob Briscoe <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: FW: Security hole
Cc: "Lamond, Keith" <[email-masked]>, [email-masked], [email-masked], [email-masked]

Borka & Peter,

Please remember to CC: me explicitly in any replies.

Borka, I'm afraid I don't deserve your God's blessings! As I don't
subscribe to any of the mailing lists I sent this to, I just wanted to
ensure the matter was raised but it's not my field - so I don't intend to
devote any time to sorting it out.=20

I did get a response from Peter Lipp (attached at end), who is implying the
current solutions cover this problem and it is therefore not a problem?...

I have embedded a comment concerning his reply, within his reply below.

Bob

>Date: Fri, 6 Dec 1996 09:28:00 -0500
>From: "Lamond, Keith" <[email-masked]>
>Bob,
>This note arrived through one of the mailing lists I monitor. It is about
>the security problem with downloadable fonts you sent out earlier.
>Keith
> ----------
>From:  Borka Jerman-Blazic[SMTP:[email-masked]]
>Sent:  Friday, December 06, 1996 8:31 AM
>To:  w3c-dsig
>Cc:  ietf-pkix; wg-i18n
>Subject:  Security hole
>
> ----------------------------------------------------
>
>From: Borka Jerman-Blazic <borka>
>
>Dear Bob,
>
>God bless you with your letter/discovery about
>security hole in digital signatures.
>I am telling the same story  everywhere I have a lecture about
>character sets, but no one listen.
>
>So, I deeply support what you have said and I am sking you
>for joint action. What should this be? IETF WG or EU project ??
>The IAB-Charcater sets report is on its way as RFC and there it is
>clearly stated that all RFC standards or protocols that have an
>issue with charcater sets must be revised. IAB is supporting
>Unicode and  UTF8 so maybe we should start for digital signature
>the use of Unicode. In the future this seems as the only solution,
>but migration approaches are also needed.
>Please go ahead with your comments.
>
>
>Regards,
>
>
>Borka Jerman-Blazic
>
>
>
> ------- End of Forwarded Message
>

>Date: Thu, 05 Dec 1996 15:34:11
>From: plipp <[email-masked]>
>To: Bob Briscoe <[email-masked]>, [email-masked],
>        [email-masked]
>Cc: [email-masked]
>Subject: Antw: Security hole: Digital Signing + Downloadable fonts
>
>>Solution would be to sign the aggregate of all the resources recursively
>>referenced. Whether this should be the default behaviour, I would say yes
>>(as to "display" them you have them all in memory anyway).
>
>We are allowing several resources within to be included one signature.
However,
>the user, or better the signing application, needs to be fully aware which=
=20
>resources are to be included in that list, such as the font in your=
 example.
>
>What you consider the default behaviour is clearly application-dependent.

The reason I said signing *every* linked resource needs to be the default
is that a client app. won't necessarily be able to cater for every possible
way a document might be structured (bearing in mind here we are talking
about not what is expected behaviour for an application, but what might be
done by someone trying to break the security). However, I guess you are
right, in principal, that an app writer could be in a position where s/he
feels s/he knows every possible way there is to link other resources to the
signed resource and which ones are security risks. I wouldn't personally
feel secure with that attitude though, especially with the Web being so
extensible.

>Our view of a signature is not limited to ordering etc.
>
>Peter
>
>
>
>Peter Lipp, IAIK, University of Technology, Graz
>Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications
>Klosterwiesgasse 32/I, A-8010 Graz, +43 316 873 5513
>________________________________________________________________________
>Was n=FCtzt die beste Erziehung, die Kinder machen uns ja doch alles nach.
>
>
>

____________________________________________________________________________
Bob Briscoe         http://www.labs.bt.com/people/briscorj/index.htm

To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked], [email-masked], [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Security hole (fwd) 
Date: Fri, 06 Dec 1996 16:07:21 +0100
From: Borka Jerman-Blazic <[email-masked]>

> I've been thinking about this issue also so now we're three. :-)

That is fine, but there are more people that had some ideas abot
that problem e.g. Alain La Bonte from Ministry for Communication in
Canada, Quebec

> As I see it there is a very simple solution to the problem:
> Let the digital signature standard also include the character
> set coding (e.g. MIME-type) in the message that is signed.
> 
> This obviously doesn't solve the problem with malicous SW that
> would display the characters wrongly but I don't think that we
> can adress that issue within this forum.

If you do not have the proper character sets then you can't read
the info in the digital signature. So, this is the line to go
for (MIME labeling) but we need more sophisticated solutions.  It
is not as easy as it looks as I am very deeply in charcater sets problems.
I am convinced that soon or later this propblem will appear as the
credit card informations (names) will not match the names in the
digital signature. The same will apply for all documents that
are signed. These documents will be of no  value for the court as the name 
spelling  will differ.

 I agree with you that this is not the forum  that can address
this issue. Maybe we should move it to the I18N part fo W3.

Regards,

Borka

Date: Fri, 6 Dec 1996 09:55:39 -0600 (CST)
From: "Brian M. Thomas" <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked], [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Security hole
Cc: [email-masked], [email-masked], [email-masked]

> As I see it there is a very simple solution to the problem:
> Let the digital signature standard also include the character
> set coding (e.g. MIME-type) in the message that is signed.

I think we're talking about two different issues here: character sets
and fonts.  The character set and its interpretation are one thing, and
their interpretation is a matter of standard.  The font issue is another,
however, and unless a signature covered the font data completely, the
defense that your signature covered something different from what you
saw is without support.

Alternatively, you could use software that insisted on fonts that displayed
the character sets as you understood them, supported by a trusted signature
on the fonts as you download them.  I would lean in this direction, since
the issue of where to get all the stuff and canonicalize it for signing
seems, on the surface, a difficult one, and the subject of years of standards
committee work that we don't have time for.  A font is, effectively, code,
and must be part of your TCB if you are going to trust it.
 
> This obviously doesn't solve the problem with malicous SW that
> would display the characters wrongly but I don't think that we
> can adress that issue within this forum.
> 
> Ragards,
> /Lars Johansson
> Sweden Post

As I think I made clear above, this really is about malicious code, in
the fonts that are downloaded with the form to be signed.  It's
probably a very good idea to specify the entire content of a form, as
displayed, that you fill out and sign, just as when you sign a paper
document "as displayed", since proof of material modification of the
document after your signature can void it.

Brian Thomas - Distributed Systems Architect  [email-masked]
Southwestern Bell                             [email-masked]
One Bell Center,  Room 34G3                   Tel: 314 235 3141
St. Louis, MO 63101                           Fax: 314 235 0162

Date: Fri, 06 Dec 1996 12:30:04 +0100
From: Lars Johansson <[email-masked]>
Organization: PSab
To: Borka Jerman-Blazic <[email-masked]>
Cc: [email-masked], [email-masked], [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Security hole

Borka Jerman-Blazic wrote:
> 
> From: Borka Jerman-Blazic <borka>
> 
> Dear Bob,
> 
> God bless you with your letter/discovery about
> security hole in digital signatures.
> I am telling the same story  everywhere I have a lecture about
> character sets, but no one listen.

I've been thinking about this issue also so now we're three. :-)
 
> So, I deeply support what you have said and I am sking you
> for joint action. What should this be? IETF WG or EU project ??
> The IAB-Charcater sets report is on its way as RFC and there it is
> clearly stated that all RFC standards or protocols that have an
> issue with charcater sets must be revised. IAB is supporting
> Unicode and  UTF8 so maybe we should start for digital signature
> the use of Unicode. In the future this seems as the only solution,
> but migration approaches are also needed.
> Please go ahead with your comments.

As I see it there is a very simple solution to the problem:
Let the digital signature standard also include the character
set coding (e.g. MIME-type) in the message that is signed.

This obviously doesn't solve the problem with malicous SW that
would display the characters wrongly but I don't think that we
can adress that issue within this forum.

Ragards,
/Lars Johansson
Sweden Post

Date: Fri, 6 Dec 1996 10:19:18 +0100 (MET)
From: PASZTOR Miklos <[email-masked]>
To: Carl Ellison <[email-masked]>
cc: Bob Briscoe <[email-masked]>, [email-masked], [email-masked], [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Security hole: Digital Signing + Downloadable fonts

 My guess is that people generally  want to sign their own material 
 produced on their PC, and not web pages and similar things downloaded 
 from anywhere.
 To tell the truth I do not see any reason to do that.

 Miklos
 ====================================================================
 Pa'sztor Miklo's            | E-mail: [email-masked]
 MTA SZTAKI/ASZI Budapest
 1132 V. Hugo u. 18-22       | Tel:  (36)-(1)-149-75-32
 Institute for Computation and Automation,
 Hungarian Academy of Sciences
 ====================================================================

On Thu, 5 Dec 1996, Carl Ellison wrote:

[...]
|
|This is an interesting problem which we should address in W3C DSig, if the
|signed document includes a reference to the font with which it should be
|displayed.  In that case, the document should give not only the address of
|the font but also the hash of the font.
|
|However, there is a more general issue -- that any page is viewed through a
|piece of software, running on something other than a trusted computing
|base.  How can you trust anything then?
|
|How much is our signature and certification work actually building a bank
|vault door on a cardboard box?
|
| - Carl
|
|
|+------------------------------------------------------------------+
||Carl M. Ellison  [email-masked]   http://www.clark.net/pub/cme |
||CyberCash, Inc.                      http://www.cybercash.com/    |
||207 Grindall Street   PGP 2.6.2: 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2 |
||Baltimore MD 21230-4103  T:(410) 727-4288  F:(410)727-4293        |
|+------------------------------------------------------------------+
|

To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked], [email-masked]
Subject: Security hole
Date: Fri, 06 Dec 1996 08:31:51 +0100
From: Borka Jerman-Blazic <[email-masked]>

From: Borka Jerman-Blazic <borka>

Dear Bob,

God bless you with your letter/discovery about
security hole in digital signatures.
I am telling the same story  everywhere I have a lecture about
character sets, but no one listen.

So, I deeply support what you have said and I am sking you
for joint action. What should this be? IETF WG or EU project ??
The IAB-Charcater sets report is on its way as RFC and there it is
clearly stated that all RFC standards or protocols that have an
issue with charcater sets must be revised. IAB is supporting
Unicode and  UTF8 so maybe we should start for digital signature
the use of Unicode. In the future this seems as the only solution,
but migration approaches are also needed.
Please go ahead with your comments.

Regards,

Borka Jerman-Blazic

------- End of Forwarded Message

Date: Thu, 5 Dec 1996 13:58:34 -0500 (EST)
From: Marc Branchaud <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: New PKIX-3 Draft... 

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I've placed a copy of this postscript file on my PKI References WWW site.
Point your browser to
	http://www.zoo.net/~marcnarc/PKI/#Drafts

		Marc

On 4 Dec 1996, carlisle (c.m.) adams wrote:
> 
> Hi,
> 
> Some of you may have noticed that a new draft of PKIX Part-III (Certificate
> Management Protocols) has been submitted.  The changes from the previous
> version are outlined on page 1 of the new draft, so I won't go over them
> here.  However, it would be helpful if people attending the San Jose meeting
> have a chance to look over the draft by the time of the meeting (that way,
> discussion is likely to be more focused and fruitful).
> 
> Stephen did a lot of good work on trying to profile a number of the management 
> protocols (i.e., say exactly what fields were mandatory and what they should
> contain, etc.).  Unfortunately, however, I was unable to get the tables he
> sent me into a readable text format so they ended up being excluded from this
> draft.  Such tables will certainly be included in the document at some point
> but there wasn't enough time to get them in this document AND meet the IETF
> deadline for submissions.
> 
> What I am doing, therefore, is including a postscript version of the profile
> in this message.  Again, it would be helpful if people take a look at these
> tables in time for discussion in San Jose.  Since the purpose of the profile
> is to specify exactly what every PKIX-3-compliant implementation must support,
> we all need to look carefully at this and come to some sort of agreement
> (hopefully in San Jose!).  What is included in these tables is our first pass
> at such a profile; there is certainly still lots of room for input...
> 
> Carlisle.
> 

Date: Thu, 05 Dec 1996 12:25:51 -0500
To: Bob Briscoe <[email-masked]>
From: Carl Ellison <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Security hole: Digital Signing + Downloadable fonts
Cc: [email-masked], [email-masked], [email-masked]

At 11:57 AM 12/5/96 +0000, Bob Briscoe wrote:
>Downloadable fonts have been added to the Web infrastructure, particularly
>to support internationalisation. Indeed it is very common and now enabled
>for, say an E. Asian document to specify downloading a sub-set of a Latin
>font to display a Latin fragment (e.g. a quote).
>
>Same technique could be used to specify that a message of any charset
>should download a font for the numeric digits with, say, all the digits
>mapped to glyphs looking like either <SPACE> 0, 1, 2 or 3 .
>
>You sign an order that appears to be for UKP  112.30, but you have actually
>signed a message that commits you to pay UKP96324.75

This is an interesting problem which we should address in W3C DSig, if the
signed document includes a reference to the font with which it should be
displayed.  In that case, the document should give not only the address of
the font but also the hash of the font.

However, there is a more general issue -- that any page is viewed through a
piece of software, running on something other than a trusted computing
base.  How can you trust anything then?

How much is our signature and certification work actually building a bank
vault door on a cardboard box?

 - Carl

+------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Carl M. Ellison  [email-masked]   http://www.clark.net/pub/cme |
|CyberCash, Inc.                      http://www.cybercash.com/    |
|207 Grindall Street   PGP 2.6.2: 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2 |
|Baltimore MD 21230-4103  T:(410) 727-4288  F:(410)727-4293        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+

Sender: [email-masked]
Date: Thu, 05 Dec 1996 09:14:50 -0800
From: Alex Deacon <[email-masked]>
Organization: VeriSign, Inc.
To: Fred Ou <[email-masked]>
CC: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Certificate and CRL chains

You can download chains from the VeriSign Digital ID center.  Browse to
http://digitalid.verisign.com/query.htm and query for a certificate.

Once you find and view a certificate, you can download it by selecting 
the "S/MIME (Binary PKCS#7)" option at the bottom of the page and save
it to your local disk.  This will send you a cert chain in PKCS#7
format.

Alex

Fred Ou wrote:
> 
>    Does anyone know where I can find chains of certificates and CRLs
> for certificate validation testing ?
> 
> Thanks
> 
> -Fred

Date: Thu, 05 Dec 1996 15:34:11
From: plipp <[email-masked]>
To: Bob Briscoe <[email-masked]>, [email-masked], [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Antw: Security hole: Digital Signing + Downloadable fonts

>Solution would be to sign the aggregate of all the resources recursively
>referenced. Whether this should be the default behaviour, I would say yes
>(as to "display" them you have them all in memory anyway).

We are allowing several resources within to be included one signature. Ho=
wever,
the user, or better the signing application, needs to be fully aware which 
resources are to be included in that list, such as the font in your example.

What you consider the default behaviour is clearly application-dependent.
Our view of a signature is not limited to ordering etc.

Peter

Peter Lipp, IAIK, University of Technology, Graz
Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications
Klosterwiesgasse 32/I, A-8010 Graz, +43 316 873 5513
________________________________________________________________________
Was n=FCtzt die beste Erziehung, die Kinder machen uns ja doch alles nach.

Date: Thu, 05 Dec 1996 15:34:11
From: plipp <[email-masked]>
To: Bob Briscoe <[email-masked]>, [email-masked], [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Antw: Security hole: Digital Signing + Downloadable fonts

>Solution would be to sign the aggregate of all the resources recursively
>referenced. Whether this should be the default behaviour, I would say yes
>(as to "display" them you have them all in memory anyway).

We are allowing several resources within to be included one signature. Ho=
wever,
the user, or better the signing application, needs to be fully aware which 
resources are to be included in that list, such as the font in your example.

What you consider the default behaviour is clearly application-dependent.
Our view of a signature is not limited to ordering etc.

Peter

Peter Lipp, IAIK, University of Technology, Graz
Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications
Klosterwiesgasse 32/I, A-8010 Graz, +43 316 873 5513
________________________________________________________________________
Was n=FCtzt die beste Erziehung, die Kinder machen uns ja doch alles nach.

Date: Thu, 05 Dec 1996 11:57:31 +0000
To: [email-masked], [email-masked]
From: Bob Briscoe <[email-masked]>
Subject: Security hole: Digital Signing + Downloadable fonts
Cc: [email-masked]

Digital Signature Working Group,

I'm not subscribed to either of the lists I have posted this to, so please
CC: any replies to me explicitly.

Should this be posted anywhere else too?

It occurred to me (at the recent W3C Internationalisation symposium) that a
digital signature signs the characters in a message, however, the user
believes they are signing what they see, which is viewed through the glyphs
with which the font represents the characters.

Downloadable fonts have been added to the Web infrastructure, particularly
to support internationalisation. Indeed it is very common and now enabled
for, say an E. Asian document to specify downloading a sub-set of a Latin
font to display a Latin fragment (e.g. a quote).

Same technique could be used to specify that a message of any charset
should download a font for the numeric digits with, say, all the digits
mapped to glyphs looking like either <SPACE> 0, 1, 2 or 3 .

You sign an order that appears to be for UKP  112.30, but you have actually
signed a message that commits you to pay UKP96324.75

In practice you might successfully argue that because the document you
signed included a downloadable font, your signature is worthless. However,
where downloadable fonts are necessary this makes any signing worthless.

Same principle applies to any linked in resource "within" a signed message
(e.g. picture of item ordered which is what you would expect to get under
the Trades Description Act or your equivalent national law).

Solution would be to sign the aggregate of all the resources recursively
referenced. Whether this should be the default behaviour, I would say yes
(as to "display" them you have them all in memory anyway).

Bob
____________________________________________________________________________
Bob Briscoe         http://www.labs.bt.com/people/briscorj/index.htm

Date: Wed, 04 Dec 1996 11:37:36 -0800
From: Fred Ou <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked], [email-masked]
Subject: Certificate and CRL chains

   Does anyone know where I can find chains of certificates and CRLs
for certificate validation testing ?

Thanks

-Fred

From: Carlisle Adams <[email-masked]>
To: "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>
Subject: New PKIX-3 Draft (again)...
Date: Wed, 4 Dec 1996 12:48:29 -0500
Encoding: 17 TEXT, 2586 UUENCODE

Hi,

I'm sending the postscript file (the PKIX-3 Appendix B) again, this time
from a different machine with a different mail package.  If any of you
have trouble printing the attachment in the previous message, try this
one (sometimes different mail packages attach things differently or
encode them differently once they're attached, etc.).

Carlisle.

--------------------------------------
Carlisle Adams
Nortel Secure Networks
[email-masked]
---------------------------------------

Date: 04 Dec 1996 12:33 EST 
Sender: "carlisle (c.m.) adams" <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked]
From: "carlisle (c.m.) adams" <[email-masked]>
Subject: New PKIX-3 Draft... 

>
> This is a MIME Encoded message.  If you are reading this text,
> then your mail reader does not support the MIME (Multipurpose
> Internet Mail Extensions) standard.  To take  full advantage of
> the features of this message, you need to upgrade  your mailer to
> a MIME V1.0 compliant package.  Some parts of this  message may
> be in human readable form.
>
> MIME Decoding Utilities
> -----------------------
> To make use of this encoded message, you can decode it using
> a MIME Decoding utility.  The following are some freely available
> MIME decoding utilities:
>
>   UNIX Users
>   -----------
>    Metamail : ftp://ftp.bellcore.com/pub/nsb/mm2.7.tar.Z
>               This is the Metamail source code distribution.
>    Mpack    : ftp://ftp.andrew.cmu.edu/pub/mpack/mpack-1.5-src.tar.Z
>               Source code for all platforms.
>   MACINTOSH Users
>   ---------------
>    Mpack    : ftp://ftp.andrew.cmu.edu/pub/mpack/mpack-1.5-mac.hqx
>               Contains the Macintosh binaries
>   PC Users
>   ---------
>    Metamail : ftp://ftp.bellcore.com/pub/nsb/mm2.7.dos.zip
>               This is the MS-DOS binaries
>
>    Mpack    : ftp://ftp.andrew.cmu.edu/pub/mpack/mpack15d.zip
>               This contains the MS-DOS binaries
> MIME-Aware Mail User Agents
> ---------------------------
> Note that the following Mail User Agents support MIME and hence if
> one of these are used the message will be automatically decoded 
> be in a readable state:
>       Elm Version 2.4 (UNIX)
>           ftp://ftp.uu.net/networking/mail/elm
>       Eudora 1.4.4   (Macintosh, MS-Windows)
>           ftp://ftp.qualcomm.com/quest/eudora/windows/1.4/eudor144.exe
>           ftp://ftp.qualcomm.com/quest/eudora/mac/1.4/eudora144.hqx
>       Pegasus mail    (MS-DOS, MS-Windows, Macintosh)
>           ftp://risc.ua.edu/pub/network/pegasus/*
>       Pine  (UNIX)
>           ftp://ftp.cac.washington.edu/pine/pine.tar.Z
>

--9IsmJdGgzaujGmzW3DIheWY0QW3jGL2K
Content-type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"

Hi,

Some of you may have noticed that a new draft of PKIX Part-III (Certificate
Management Protocols) has been submitted.  The changes from the previous
version are outlined on page 1 of the new draft, so I won't go over them
here.  However, it would be helpful if people attending the San Jose meeting
have a chance to look over the draft by the time of the meeting (that way,
discussion is likely to be more focused and fruitful).

Stephen did a lot of good work on trying to profile a number of the management 
protocols (i.e., say exactly what fields were mandatory and what they should
contain, etc.).  Unfortunately, however, I was unable to get the tables he
sent me into a readable text format so they ended up being excluded from this
draft.  Such tables will certainly be included in the document at some point
but there wasn't enough time to get them in this document AND meet the IETF
deadline for submissions.

What I am doing, therefore, is including a postscript version of the profile
in this message.  Again, it would be helpful if people take a look at these
tables in time for discussion in San Jose.  Since the purpose of the profile
is to specify exactly what every PKIX-3-compliant implementation must support,
we all need to look carefully at this and come to some sort of agreement
(hopefully in San Jose!).  What is included in these tables is our first pass
at such a profile; there is certainly still lots of room for input...

Carlisle.

--9IsmJdGgzaujGmzW3DIheWY0QW3jGL2K
Content-type: application/octet-stream
Content-transfer-encoding: base64

--9IsmJdGgzaujGmzW3DIheWY0QW3jGL2K--

Date: Tue, 3 Dec 1996 14:58:28 -0500
From: Tim Polk <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked]
Subject: NIST PKI Specs
Content-Length: 1875

NIST has just released the "Minimum Interoperability Specifications for
PKI Components (draft Version 1)" for a 90 day review period.  NIST
developed this document with the assistance of ten CRADA partners -
AT&T, BBN, Certicom, Cylink, DynCorp, IRE, Motorols, Nortel, Spyrus,
and Verisign. This specification is intended to provide the basis for
interoperable PKI components (CAs, ORAs, and clients) from different vendors.

This specification addresses certificate generation, renewal, and
revocation. It includes a certificate and CRL profile, and defines
transactions between PKI components for requesting, renewing, revoking,
and retrieving certificates.

Version 1 is focused on interoperability for a large scale PKI that
issues, revokes and manages digital signature public key certificates.
This specification does not preclude support for key management
certificates; there is simply no direct support.  (A sound digital
signature PKI should provide the basis for issuing any kind of
certificate. This specification could be enhanced to address key
managment in a later version.)

The URL for this document is

	http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/welcome.html#mispc

The document is available in Microsoft Word and PostScript.

It is NIST's goal that the MISPC align closely with the PKIX documents.
The functionality of the MISPC is akin to Parts 1 and 3, and shares many
features, but it is not a proper subset at the moment.  Close alignment
of the MISPC and PKIX efforts is our goal. I hope you will get a chance
to download the MISPC and review it.  It could prompt some interesting
discussion in San Jose. 

After the 90 day review period closes (March 2, 1997) we intend to
publish this document as a NIST Special Publication.  Follow-on projects
are planned, including development of a reference implementation and a
suite of conformance tests.

Thanks,

Tim Polk

Date: Tue, 3 Dec 1996 09:33:17 -0800 (PST)
From: David Rudder <[email-masked]>
To: Edward Russell <[email-masked]>
cc: [email-masked], [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Conversion of PEM certificates?

On Tue, 3 Dec 1996, Edward Russell wrote:

> Is it possible to convert PEM formatted certificates from/to PKCS 
> formatted certificates? 

Actually, for the most part, they are the same thing.  PKCS uses the 
Extended Certificates, but they are backwards compatible.

> 
> If you go to http://cms.cost.se/cgi-bin/iceuca you can fetch someone's 
> certificate in PEM 
> format.

Okay, done that.  Then, I clipped out the section under "Originator 
Certificate", base64decoded it, and was left with a valid x509 cert.
I'm clipping a bunch of stuff here because I can answer all your 
questions here.  They are the same certificates.  X509 works well, so 
S/MIME (PKCS-7) saw no reason to change them, above adding a couple 
extensions.  The X509 certs in PKCS-6 is the Extended cert, so according 
the the PKCS spec, the PEM certs are valid.  I'd check out the PEM RFC's 
(1421 through 1424) for how to split up a PEM file, but it's all just 
messing with text.

			-Dave
		   [email-masked]

I got a coffee mug from Cray Research when they moved out.  Now I can 
drink my coffee while doing 63 other, unrelated tasks.

Priority: Normal
To: [email-masked], [email-masked]
From: Edward Russell <[email-masked]>
Sender: Edward Russell <[email-masked]>
Subject: Conversion of PEM certificates?
Date: Tue, 03 Dec 1996 09:29:23 -0500

Is it possible to convert PEM formatted certificates from/to PKCS formatted certificates?

If you go to http://cms.cost.se/cgi-bin/iceuca you can fetch someone's certificate in PEM
format.

If you go to http://cms.cost.se/cgi-bin/icepca?-c you can fetch a CA's CRL in PEM format.

These sites are part of the ICE-TEL project in europe.  If I would like my product to interoperate
with these certificates, I would need to import and export that format.

If I converted them and imported them to PKCS format, could I then do authentication of a remote user 
if I had imported his cert and CA chain and trusted his root.

Or am I off-base and these PEM certs are completely incompatible with the type of certs from
Verisign, etc.

Edward Russell
[email-masked]

To: "[email-masked]'"@japannet.or.jp, <[email-masked]>
From: Yoshito <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 03 Dec 1996 14:03:25 +0900

subscribe

From: "Brick, David" <[email-masked]>
To: "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>
Subject: subscribe
Date: Mon, 2 Dec 1996 15:37:48 -0500
Encoding: 1 TEXT

subscribe

Sender: [email-masked]
Date: Mon, 02 Dec 1996 14:15:50 +0100
From: Petra Gloeckner <[email-masked]>
Organization: GMD-TKT.SIT
To: [email-masked]
CC: Ingmar Camphausen <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Displaying an X.509 certificate

Ingmar Camphausen wrote:
>=20
> Hallo,
>=20
> on Mon, 02 Dec 1996, Petra Gloeckner <[email-masked]> wrote:
>=20
> > We have just released our new version SECUDE-5.0 beta for several
> > plattforms ! Have a look at
> >
> > http://www/secude
>          ~~~~~~~~~~
>=20
> Das ist etwas knapp geraten, oder? ;-)
>=20
> Gru=DF,
>         Ingmar
>=20

I'm sorry. That was the address I'm using internally. The correct address=
 is:

		http://www.darmstadt.gmd.de/secude

Regards, Petra

Sender: [email-masked]
Date: Mon, 02 Dec 1996 10:32:51 +0100
From: Petra Gloeckner <[email-masked]>
Organization: GMD-TKT.SIT
To: [email-masked]
CC: [email-masked], [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Displaying an X.509 certificate

[email-masked] wrote:
> 
> >Does anyone know where I can find a program that, given an X.509 certificate,
> >will display its fields and their values in some human-readable form?
> 

We have just released our new version SECUDE-5.0 beta for several plattforms !
Have a look at
	
		http://www/secude

to register and download the security toolkit. It also contains a SECUDE command 
shell which provides the functionality for example to dump or show ASN.1 code.
		
Best regards,
Petra Gloeckner

From: Kurt Stammberger <[email-masked]>
To: "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>
To: "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>
To: "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "'David M. Balenson'" <[email-masked]>
Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: 1997 RSA Data Security Conference
Date: Sun, 1 Dec 1996 18:38:08 -0800

28-31 January, 1997
NOB HILL, SAN FRANCISCO

1997 marks RSA's fifteenth anniversary and our sixth annual conference.
Two days of general sessions and two days of classes will provide over
100 different  classes to choose from, with separate tracks for
mathematicians and cryptographers, developers, industry analysts and
business people.

We invite you to join us.  Find out more information, view the class
syllabi and register online at http://www.rsa.com

Thanks

Kurt Stammberger
RSADSI
>