Subject: Re: Revoking bogus certificates

From: [email-masked] (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2001 11:12:50 (NZST)

Rich Salz <[email-masked]> writes:

>If Peter is correct about CMP -- the EE can reject the cert after the CA
>signs it -- then I do not see we CANNOT have "neverValid."

From RFC 2510:

2.2.2.2 Basic authenticated scheme

[...]

      End entity                                          RA/CA
      ==========                                      =============
           out-of-band distribution of Initial Authentication
           Key (IAK) and reference value (RA/CA -> EE)
      Key generation
      Creation of certification request
      Protect request with IAK
                    -->>--certification request-->>--
                                                     verify request
                                                     process request
                                                     create response
                    --<<--certification response--<<--
      handle response
      create confirmation
                    -->>--confirmation message-->>--
                                                     verify confirmation
 
   (Where verification of the confirmation message fails, the RA/CA MUST
   revoke the newly issued certificate if it has been published or
   otherwise made available.)

(The initial request type can vary, but the remainder of the messages are
the same for other request types.  The cert.response contains the new
certificate.  As soon as that message leaves the CA, it's necessary to revoke
the cert if a positive confirmation isn't received, and the only valid 
revocation reason for this is "neverValid").

Peter.

---

From: Rich Salz <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2001 21:52:58 -0400

> revocation reason for this is "neverValid").

Well then, I strongly agree with you.
	/r$