Subject: [pkix] I-D Action:draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3161-update-07.txt

From: [email-masked]
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2009 04:45:01 -0700 (PDT)

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF.

	Title           : ESSCertIDv2 update for RFC 3161
	Author(s)       : S. Santesson, N. Pope
	Filename        : draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3161-update-07.txt
	Pages           : 8
	Date            : 2009-10-01

This document updates RFC 3161 [RFC3161]. It allows the use of
ESSCertIDv2 defined in RFC 5035 [ESSV2] to specify the hash of a
signer certificate when the hash is calculated with a function other
than SHA-1 [SHA1].

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3161-update-07.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

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Internet-Draft.

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From: "Pope, Nick" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2009 11:22:49 +0100

I agree with Stefan.  We have worked on polishing this text for some time
now and without having a multi-page discussion on the threats this gives the
reader a basic understanding of the security issues.

Nick

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of
Stefan Santesson
Sent: 05 October 2009 23:05
To: [email-masked]; pkix
Subject: Re: [pkix] I-D Action:draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3161-update-07.txt

Denis,

On 09-10-05 12:05 PM, "Denis Pinkas" <[email-masked]> wrote:

Thanks to your efforts for tryinvgto solve the issue but the new proposed
text is still incorrect.
 
It states: " Upgrading the hash function through ESSCertIDv2 addressess a
theoretical scenario 
   involving a trusted malicious CA issuing ...

No, this statement is correct.

ESSCertID was introduced as a mechanism to bind the signer certificate to
the signature, but it was not designed to protect against replacement of
certificates with colliding hashes.
This is however exactly the motivation for hash algorithm agility introduced
by ESSCertIDv2

I can't accept your text of the following main reasons:

1.	It introduce requirement text that either is a copy of something
that should be placed in the main document or should not be there at all. 
2.	It does not inform the reader that the threat of trusted malicious
CAs in general is out of scope. 
3.	It introduces text that is likely to confuse a reader rather than
bringing clarity (As Peter pointed out).

As such I prefer the original text.

/Stefan 

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