Subject: Consensus Calls on Recent Transport/TLS Issues

From: Mark Nottingham <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 15:33:43 +1000

The following issues have proposals for resolution, and discussion so far seems to support consensus to accept them. If you object, please do so on the issue or in response to this message (changing the Subject appropriately!).

* #2732 - Reusing SRTs  ( PR#2733)
* #2580 - Is path validation a SHOULD or a MUST?  (PR#2637)
* #2689 - Checking duplicate TPs is onerous   (PR#2691)
* #2192 - Optimistic ACK in early handshake  (close with no action)
* #2471 - Stateless Reset lacks Normative Text  (PR#2574)
* #2581 - Bring back AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8  (PR#2743)
* #2552 - Saving a round-trip time in the initial handshakes with retry  (close with no action; mark issue as quicv2)
* #2394 - Spoofed retry token attack on IP authentication  (close with no action)
* #2308 - Handling of coalesced packets with decryption errors creates DoS opportunity  (PR#2747)
* #2267 - Loss of only two packets can lead to an unrecoverable situation  (PR#2673)
* #2441 - Peers that only terminate a single connection on an IP/port cannot migrate with 0-byte CIDs  (close with no action; mark issue as quicv2)
* #2214 - Simultaneous key update can lead to deadlock  (PR#2673)
* #2458 - Client MUST use 1-RTT packets if it reads 1-RTT packets  (PR#2461)
* #2672 - Transport error codes would be smaller and more consistent as a varint  (PR#2680)
* #2582 - Attacks Against Address Migration  (PR#2637)
* #2579 - Path validation should be done even for what looks like NAT rebinding  (PR#2637)
* #2360 - 0-RTT flow control limits can't be increased  (PR#2461)

Absent any pushback, we'll declare consensus at the end of the week.

Cheers,

--
Mark Nottingham   https://www.mnot.net/