Subject: [radext] FYI: New Version Notification for draft-perez-radext-radius-fragmentation-06.txt

From: Alejandro Perez Mendez <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 02 Jul 2013 08:56:28 +0200

Hello,

we have updated our RADIUS fragmentation draft. This new version 
addresses comments from Bernard, as well as it re-introduces the 
possibility to send large amounts of authorization data before 
authentication.

Regards,
Alejandro

-------- Mensaje original --------
Asunto: 	New Version Notification for 
draft-perez-radext-radius-fragmentation-06.txt
Fecha: 	Mon, 01 Jul 2013 23:47:11 -0700
De: 	[email-masked]
Para: 	Alejandro Perez-Mendez <[email-masked]>, Rafael Lopez <[email-masked]>, 
Fernando Pereniguez-Garcia <[email-masked]>, Rafa Marin-Lopez 
<[email-masked]>, Gabriel Lopez-Millan <[email-masked]>, Diego R. Lopez 
<[email-masked]>, Alan DeKok <[email-masked]>

A new version of I-D, draft-perez-radext-radius-fragmentation-06.txt
has been successfully submitted by Alejandro Perez-Mendez and posted to the
IETF repository.

Filename:	 draft-perez-radext-radius-fragmentation
Revision:	 06
Title:		 Support of fragmentation of RADIUS packets
Creation date:	 2013-07-02
Group:		 Individual Submission
Number of pages: 25
URL:             http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-perez-radext-radius-fragmentation-06.txt
Status:          http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-perez-radext-radius-fragmentation
Htmlized:        http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-perez-radext-radius-fragmentation-06
Diff:            http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-perez-radext-radius-fragmentation-06

Abstract:
    The Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) protocol is
    limited to a total packet size of 4096 octets.  Provisions exist for
    fragmenting large amounts of authentication data across multiple
    packets, via Access-Challenge.  No similar provisions exist for
    fragmenting large amounts of authorization data.  This document
    specifies how existing RADIUS mechanisms can be leveraged to provide
    that functionality.  These mechanisms are largely compatible with
    existing implementations, and are designed to be invisible to
    proxies, and "fail-safe" to legacy clients and servers.

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