Subject: Re: (radius) Comments on Tunnel Draft

From: Ignacio Goyret <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 1999 13:11:41 -0800

At 12:48 PM 12/10/99 -0800, Gopal Dommety wrote:
>So, let us be realistic. People are implementing and using this
>feature. Most of them understand the issues of  hop-by-hop security
>and also understand the alternatives. If it helps have a statement
>stating the risk of using this in an hop-by-hop environment.

I agree whole-heartedly. Add a security risk statement and let the
people decide what their security policies should be.

-Ignacio

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From: Randy Bush <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 1999 13:51:29 -0800

> people decide what their security policies should be.

given the conversation so far, that seems a reasonable solution.

"Note that this uses text passwords sent over the net in the clear.  This is
a well-known security exposure."

randy
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From: "David Mitton" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 1999 09:51:38 -0500

>a well-known security exposure."

Except, this would be totally incorrect.
The draft does not specify that they are "text" nor are they "in-the-clear".

The password content can be anything that fits the field (presumably the 
peers know what they are using)  and the field is encrypted using a 
technique as strong as the main RADIUS password encryption (because it's 
effectively equivalent).

The only security exposure is administrative.
This attribute should only be used with clients that you trust to set up 
tunnel service on your behalf.

         Dave.
---------------------------------------------------------------
David Mitton                                  ESN: 248-4570
Consulting Engineer, Nortel Networks           978-288-4570 Direct
Carrier Packet Solutions, Preside              978-288-3030 FAX
Billerica, MA 01821                     [email-masked]

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From: Randy Bush <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 1999 06:53:34 -0800

> Except, this would be totally incorrect.

apologies.  you are quite correct.

> tunnel service on your behalf.

a much better statement.  but it might explain why a bit.

randy
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From: Randy Bush <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 1999 07:18:38 -0800

> I would be willing to accept such a statement, but I would also like to
> quantify this by stating that the password made available by the RADIUS
> server is likely to be a long-lived password that the LNS is willing to
> share with any LAC that has a valid user.
>
> Of course, if my assumption is incorrect, please do let me know, but this
> is my reading of the draft (in between the lines, of course :).

would someone please propose correct, concise, and short/simple wording so
we can move on?  if we can get past this and get a new draft tomorrow in the
directory on wednesday, i have a good chance to get it past the iesg on
thursday.  there have been no other technical comments that i have seen.

david, you had the best wording so far.  please help.

randy
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