Subject: RP Security BOF....

From: Russ White <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2002 20:26:29 -0500 (EST)

Meeting on Thursday from 1300-1500. Proposed Charter Follows.

Russ

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Routing Protocol Security Requirements (rpsec)

CHAIRS: Russ White ([email-masked])
        Danny McPherson ([email-masked])

Description
-----------

The lack of a common set of security requirements and methods for
routing protocols has resulted in a wide variety of security
mechanisms for individual routing protocols.  Ongoing work on
requirements for the next generation routing system and future work on
the actual mechanisms for it will require well documented routing
security requirements.

The products of this working group will be used by routing protcool
designers to ensure adequate coverage of security in the future,
including well known and possible threats. It is not the goal of this
working group to revisit current routing protocol security mechanisms.

The goal of this BOF is to discuss creation and charter of a WG in the
routing area that would be charged with the following tasks:

 - Document threat models for routing protocols
 - Document security requirements for routing protocols

Proposed WG milestones:

  1. Jul 2002: Submit initial I-D (or set of I-Ds) which details
     the threats to routing protocols.

  2. Oct 2002: Submit initial I-D (or set of I-Ds) which outlines
     security requirements for routing protocols.

  3. Dec 2002: Submit I-Ds documenting threats to routing protocols
     for publication as Informational RFC.

  4. Mar 2003: Submit the I-D documenting security requirements to
     routing protocols for publication as Informational RFC.

  5. Mar 2003: Evaluate progress, recharter with new goals (see possible
     future work below) or shutdown.

BOF Agenda
----------

 1. Agenda bashing
 2. Overview of security issues in routing protocols
 3. Overview of the current status of routing protocol security work
 4. Presentation on proposed WG charter and milestones
 5. Open mike (discussion, Q&As)

References
----------

 1. Flaws in packet's authentication of OSPFv2, Jerome Etienne
    http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-etienne-ospfv2-auth-flaws-00.txt
 2. Flaws in RIPv2 packet's authentication, Jerome Etienne
    http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-etienne-ripv2-auth-flaws-00.txt
 3. ,BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis, S. Murphy
    http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-murphy-bgp-vuln-00.txt
 4. BGP Security Protections, S. Murphy
    http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-murphy-bgp-protect-00.txt
 5. OSPF with digital signature against an insider, Jerome Etienne
    http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-etienne-rfc2154-flaws-00.txt
 6. Secure BGP (S-BGP)
    http://www.net-tech.bbn.com/sbgp/draft-clynn-s-bgp-protocol-00.txt
 7. OSPF Version 2 (RFC2328)
    http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2328.txt
 8. RIP-2 MD5 Authentication (RFC2082)
    http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2082.txt
 9. IS-IS Cryptographic Authentication
    http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-isis-hmac-03.txt
 10. Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 Signature Option
     http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2385.txt
     http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-idr-rfc2385bis-00.txt

Possible Future Work
--------------------

 - Document the feasibility of various types of security mechinisms
   within routing protocols
 - Document requirements for new security mechanisms
 - Document security requirements for the next generation routing
   system