Subject: RE: [RPSEC] Draft Status....

From: "Michel Py" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 20:26:50 -0700

Bill / Russ / Alex,

>>> Also - there are lots of different ways to characterize
>>> protocols:
>>> - by scope (IGP vs EGP)
>>> - by algorithm (link state vs distance vector)
>>> - by underlying layer (link layer (well, maybe not),
>>>   network, transport)

>> No, I think we need to stay away from that one.

> Why? We have IS-IS, OSPF, and BGP that use link layer, IP,
> and TCP as their transport. Each type of transport has its
> own set of vulnerabilities.

I have a very dumb question, as someone that just jumped in:
As an example, regarding BGP using TCP, and WRT the rpsec charter:

> Document threat models for routing systems.

My reading is that it is within scope to describe BGP vulnerabilities
induced by the use of TCP.

> Document security requirements for routing systems.

However, here it is not clear to me if it is in|out of scope to document
security requirements for TCP, or if the scope is limited to security
requirements for BGP (I can share some insight WRT the same issue we
(ipv6mh) are dealing with if you wish).

Michel.

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From: "Paul Traina" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 20:58:46 -0700

Fine, but then you should document the practices of BGP/TCP+MD5 checksums
and BGP/TCP/IPSEC.

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From: Alex Zinin <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2002 00:38:07 -0700

Michel,

> As an example, regarding BGP using TCP, and WRT the rpsec charter:

Not dumb at all, in fact...

> induced by the use of TCP.

Since routing protocols inherit vulnerabilities of the transport
service they use, we definitely do not want to just say "hey,
it's not our problem" (this is in fact what people did when said
"just use ipsec" and we're trying to solve this now). On the other
hand, we're a RTG area WG, and should not deep into every possible
bit here, but should rather be concerned on how transport level
vulnerabilities map to the routing protocols, i.e., if I have 5
possible ways to hijack a TCP session and 5 ways to replay a segment,
ideally the model would tell me this can happen and refer the reader
to a document describing those details.

> requirements for BGP

Security requirements for a routing protocol will eventually
map to requirements for securing the transport subsystem, which
may mean mechanisms embedded into the protocol itself or into
the transport, so while the requirements for TCP as a specific
transport instance are a potential outcome of the discussion on
securing routing, they are not on the list of deliverables that
the WG should explicitly concentrate on.

> (I can share some insight WRT the same issue we

Please do.

Thanks.
Alex