Subject: RE: [RPSEC] Minutes and Presentations from Paris are now Posted...

From: "Vishwas Manral" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2005 22:46:38 -0700

Hi,

As I got in late for the meeting I could not take the questions myself.
I had a few doubts. 

In the sentence: -
 "Steve Kent: MD5 and HMAC constructs in current use not planned or
 valid. Current attacks not a problem for HMAC."

I think it is "MD5 and SHA-1" and not "MD5 and HMAC" is that right?

I agree with Richard's comment that we do not currently talk about the
use of confidentiality, we could do that.

Regarding Sandy's and Acee's comment, I think we need to decide what
issues need we need to solve and which ones we do not need to solve. The
resolution of issues will be part of another document. This is only an
issues document.

Thanks,
Vishwas
-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf
Of Russ White
Sent: Saturday, August 06, 2005 8:11 PM
To: [email-masked]
Subject: [RPSEC] Minutes and Presentations from Paris are now Posted...

Here:

http://www.rpsec.org

Comments welcome.

Russ

- -- 
[email-masked] CCIE <>< Grace Alone

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From: Stephen Kent <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2005 16:11:59 -0400

The minutes should say something along the lines of:

Efficient BGP security ...

Steve Kent: S-BGP does not call for issuing CRL or using OCSP to deal 
with revocation for RAs. RAs are assumed to have limited lifetimes, 
e.g., 1 day, and thus need not be revoked explicitly.

Issues with RP Security Mechanisms ...

Steve Kent: The keyed MD5 and HMAC constructs in current use are not 
vulnerable to the sort of hash function attacks that Russ cited in 
his presentation. These attacks allow someone to construct distinct 
bit strings that yield the same hash value, but do not allow someone 
to create a distinct bit string that maps to a has value chosen by 
someone else, much less a hash value that is chosen by someone else 
and that is a function of a secret key.