Subject: [Rserpool] AD comments on draft-ietf-rserpool-threats-08

From: Magnus Westerlund <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2007 18:38:01 +0200

Hi,

A couple of comments on the threats text.

1. I am missing clear text on what the benefit would be for different
attacks. Lets take a look at 2.1 to 2.5 which all deals with adding or
removing PE to the ENRP database. The text is not fortcomming what
benefit the attacker would have in succeeding with it. For example 2.3
is clearly desirable from two persepctives:
a. DDoS, by adding a PE that is a target for DDoS attack for some
popular high volume service the attacker can register a PE that a lot of
PUs will try to connect to.
b. Man in the middle or masqurade attack on the service provided by the
real PEs. If a malicious user adds itself as a PE and handles the
request he can learn a lot of service data.

This was just an example, for most threats the effect should be expanded
to show what this can be used for and why it is a really bad idea to do
this without security.

2. This a bit more nit: Can you please provide some proper indentation
of the text. It is very hard to read and it is hard to find the section
headings and where each new property:value paragraph starts.

Cheers

Magnus Westerlund

IETF Transport Area Director & TSVWG Chair
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S-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden | mailto: [email-masked]
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From: <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2007 10:37:17 -0500

Attacks 2.1 to 2.5 are all potential denial of service attacks.  Instead
of pounding a PE server with a stream of bits to deny service, what one
could do instead is corrupt the ENRP database.  Then when a client
queries ENRP server for a pool address, ENRP potentially serves up the
IP address of a non-existant server or a server that the hacker has set
up.  The gain for the attacker is either denial of service or directing
the user to a server controlled by them.  Any attempt to intentionally
corrupt the ENRP database was considered a threat and potential for
attack by the security design team.

I will add text to the draft which says this.

The formatting will also be updated. 

-- Maureen
Maureen Stillman
Nokia Enterprise Solutions
Mobile: (607)229-3358

-----Original Message-----
From: ext Magnus Westerlund [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: Tuesday, October 16, 2007 12:38 PM
To: [email-masked]
Subject: [Rserpool] AD comments on draft-ietf-rserpool-threats-08

Hi,

Cheers

Magnus Westerlund