Subject: Re: [Seamoby] Security Requirments for CAR Discovery

From: "Hemant Chaskar" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2002 20:41:05

Hi James:

Some comments inline.

>From: "James Kempf" <[email-masked]>
>To: <[email-masked]>
>Subject: [Seamoby] Security Requirments for CAR Discovery
>Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2002 11:52:19 -0800
>
>The current requirements draft is a little thin on security. Here's a
>proposal:
>
>     The Seamoby CAR discovery solution MUST provide proper security.
>     Security on CAR information and capabilities distribution MUST
>conform
>     and interoperate with existing IETF security policies and protocols

[HC] I agree with this part, though I think that the first sentence is 
superfluous. Also, do we have an official reference on such IETF security 
policies and protocols? If we do, we can quote it too. Furhter, will the 
currentness of that referece change over time?

>on
>     the security of routing information distribution.

I do not agree with this part. What is the relation between routing and CAR 
requirements? The first part of your requirement covers all the IETF 
security policies and protocols, and that should be enough in my opinion.

Security on
>communication
>     of MN preferences to ARs MUST conform and interoperate with existing
>     IETF security and AAA policies and protocols for host security,
>where
>     applicable.

I agree with this again.

>
>Comments?
>
>             jak
>
>
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From: "James Kempf" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2002 13:14:14 -0800

> currentness of that referece change over time?

We should have proper references, of course. And such references do
change, we can only work with what we have right now.

> security policies and protocols, and that should be enough in my
opinion.

CAR discovery involves sending information about the reachability and
capabilities of one router to another, possibly via a host. Routing
information distribution involves sending information about the
reachability and capabilities of one router to another, usually not via
a host. The only thing the two don't have in common is that one could
possibly use a host while the other doesn't. In either case, the routing
fabric has to be able to trust the information it gets. Thus, the
security on the information distribution needs to be the same. Note that
this is *not* to say that, a priori, CAR discovery and routing
information distribution should be solved by the same protocol, just
that they involve the same kind of security problem.

For an example of the problems it might cause if security on CAR
discovery were any less than that on routing information distribution,
consider security on MIP binding updates. The newly decided upon
protocol, return routability, depends critically upon the security of
the routing fabric. If the security on CAR discovery causes the security
of the routing fabric to be compromised, then MIP RR security on BU
updates is compromised.

            jak

---

From: "James Kempf" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2002 13:14:14 -0800

jak