Subject: [Sip] RLS and identity

From: Aki Niemi <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2004 16:33:32 -0500

Hi,

Just a minor note on this: if/when mandating the support for asserted 
identity in the event-list draft, please remember to say that p-asserted 
identities also count (to some extent).

Cheers,
Aki

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From: Adam Roach <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2004 16:34:42 -0600

Aki Niemi wrote:

> identity in the event-list draft, please remember to say that 
> p-asserted identities also count (to some extent).

Based on Rohan's suggestion, the text will effectively say:

 - Jon's Identity draft will be mandatory to implement, optional to use.

 - Other mechanisms that have properties such that they can adequately
   convey the identity of the subscriber and the permission of the RLS
   to subscribe on the user's behalf can also be used.

If you think that your architecture, in combination with 
P-Asserted-Identity, satisfies the second bullet, then you're probably 
fine. However, I think it is a really bad idea to specifically include 
any mention of P-Asserted-Identity in the draft.

/a

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From: Adam Roach <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2004 21:17:32 -0600

>   to subscribe on the user's behalf can also be used.

As a clarification, I have received specific guidance from the area 
directors that the draft cannot contain anything about such alternate 
mechanisms, even if they are not specifically mentioned by name. The use 
of e.g. P-Asserted-Identity will need to be a modification that 3GPP 
specifically calls out relative to the draft.

Of course, since the identity work is basically done and works so much 
better than P-Asserted-Identity, there could be a very valid argument 
made that 3GPP R6 should abandon the inherently insecure 
P-Asserted-Identity mechanism in favor of the cryptographically secure 
SIP Identity mechanism.

/a