Subject: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-02.txt

From: Yaron Sheffer <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2016 19:21:37 +0530

Hi everyone,

This draft extends TLS 1.3 to provide pinning of the TLS server using a
stateless ticket. This is similar to public-key pinning but not quite,
and our goal was to overcome the deployment issues that prevent
widespread deployment of HPKP.

Version -02 of the draft incorporates learnings from my proof-of-concept
implementation at https://github.com/yaronf/mint. Thanks to the authors
on the Mint TLS 1.3 implementation from which my code was forked.

Best,
	Yaron

-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: New Version Notification for
draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-02.txt
Date: Fri, 08 Jul 2016 06:42:25 -0700
From: [email-masked]
To: Yaron Sheffer <[email-masked]>

A new version of I-D, draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-02.txt
has been successfully submitted by Yaron Sheffer and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket
Revision:	02
Title:		TLS Server Identity Pinning with Tickets
Document date:	2016-07-08
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		18
URL:
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-02.txt
Status:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket/
Htmlized:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-02
Diff:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-02

Abstract:
    Fake public-key certificates are an ongoing problem for users of TLS.
    Several solutions have been proposed, but none is currently in wide
    use.  This document proposes to extend TLS with opaque tickets,
    similar to those being used for TLS session resumption, as a way to
    pin the server's identity.  That is, to ensure the client that it is
    connecting to the right server even in the presence of corrupt
    certificate authorities and fake certificates.  The main advantage of
    this solution is that no manual management actions are required.

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