Subject: [Drip] DET PRrivacy

From: Robert Moskowitz <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 2021 16:32:26 -0400

I have been working on text for DET Privacy.  This is NOT an easily 
achieved goal.  Please review and comment here about the proposed text 
for ver -10:

8.  DET Privacy

    DETs are broadcast in the clear and will be collected and collated
    with other public information about the UAS.  This will include
    location and times of operations for a DET.  A DET can be for the
    life of a UA if there is no concern about UA activity harvesting.  It
    is not adequate to simply change the DET for a UA per operation to
    defeat historically tracking a UA's activity.

    The UAS Remote ID (of all types) only appear in the Remote ID Basic
    Message; the wireless MAC address is used to aggregate Remote ID
    messages to a UA for meeting the FAA rules [FAA_RID] (as well as
    rules from other CAAs).  As such, the MAC address, like the UAS RID,
    SHOULD be unchanging for the duration of an operation.  As the DET is
    changed, so too SHOULD the MAC address change to break any historical
    tracking at the Remote ID message level.

    However, any changes to the UA MAC may have impacts to C2 setup and
    use.  A constant GCS MAC may well defeat any privacy gains in UA MAC
    and RID changes.  Further, UA/GCS binding is complicated with
    changing MAC addresses; historically UAS design assumed these to be
    "forever" and made setup a one-time process.  Additionally, if IP is
    used for C2, a changing MAC may mean a changing IP address to further
    impact the UAS bindings.  Finally an encryption wrapper's (such as
    ESP [RFC4303]) identifier would need to change per operation to
    insure operation tracking separation.

    Creating and maintaining UAS operational privacy is a multifaceted
    problem.  Many communication pieces need to be considered to truly
    create a separation between US operations.  Simply changing the UAS
    RID only starts the changes that need to be implemented.

---

From: Michael Richardson <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 2021 20:21:56 -0400

>    defeat historically tracking a UA's activity.

This sentence confused me.

I think that maybe it needs a new paragraph, or should go with the next paragraph?

I think that maybe it would work better if one focused on the case of privacy
for a single operation (there isn't any: if you saw UAS XYZ at 9am, and you
see it again at 10am, and it's the same operation, then you can identify it
as such).

Then how to deal with unlinking operations.

--
Michael Richardson <[email-masked]>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide