Subject: [trill] Stephen Farrell's No Objection on draft-ietf-trill-irb-13: (with COMMENT)

From: "Stephen Farrell" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2016 05:04:46 -0700

Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-trill-irb-13: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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- section 5: The tenant ID is sometimes described as "globally
unique" and sometimes (in 5.2) as "throughout the campus." The
latter seems likely correct to me. (As an aside, is this document
the first to introduce that concept to TRILL?)

- section 8: If IS-IS security is not actually used, (is that the
current deployment reality btw?) and if I can guess a tenant ID then
what new mischief can happen? If there is some, then perhaps you
ought recommend that tenant ID's be randomly selected within the
campus? (I see you use "1" in the example, which is pretty easy to
guess:-) I think one could argue that that (and maybe more) ought be
covered in section 8, if the current deployment reality is that no
crypto is actually used to protect most IS-IS traffic. Is it?

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From: Donald Eastlake <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2016 13:44:12 -0400

Hi Stephen,

Thanks for the comments. See below.

On Wed, Jun 29, 2016 at 8:04 AM, Stephen Farrell
<[email-masked]> wrote:
> ...

Yes, it should be unique within the TRILL campus.

> crypto is actually used to protect most IS-IS traffic. Is it?

My impression is that IS-IS security is not used in a majority of
cases. The importance of this depends on a lot of factors such as how
tightly managed the routing area is, the security of the links between
routers, etc.

Without link (RBridge-to-adjacent-RBridge) security or edge-to-edge
(ingress-RBridge-to-egress-RBridge), obfuscating Tenant IDs provides
only limited protection against off path attackers but I agree it
would be reasonable to mention it.

Thanks,
Donald
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 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd   +1-508-333-2270 (cell)
 155 Beaver Street, Milford, MA 01757 USA
 [email-masked]