Subject: Comments on draft-ietf-v6ops-tunnel-security-concerns-00.txt

From: Gabi Nakibly <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2008 06:27:04 -0700 (PDT)

Hello,
I have some general comments concerning draft-ietf-v6ops-tunnel-security-concerns-00.txt.
 
1) In the Introduction the draft mentions tunnels that go through NATs and it seems that it is focused solely on such tunnels. However, there are some security vulnerabilities discussed throughout the draft (specifically in sections 2 and 3) that relate to tunnels in general. I think the draft should be positioned to address tunnels in general.
2) What is the relation of this draft to RFC4942 ("IPv6 transition security considerations")? Will it update this RFC? There is some considerable overlap between section 3 of the RFC and the draft. The draft elaborates on issues which are already mentioned in section 3 of the RFC and there are some points mentioned in the RFC which are not raised in the draft. For example, using tunnels to make sure that the Hop Limit = 255. Of course, there some issues in the draft which are not mentioned in the RFC.
3) The major recommendation of the draft is in 3.1.3: "Tunneling over UDP or TCP (including HTTP) to reach the Internet is  not recommended as a solution for managed networks.". Why is this recommendation relevant only to managed networks? It seems that in unmanaged environments (home or SOHO) the use of such tunnels will have similar effects.
4) How the above recommendation settles with the softwire group's recommendation to use LT2P tunnels in the hub and spoke scenario (http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-softwire-hs-framework-l2tpv2-09.txt)?
 
Gabi